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I. INTRODUCTION
The key goal of communications policy is to promote the welfare of
our citizens, primarily through productivity gains. These productivity gains
will increase business productivity and increase the benefits to consumers
through access to better products and services and through lower prices.
Much of the gains will come from decreases in prices of transmission and
increases in the amount of information that can be cheaply and rapidly
moved from place to place. These efficiency goals can be combined with
other social and political goals such as universal access and make
achievement of such goals much less costly.
The best means to achieve these goals of communications policy is to
maximize the operations of markets. We prefer markets, as opposed to
state-owned or state-managed communications businesses, because markets
collect and distribute information about what sellers are willing to offer and
buyers are willing to purchase in many ways better than the state. However,
markets in communications industries may not produce optimal results for
at least two principal reasons that may also apply to other industries. First,
competition-winning firms tend to obtain market power and may have
incentives and ability to deter new entry. In addition, winning firms have
different incentives than new entrants that may affect the introduction of
new products and services. Second, regulators seeking to distribute
communications services to everyone in the nation, for very laudable social
and economic reasons, have tended to interfere in ways that diminish the
responsiveness of the market as well as the magnitude and speed of the
introduction of new goods and services.
The United States currently has a communications policy in place that
does not state clearly its own goals, yet applies regulations that greatly
affect outcomes. Not surprisingly, the result appears to be deficient in both
economic and social benefits. A better communications policy would
substitute markets for regulation as a way to determine both what is sold
and what price is paid while continuing to be conscious of specific market-
power concerns and obtaining any desired social benefits in the most
efficient manner possible. Such a wise policy must assure that new
entrants, armed with a different sense of what can be sold and who might
be persuaded to buy, should be able to challenge even the largest
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incumbents. An attribute of this policy would be that all could enjoy the
social and economic benefits of ubiquitous and all-inclusive access to the
network (i.e., allowing everyone the chance to communicate with everyone
else all the time) without detracting materially from the price-setting and
competitive mechanisms of markets or imposing an unnecessary cost
burden on the overall economy.
One of the metrics for judging communications policy is whether the
creation of new networks, goods, services, and markets is keeping pace
with rapid technological advances. An important example of success in this
respect is the proliferation of wireless communications. Apparently, the
absence of retail price regulations, presence of cheap interconnection
mandated by government, and existence of multiple providers have all led
to high growth, high usage, high penetration, and high rate of technological
change for wireless services.' This is especially true since the additional
competition from the introduction of Personal Communications Services
("PCS") services and the development of Nextel's service around the same
time increased the number of competitors in each geographic area from two
to five or more.2 Communications policy should aspire to replicate this
success story for wireline and communications services.
By contrast, broadband in the United States may be viewed by some
as a frustrating disappointment both from the perspective of service
providers and users of broadband networks. For reasons that trouble, and to
a degree mystify many, in Japan and Korea, among other countries,
broadband providers offer customers much higher bandwidth (i.e., speed)
at much lower prices than in the United States and achieve much greater
penetration rates.3 This is true even in densely populated areas of the
United States that have similar demographic characteristics as large cities
in the other countries.
Follow-on effects from higher broadband penetration include the
development of new products and services. Social benefits to areas such as
1. See CTIA, CTIA SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS SURVEY (2005), http://files.cita.org/pdf/
CTIAMidYear2005Survey.pdf.
2. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilitation Act
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming 2006), para. 2
(2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-173AI.pdf (stating that
97% of the American population lives in an area with 3 or more wireless operators and that
the market is behaving competitively).
3. See Thomas Bleha, Down to the Wire, Foreign Aff., May/June 2005, at 111, 112
(stating that Japan has much faster broadband at cheap rates and that South Korea has the
world's highest percentage of individuals who use broadband.). It is unclear at this point in
time whether the rapid provision of high-speed access in these other countries is financially
remunerative for the firms deploying the services.
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education and health care may also become quite significant. Meanwhile,
in the United States, broadband penetration rates are growing substantially,
but nevertheless are still at levels below those in Japan and Korea.4
Moreover, it is not certain that broadband providers will soon offer the
much higher speed services of 8 to 40 megabits per second per household
that are evidently being offered in Seoul, Tokyo, and other Asian cities.5 A
wise communications policy would assess the state of American broadband
provisions, define goals, and lay out sensible means to achieve the desired
outcomes.
Communications in the modem world often involve sending
information across national boundaries, yet networks by definition always
have a local, physical manifestation and local, social, and economic impact.
It should follow that sensible policy creates both new jobs and productive
work because employees can use innovative techniques to build, maintain,
and utilize networks. So, another test of the wisdom of policy should be
whether productive new jobs are created as a result of that policy. At the
same time, it must be admitted that less productive, old jobs may be
replaced and the sheer number of jobs in the business of providing service
may decline as new technologies permit any employee to do more work
than was possible in previous years.
As set forth in more detail below, communications policy should
extend the operation of market forces more fully to wireline and broadband
communications markets. It would assure that new firms with new
technologies can easily enter and provide service. And, it would obtain
universal participation in communications markets by techniques that do
not undercut either of these two goals. To these ends, Congress and the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in 2006, as well as every
state regulatory commission, must change many existing laws and
regulations. Although the prescriptions herein are legitimately subject to
debate, they are not fundamentally ideological in their content. Therefore, it
is reasonable to ask that the Bush administration and Congress agree to
create a bipartisan and independent commission to suggest a complete
overhaul of the law and policy for communications, and to do so as soon as
possible. This Article is aimed at starting the sort of discussion such a
commission would pursue. While, as the architect Mies van der Rohe
4. Id.
5. See id. at 114; see also Reed E. Hundt, Reforming Telecom Policy for the Big
Broadband Era: Why Is Government Subsidizing the Old Networks When "Big Broadband"
Convergence is Inevitable and Optimal, 14 New Am. Found. Spectrum Series 2 (2003),
http://www.newamerica.net/DownloadDocs/pdfs/Pub File_1431li.pdf (arguing that as
much as 10-100 megabits per second should become available for household use and 1-10
gigabit per second should be available for business use).
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famously said, "God is in the details," 6 it is also true that blocking out the
main issues is not an unworthy first step and certainly is as much as this
Article hopes to achieve.
II. ACCESS NETWORK COMPETITION
The fundamental problem of all communications policy is the access
network, also called the last mile or local loop. In the context of the
household, the access network is the economically powerful but visually
humble line that typically stretches from the house along the driveway to
the telephone pole, where it is tied to other telephone lines and carried
down the street until it hits a box in a building called a central office. In
some cases, the access network is wireless so the traffic is collected from
wireless signals and relayed to a central office either through wires or
through additional wireless connections.
More than half of households have two primary wireline access
lines-the wire-based telephone company and a cable television company.7
In some areas, there is only a single network. In the future, power lines may
be a cost-effective way to provide alternative wire-based access, but today
scarcely any homes have such a service.
8
At the central office, traffic is combined and signals are directed
where the sender wishes. Calls originate from an access network and
terminate on an access network, which may have a different proprietor9 or
different architecture10 than the originating network. Any time a network is
accessed calls are both originated and terminated (e.g., e-mails are both
sent and received, Web sites are accessed or information is downloaded
from a Web site). Calls are directed through a specialized computer called a
switch; a router directs communications that occur via the Internet. A more
complicated and hence more precisely accurate description can be
provided, but this suffices as a means to describe the economic issue: a
firm incurs a fairly large cost to build an access network and a minimal cost
for each use of it. To put the same point in numerical terms, a telephone
company, or for that matter a cable company installing a modern access
6. Wikipedia, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LudwigMies.
van derRohe (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
7. Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC, Bucks for Broadband Summit 11 (Jan. 12, 2005),
www.fcc.gov/commissioners/martin/documents/summit0l 1205.ppt (showing a 53% overlap
in high speed cable and DSL availability as of 2003).
8. See Amendment of Part 15 regarding new requirements and measurement
guidelines for Access Broadband over Power Line Systems Carrier Current Systems, Report
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, paras. 4-9 (2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs~public/attachmatch/FCC-04-245A1 .pdf.
9. For example, a Verizon customer may call a Bell South customer.
10. For example, a wireline customer may call a cell phone.
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network capable of serving video in addition to communication services,
has to spend between $1000 and $3000 to string the lines from switch to
house, or in the case of cable, head-end to house for a typical suburban area
with buried plant."1
Every call on a wireline network requires little if any extra capital
expenditure and minimal incremental cost. For wireless networks, the
capacity of the access network correlates more directly to the volume of
traffic so that upfront fixed costs are proportionately smaller than in wire
networks. 12 However, even for wireless networks, the upfront costs are still
quite large.
In a long-run competitive equilibrium, prices tend to marginalize cost.
In an industry with large sunk costs and small marginal costs, like most of
the telecommunications industry, pricing that goes to marginal cost will not
provide an adequate return to the investors who provide capital. Investors
will be cautious about investing money upfront because ex post
competition could drive prices to nonremunerative levels. For example, the
long-distance industry has large fixed upfront costs and extremely low
incremental costs. Long-distance firms deployed large amounts of capacity
in the late 1990s that greatly exceeded total demand, even for a number of
subsequent years.' 3 As a result, competition drove prices down
substantially. 14 Collectively, the long-haul industry has likely produced
negative return on invested capital. In the long run, perhaps only two or
three national long-haul carriers will be able to stay in business.
With access network, very similar scenarios are plausible that
investors may be reluctant to support new entrants. However, product
differentiation is one way for new entrants to attract capital for network
build-out. For example, a mobile service or a lower cost or higher quality
network may be better able to acquire funding than a duplicate fixed wire
network.
Economists studying access networks for many decades tended to
believe that wire-based access networks may be a natural monopoly,
meaning that production by a single firm results in the lowest cost
11. Nicholas J. Frigo, AT&T Labs, Presentation to Federal Communications
Commission: Whatever Happened to Fiber to the Home? 16-17 (April 17, 2003),
http://ftp.fcc.gov/oet/tac/TAC_II_04_17_3/fiber_to_the_home.ppt.
12. GEORGE CALHOUN, DIGITAL CELLULAR RADIO 83-91 (1988).
13. David Kaserman & John May, Competition in the Long-distance Markets, in 1
Handbook of Telecommunications Economics 509, 521 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
14. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, STATISTICS OF THE LONG DISTANCE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 13 (2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/LIAD/ldrptl03.pdf (scroll down past the Public
Notice).
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provision per unit.' 5 Belief that any access network is a natural monopoly
led many years ago to decide to regulate such networks for two principal
purposes: first, to set a price that assured the builder that the fixed cost-
often called historic or embedded cost-would be recovered and second, to
set a price below the maximum that the consumer would be willing to pay
given the lack of choice among offerings.'
6
The historic view of a natural monopoly, however, may not be valid,
or at least may not be valid when the existing allegedly "naturally
monopolistic" network can be replaced by a network that has a radically
different total cost or generates a materially different set of services. As
evidence of this, cellular networks provide both lower cost per added
subscriber and different functionality from fixed-line networks since
mobility is different than stationary calling. For example, cable networks
provide multichannel video as well as, in some cases, voice, while satellite
networks provide more channels than cable. So, each of these examples
provides access to full or partial substitution of the allegedly naturally
monopolistic fixed line telephone access network. As a result of the last
quarter-century of competition policy in America, the so-called monopoly
in the telephone network has given way to a market that includes, just for
voice, five wireless providers, sometimes a cable company offering
communications services, and the traditional telephone company. Of
course, cost, services, and quality vary across these networks such that the
case for or against natural monopoly is not closed. Yet, the phenomenon of
different networks converging to provide alternative forms of similar
services appears to be quite real.
This multifirm market leads to the real possibility that as long as
government does not allow too many mergers in the access market to take
place, then retail price regulation is no longer necessary. The prospect of
retail price deregulation is reasonably bright for voice, video, and data
services since each of these three genres of communications markets is
marked by multifirm competition in many geographic areas. The virtue of
deregulating prices is that each consumer can then signal the price it is
willing to pay and can purchase different services, not merely traditional
local phone service, but perhaps mobile or high-speed Internet, and
providers have the incentives to invest in the services that consumers
desire. This should result in productivity gains and high paid jobs as well as
benefits to consumers. It should also produce best utilization of capital over
15. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND rIs REFORM 1, 15-19 (1982) (stating
and countering this proposition).
16. See generally KR' W. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST
377-411 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing natural monopolies).
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time, although in high-fixed cost industries the risk of wasted capital is
always significant.
However, the maximum benefits of deregulation will result if both
actual and potential competition exist in the provision of the deregulated
services. Therefore, a necessary part of deregulation is the continued
application of antitrust principles.
The first step for communications policy, then, is to achieve retail
price deregulation where multifirm competition is available. To this end,
Congress and the FCC need to order states to deregulate retail prices where
at least three firms offer similar services. A crucial question will be
whether wireless and wireline are considered to provide similar services.
But that is an antitrust issue and is routinely answered by economic studies
relating to substitution.
Any move to deregulate dominant firms should be cushioned by
annual caps of price increases at a number that, if somewhat arbitrary, did
not produce meaningful declines in subscription. For example, regulators
could limit retail price increases to a maximum of 5% increase per year for
traditional local telephone service offered by any regulated firm that
wished to take advantage of price deregulation. In addition, a quantity-
based rule might make sense for firms with a large market share. This
would help to take account of quality changes for different services. For
example, if a firm offered a higher quality service, it would be allowed to
charge a higher price. A possible rule would be that if any firm has more
than 60% market share for any particular kind of communication service, it
would not be allowed to raise prices to a level that causes more than 5% per
annum reduction in subscriptions in the market as a whole. These
somewhat rough, but perhaps useful protections of consumers, of course,
can be debated by the proposed independent commission. This approach is
very likely to be vastly superior to the detailed rate regulation currently in
place.
Wireless firms would have no such restrictions as long as the market
remains as competitive as it is today. The FCC deregulated all retail pricing
regulation in the early 1990s. 17 The wireless marketplace has multiple
competitors and the market is performing well, at least from any
economist's perspective, although investors may find the competition
unappealing compared to other markets. Cable and satellite competition,
18
17. Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, paras. 12, 14-16
(1994) (hereinafter CMRS Second Report and Order).
18. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 543 (2000) (giving an
express preference for competition in cable).
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coupled with possible video entry by telephone companies, and other forms
of access to video, such as broadcast, streaming media, and rental, all
suggest that video price regulation is not necessary; it scarcely exists now.19
Therefore, the proposal here relates principally to the means for
deregulating the wire-based phone company. High speed data services are
generally provided by two firms: cable and telephone companies.
Currently, those two providers are not regulated; with a third provider, the
proposed rule would give more assurance of deregulation. Nevertheless,
this proposal should provide very large incentives to invest efficiently
while at the same time protecting consumers. But will it produce a natural
monopoly in time? That is not easily predicted, and should be guarded
against by the additional rules proposed below.
Under any circumstances, one outcome of a more market-oriented
policy is likely to be network architecture that is not uniform across the
country and has prices that vary significantly from place to place. This is a
good outcome-it encourages competition for the purchase of equipment
and other network inputs and provides competition and comparisons
between different types of architecture. It leads to efficient scale and scope
since these economies differ across geographic areas. Different modes of
access networks also reflect varying costs of providing network services to
different areas of the country and reflect varying demand for network
services. In some areas, for example, stringing fiber to every home and
business would not be prohibitively expensive, whereas in other areas, the
cost would be significantly higher.20 The framework outlined above should
be flexible enough to allow prices in different areas to move toward cost.
The policy recommended here should permit new firms to enter.
These firms may be backed by private investment or even municipal
investment. Contrary to the Supreme Court decision in Nixon v. Missouri
Municipal League21 that gave states the ability to bar cities and towns from
providing telecommunications services to their residents, Congress should
pass a law declaring that communities should have the ability to use their
funds in a way that they see fit. The government should make it clear that if
citizens decide to operate their own co-op or municipally owned franchise
to provide broadband services on a wireless, wireline, or hybrid basis, they
can legally do so. It is astounding to think that government instead may bar
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 543 (c)(3)-(4) (ending the regulation of cable programming rates
for § 543 (c) after Mar. 31, 1999).
20. The Federal Communications Commission's Hybird Cost Proxy Model presents
estimates of the costs of construing a network to various different locations. FCC, Hybrid
Cost Proxy Model, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/tapd/hcpmwelcome.html (follow "hcpm_
install.zip" hyperlink and the instructions on Web site) (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
21. Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
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citizens from coming together to buy common communications capability.
This possibility is economically unwise as well as inequitable. Conversely,
no municipality should be able to use law or public property to compete
unfairly against a private firm. For example, municipalities should not be
allowed preferential access to public facilities.
The goal of access network competition should be to produce long-
term consumer benefits by providing competition and incentives for firms
to invest and innovate. Access networks that arise under these criteria will
be highly productive. In competition, over time the most efficient network
is likely to prevail. In short, in any particular geographic market a winning
network may emerge and others may fall into desuetude. To this end,
government must not tip the scales for or against a particular competitor.
One way that such tipping occurs is the imposition of selective taxes
on different providers. At this time, governments impose substantially
different taxes depending on whether the phone uses wireline, wireless, or
VolP service.22 Tax policy should not be used to differentially advantage
competing service providers. Congress should pass a law to this effect.
Differential tax policy can have a variety of effects-businesses and higher
income individuals may have better access to alternatives such as VoIP that
have lower taxes than conventional telephone service. Thus, lower income
households may wind up paying higher taxes. State and local governments
have levied fairly high taxes on mobile phone service 23 that may make
wireless less of a competitive threat to wireline service.
Another way to distort the access market is to impose unnecessary or
unreasonably high charges for necessary inputs, such as spectrum or access
to telephone poles or rights of way. Public property should be available at
the same price for all providers, and preferably the price should verge
toward cost (including opportunity cost24), so as to permit firms to dedicate
their funds to maximizing the carrying capacity of the network as opposed
22. See Ellen Muraskin, Bill Would Let States Tax VoIP, EWEEK, July 22, 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1748841,00.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2005); see
also Mark Rockwell, Carriers Find States Taxing, WI.ELFSs WEEK, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA499943.html?spacedesc=Departments (last visited
Nov. 20, 2005).
23. Rockwell, supra note 22.
24. "Opportunity cost" is the value of the resource in its next best alternative use.
Spectrum serves as a great example. The actual use of spectrum does not cost anything. Yet,
spectrum is highly valuable and has fetched high prices in government auctions. By selling
spectrum at an auction, the winning bidder should pay the value of the second highest
bidder. This means that the purchaser of spectrum pays the opportunity cost of the spectrum,
which is the appropriate cost to society of its use in any particular service. Wikipedia,
Opportunity cost, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity-cost (last visited Nov. 20,
2005).
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to paying for wireless licenses or some other input. As set forth in more
detail below, Congress should work to minimize the cost of all public
property inputs needed by access networks, including spectrum rights.
A. Spectrum Policy to Develop Access Networks
Because the economic characteristics of spectrum-based networks
differ from wire-based networks, and the different services spectrum-based
networks can provide, spectrum is likely to facilitate the creation of
important alternative access networks. The best way to get new spectrum-
based networks is for the FCC to make large amounts of spectrum available
to potential access network providers.
The FCC needs to adopt a clear and systematic approach for spectrum
currently available and to set forth a clear and immutable policy for the
treatment of spectrum that will come to the market in the future.
Unfortunately, the FCC has a poor track record, and that poor record is not
just historical. In November 2002, the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force
issued a report that said the FCC should generally rely on market forces,
and gave an outline for how to increase the amount of spectrum in the
market and how to use market forces to govern the use of spectrum and to
increase flexibility.25 That report did not go far enough in its ambitions for
spectrum management.26 But by and large it could be the basis for a good
law. It certainly is superior to the actual decisions of the FCC in the last
few years.27
By law, the FCC should be required to publish a blueprint for making
spectrum available to the public and obliged to follow the blueprint. The
proposed independent commission should describe such a blueprint. This
blueprint should recognize that the entire spectrum is interrelated, and
therefore, should auction all spectrum in a short period of time. Some
spectrum is likely to be used currently for any number of purposes. If
25. SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT 38 (2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A1 .pdf.
26. See generally Statement of Reed E. Hundt Before the United States Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004),
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/hundtO42804.pdf (laying out a basic plan to increase
competition in the telecommunications market).
27. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG 242
(2005) (arguing that spectrum regulations have empirically failed to account for tragedy of
the commons); Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and Winding Road: The FCC Paves the Path
with Good Intentions, 27 TELECOMM. POL'Y, 501 (2003) (highlighting the Commission's
difficulty in moving to a market based approach); Gregory L. Rosston, A Losing Battle for
All Sides: The Sad State of Spectrum Management, 56 FED. CoMM. L.J., 437, 440 (2004)
(reviewing JENNIFER A. MANNER, SPECTRUM WARS: THE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY DEBATE
(2003)) (observing that FCC compromise of a spectrum dispute ended in a wasteful,
inefficient use of the spectrum).
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auctioned, the buyers should have the right to pay the current users to stop
using the spectrum. The FCC will need to describe a mediation process to
facilitate such clearing. However, the more spectrum sold, the more liquid
that market will be; efficiency will then be served.
The ultimate goal would be to have spectrum not be a scarce resource
and to have the price be zero. That requires ensuring that a sufficient
supply of spectrum is made available with maximum flexibility, that firms
enjoy returns from using spectrum efficiently to innovate and introduce
new technologies, and to make spectrum available to others who can use it
more efficiently. In other words, the FCC would try to eliminate scarcity or
monopoly rents accruing to spectrum rights holders while at the same time
ensuring that spectrum is able to be used in its socially most valuable ways.
We would know that this policy was successful if prices for spectrum were
close to zero.
After all, spectrum is not an end in and of itself-people do not
consume spectrum. Spectrum is an input into other services such as radio
broadcasts or Wi-Fi access. Although spectrum has many different possible
uses, some are incompatible. Also, all spectrum is not created equal. Some
spectrum is very good for use in satellite transmissions, other frequencies
are very good for narrow point-to-point transmissions, and other spectrum
is very good for wider area mobile use. Consequently, Congress and the
FCC should make all spectrum available for all possible uses, and thereby
permit firms to make the investments that the market will bear, instead of
the investments that regulators determine wise. The reason is not that
regulators are ill-motivated, but that they cannot have enough information
to make the necessary decisions about spectrum use.
To implement a good spectrum policy, the government should
immediately make more spectrum available. The two key ways to do this
are to increase the supply of spectrum outright and to get rid of use and
eligibility restrictions on spectrum.
As of now, the FCC is considering auctions of various blocks of
spectrum.28 Some of the spectrum under consideration includes the PCS C
and F block 1.9 GHz spectrum, the PCS H block in the 1915-1920/1995-
2000 MHz band, 90 MHz in the 1710-1755/2110-2155 MHz bands, the 700
MHz UHF television bands, the MDS/ITFS bands and 37/42 GHz bands
(37.0-38.6/42.0-42.5 GHz).29 In addition, the FCC has proposed to
28. For a list of scheduled and future auctions that have yet to be scheduled, see the
Auctions Web site. FCC, Auctions Summary, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm
?job=auctions-all (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
29. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming 2006), paras. 75, 82,
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designate the 3650-3700 MHz band for unlicensed operations. ° The FCC
needs to establish comprehensive rules for this spectrum. Given current
advances in auction technique, it is possible to put all of the spectrum on
the market at the same time and to facilitate clearing of incumbents.3'
All of the auctions should be on a cash basis so that the FCC no
longer has to act as a banker, security holder, or litigant in bankruptcy
court. Immediately after the auctions, all spectrum should be freely
tradable, just like the buyers at the Google IPO were able to sell their stock
the same day. As discussed in virtually all FCC statements, but only put
into practice in certain circumstances, the FCC should not place artificial
use restrictions on the licensees. Licensees should be allowed to compete to
provide whatever service they think will serve consumers' demand
provided that they do not cause undue interference to other spectrum users.
The FCC should not impose any build-out requirements because firms may
choose to postpone investment while waiting for a market to mature or a
technology to be invented or improved.
If Congress or the FCC decides on social goals that involve the use of
spectrum, it should specify and quantify these goals, and then pay for them
explicitly either out of general revenues or from auction revenues. For
example, suppose the government wished to have over-the-air digital
television made available to all Americans. It could dedicate general
revenue or divert from receipts to general revenue a portion of spectrum
auction revenues to pay for this outcome. Then, set-top box manufacturers
and digital television makers would enter an auction to provide digital
tuners in return for money, and the lowest bidder would win the subsidy.
In making spectrum available for access networks, the FCC can treat
spectrum as private property, public property, or a combination of the two.
The law states that the public owns the spectrum, 32 but the method of
86-87 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/FCC-05-173
Al.pdf.
30. Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 Mhz Band, Report and Order and
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming 2006), paras. 21 n.33, 22,
available at http://www.broadbandwirelessreports.compressreleases/files/FCC-05-56AI.
pdf.
31. The FCC has cosponsored three conferences with the Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research and the National Science Foundation to refine and improve
package bidding and expressive bidding techniques. The results of these conferences should
improve the ability of the FCC to hold more complex auctions and lead to greater efficiency.
Summaries of presentations and some of the papers presented at the conferences are
available at the FCC Web site on Conferences, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm
?job=past_conferences (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 336 (authorizing the FCC to distribute licenses to operate on the
spectrum in accordance with the public interest); see also Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C.,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that the public's rights to the spectrum outweigh individual
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allocation could mimic private ownership or provide open access like
public parks. The government should pick the method or methods that
produce the most efficient market for access networks.
As private property, the frequencies can be zoned or limited in use.
The owner could subdivide, consolidate, or transfer the rights to use the
property. As public property, zoning or restrictions in use could be
mandated. The difference is that with private property, the owner has the
right to exclude others from using the frequencies. While exclusion may
sound antithetical to obtaining the maximum value of the spectrum, certain
types of exclusion may help to increase the value of the spectrum because
of the ability to control interference.
Generally, the property rights approach is termed a licensed approach;
whereas, the public property approach is the unlicensed or commons
approach.33 A combination of the two would be the underlay approach.34
With underlay rights, a licensed user might have the right to transmit on
specific frequencies, but others might have the right to transmit as well,
subject to certain rules that limit the interference they might cause to the
licensed user.
Licensed use is a system where a user has the right to use spectrum in
a designated geographic area. That user has control over the spectrum,
essentially the right to exclude other users. Under the licensed approach, it
is possible for the user to sublease or sublicense the spectrum use rights to
others in a market transaction or to retain sole use of the spectrum. 35 For
example, cellular and PCS providers have licenses for the use of particular
frequencies in particular geographic areas.36 Currently, they are the only
ones with a legal right to broadcast over those frequencies. However, these
rights are not comprehensive or absolute. The government still retains the
ability to set technical standards or acceptable use policies in these licensed
bands.37 Hence, because they are not limited to preventing interference
externalities, they do not match completely with a pure property rights
approach in their implementation.
broadcasters').
33. SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 5, 35-42.
34. Spectrum Policy Recommendations: Comments on the Federal Communications
Commission Spectrum Policy Task Force Report: Before the S. Commerce Comm., 108th
Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Gregory L. Rosston, Deputy Director, Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research), http:/commerce.senate.gov/presslO3/rosstonO306O3.pdf
[hereinafter Spectrum Policy Recommendations].
35. SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 55-58.
36. See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, para. 83
(1994).
37. SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 5.
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The FCC has set aside some specific bands for unlicensed use.38 In
these bands, instead of a specific user being allowed to determine the use of
the band, anyone who meets the equipment standards is allowed use of the
band.39
A third approach is the underlay licensing. This is combinable with
either of the other two models of spectrum licensing. One implementation
of this is known as ultra wideband, although it is not the only possible
implementation of underlay use.4° Essentially, underlay use gives users the
right to use spectrum provided that they do not cause interference to the
primary user or users of the spectrum. 41 For example, a very low power use
of spectrum might go undetected by a television broadcaster and its viewers
and hence not cause any interference or degradation of the signal.42 Under
this approach, such noninterfering signals would cause no harm and would
create additional consumer benefit.43 The two keys to the underlay use of
the spectrum are setting the levels that would provide truly noninterfering
use, and setting a method for determining how to allocate responsibility if
interference occurs. In essence, an underlay system limits the rights of the
licensee to specific tolerances and does not give them the right to exclude
non-interfering users from using the same frequencies.
Licensed spectrum does not have to remain in the conventional
licensed use. For example, an equipment firm, group of firms, or an
entrepreneur may decide to participate in an FCC auction for licensed
spectrum with the express intent of using the spectrum like an unlicensed
commons. Companies like Cisco and Microsoft have expressed a desire for
unlicensed spectrum.44 They might be able to figure out a way to pay for
the opportunity cost of the spectrum and to promote the use of unlicensed
devices. If the government wants to allocate spectrum for a commons use,
it would be useful to know the opportunity cost of that use by having the
38. For example, the FCC allocated 255 MHz of spectrum for unlicensed uses in 2003
in its Revision of Parts 2 and 15 of the FCC's Rules to Permit Unlicensed National
Information Infrastructure ("U-NIl") devices in the 5 GHz band, Report and Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 24484, paras. 1, 3 (2003).
39. See id. para. 2.
40. Spectrum Policy Recommendations, supra note 34, at 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. One possible exception to the "no harm" might be from additional competition so
that the additional use might cause harm to the incumbent. We ignore that harm.
44. See Cisco Systems High Tech Policy Guide, Wireless and Spectrum Management,
http://www.cisco.comlenlUS/aboutlgov/networkslwireless~spectrum-management.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2005); Microsoft PressPass Information for Journalists, New Radio
Spectrum Allocations Help to Bring Wireless Data Worldwide, www.microsoft.com/
presspass/features/2003/jul03/07-09wrc-03.mspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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government either participate in an auction or set a reserve price in
advance. If the reserve price were not met, then the government could set
the spectrum up as a commons. This would create a market test regarding
the value of spectrum in a commons compared to spectrum in a more
conventional licensed allocation. Such an approach could be an extension
of the "band manager" concept the FCC introduced for the 700 MHz Guard
Bands.45 Indeed, the various band manager allocations should be
aggregated and auctioned in this way.
None of the approaches discussed has been implemented in the U.S.
in a pure fashion. For example, in the licensed approach, the government
has succumbed repeatedly to politically irresistible use and eligibility
requirements despite a clear cost to consumers. 6 Unlicensed use has also
been subject to different power limits and etiquettes that may not be
optimal.47
Proponents of licensed use argue that markets, while not perfect,
provide incentives for efficient use of spectrum.4 8 Unlicensed advocates
argue that the licensed approach will not create access to spectrum because
incumbents would have incentives to block access to spectrum by new
entrants who threaten existing businesses and business models.49
Unlicensed advocates believe that either devices or protocols can
solve interference problems sufficiently well so that no exclusion from use
of a particular frequency is necessary.50 Licensed advocates argue that the
45. See Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands, Second Report and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5299, para. 2 (2000). See also Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and
Winding Road: The FCC Paves the Path with Good Intentions, 27 TELECOMM. POL'Y 501,
504-06 (2003).
46. See Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwith Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase 's "Big Joke": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 337, 462-71, 477-81 (2001); Rosston,
supra 45, at 506.
47. See, for example, a proposal for new unlicensed etiquettes, Pierre De Vries & Amer
Hassan, Sr. Director of Advanced Technology and Policy & Marketing Chair, Microsoft,
Spectrum Sharing Rules for New Unlicensed Bands (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.wi-
fi.org/membersonly/getfile.asp?f=SpectrumSharing-RulesNewUnlicensedBands.pdf.
48. Promoting Efficient use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Comments of 37 Economists 2-4 (Feb. 7, 2001),
http://www.aei-brookings.org/adminauthorpdfs/page.php?id=176.
49. Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 72 (2000); see also, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REv. 863, 915-18 (2004) (giving the
example of Sprint's attempts to obstruct unlicensed access). However, it should be noted
that Sprint PCS has allowed other providers such as Virgin Mobile to use its spectrum and
network to provide service to customers. See http://www.virginmobileusa.com/greatrates/
howitworks.do;jsessionid=D2LvlnZp23CxXn6D2TSQj67wwgl4jQQGQ7TnQ9scyznJ6BvF
9WQv!-410112968 !-839916648!7501 !7502.
50. Benkler, supra note 49, at 32.
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problem is not likely to be easily solved nor are the solutions free-
equipment requirements and protocols impose costs.51
Licensed spectrum allows users to block access to specific
frequencies. With a sufficient amount of spectrum available disbursed
among enough different licensees, no licensee would have an incentive to
block access to another potential spectrum user that had a higher value use.
Not enough spectrum is now available to dispense with this concern.
Moreover, spectrum in specific bands is not a perfect substitute for other
bands. Just as land next to Central Park is extremely valuable, the spectrum
below 1 GHz is also very valuable. It is valuable because of its propagation
characteristics and because the handset equipment and the equipment
necessary to deploy a network is substantially cheaper than the equipment
required in higher bands.
We think that other mechanisms can provide better use of the federal
government spectrum in the longer term, and such mechanisms should be
encouraged today. For example, the United Kingdom has attempted to
force government agencies to realize at least some of the opportunity cost
they impose through their use of spectrum by charging each agency a fee
for the use of the spectrum.52 One task for the proposed independent
commission would be to reach agreement on which spectrum should be
licensed, unlicensed, or subjected to a hybrid approach. The goal in such
debate should be maximizing the amount of spectrum used to provide
access network solutions, so as to facilitate the most competitive access
market and to expedite the deregulation of retail pricing for all
communications services.
B. Access Network Competition and Unbundling
The intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to create
competition in the access market, as well as long distance, without belying
the economies of scale, scope, and density that exist for networks.53
51. See Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. Rosston, Spectrum Allocation and the Internet,
in CYBER POLICY AND ECONOMICS IN AN INTERNET AGE (W. Lehr & L. Pupillo eds., 2002),
available at http://siepr.stanford.edulpapers/pdf/Ol-09.pdf.
52. Martin Cave, Professor, An Independent Review for Department of Trade and
Industry and HM Treasury, Review of Radio Spectrum Management 26 (March 2002),
http://www.see.asso.frICTSRINewsletter/NoOO4IRS%20Management%20-%202_title-
42.pdf. As discussed above, the opportunity cost imposed by government use of the
spectrum is the value of the precluded commercial service that could otherwise make use of
the spectrum. Id. at 16-17.
53. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (2002) (governing
development of competitive markets in the local exchange service). See also Gregory
Rosston, The Telecommunications Act Trilogy, 5 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 1, 1-12 (1996)
(discussing the economic barriers for local exchange carriers before the 1996 Act and what
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Meanwhile, the Act intended to share, by law, among rivals.54 The Act did
this by providing three different modes of entry-facilities based entry
including but not limited to wireless and cable voice, entry using
unbundled network elements, and resale.55 The techniques of the Act
focused on sharing certain facilities of the incumbents with their rivals,
including but not limited to elements of the access network, directories,
central offices and numbers.56
Facilities-based entry, no matter how extensive the facility, depends
on fair charges to interconnect and exchange traffic with the incumbent. A
new entrant can compete by leasing portions of the incumbents' networks
only if the price for the lease is low enough to compare to the incumbents'
true operating cost, which means that the price has to be forward-looking.57
And resale, for a reasonable duration, can be a mode of entry only if the
margin between wholesale and retail is large enough to permit the reseller
to cover costs. These simple postulates lead to important debate over the
appropriate price for interconnection, termination of traffic, leasing, and
wholesale purchase. In the eight years between 1996 and 2004, the FCC
has changed its mind on such prices from time to time,58 courts have
interfered repeatedly in such pricing, 59 states have injected distinct and
different decisions on these issues,6° and in general investors have not had a
clear and consistent answer to the question of what price new entrants
would have to pay for interconnection, termination, leasing, or wholesale.
As of the end of 2004, indecision and confusion on this topic reign at
the FCC. No state has the capability to promulgate or enforce a regime that
can have a significant national effect. As to big bandwidth networks, the
the 1996 Act did to promote competition).
54. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (2002).
55. Id. at § 251.
56. Id.
57. See generally Gregory L. Rosston & Roger Noll, The Economics of the Supreme
Court's Decision on Forward Looking Costs, REv. NETWORK EcON. 81 (2002) (explaining
forward-looking pricing rules, their rationale and implications).
58. See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996),
reconsidered by Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 13042 (1996), reconsidered by
Second Order on Reconsideration, 11 F.C.C.R. 19738 (1996), reconsidered by Third Order
on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 12460 (1997)
(showing the FCC's change in its stance on interconnection from 1996 to 1997).
59. See, e.g, Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part and
remanded, AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
60. For a summary of such different pricing, see Billy Jack Gregg, A Survey of
Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United States, http://www.cad.state.wv.usUne%
20Page.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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FCC has determined to abandon at least unbundled elements and
wholesaling as techniques for introducing competition in access
networks.6' Meanwhile, competitors hoping to offer either wireless or VolP
do not need leasing or wholesale, although other regulations are desired by
new entrants offering these services.
Soon, Congress and the FCC need to decide whether to maintain or
disband unbundling and wholesaling. Although these techniques might be
useful in some market situations, history shows that FCC vacillation and
judicial interference produce such negative results for industry conduct and
performance 62 that perhaps other more reliable techniques for introducing
competition now should be preferred. The problem, in any case, remains
the same: obtaining maximally beneficial performance from access
networks is difficult in light of the economics of these networks.
C. Competing Access Networks Require Interconnection
Regardless of the structure, conduct, and performance of the access
market, different originating service providers will always need to send
communications to terminating service providers. However, in the case of
any particular instance of communication, the originator may not have a
choice of terminators. Suppose for example that the consumer elected the
telephone company's line as its choice of access. Anyone wishing to
communicate to that consumer would be obliged to connect, directly or
indirectly, to that consumer's telephone company. But, that company could
then charge a monopoly price to the incoming caller. If all companies
behaved in this manner, the total effect would be monopolistic pricing,
thereby defeating the purpose of access network competition.63 Moreover,
firms with relatively larger customer networks could choose to charge
discriminatory prices to smaller originating firms, so as to drive small firms
out of business. Other tactics that would deter competition can be imagined
and have been practiced in the history of communications. 64 To preclude
61. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533,
para. 29, 34, 48, 62-63 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/FCC-04-290Al.pdf.
62. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Robert Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable
Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1981) (discussing FCC vacillating regulation of
cable television).
63. See Joseph Farrell, Former Chief Economist, FCC, Prospects for Deregulation in
Telecommunications: Mildly Revised Version (May 30, 1997), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus
/OPP/Speeches/jf050997.html.
64. For example, AT&T's discrimination against its long-distance rivals was the basis
for the breakup. See generally Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses
of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTrRUST REVOLUTION 290 (John Kowka &
Lawrence White eds., 1989) (discussing AT&T's anticompetitive efforts).
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such means to an anticompetitive end, government needs to provide a
competitive benchmark for intercarrier compensation-the charges firms
will pay each other for terminating calls.
To this end, in 2004, a group of local exchange providers, long-
distance companies, and competitive-service providers presented the FCC
with a proposal that could eventually become a bill to solve the voice
traffic problem. 65 Although the proposal is more detailed than this Article's
level of discussion, its essence is to have every originator charge its
customer for access and to lower charges for interconnecting among
originators (i.e., to lower termination charges) very close to zero.66 Of
course, carriers could enter into other arrangements voluntarily. The
proposed commission should consider this proposal, among others, and
recommend adoption of this or a similar notion to the FCC. Congress
should mandate that such a plan be put into place. It should preempt any
state regulation, especially since the contemplated communications will
freely cross state lines.
The reduction of interconnection charges to zero has been termed
"Bill and Keep." 67 A Bill and Keep system addresses the terminating
monopoly problem discussed above and means that network service
providers charge their own customers for connection and traffic charges,
but do not compensate other networks for the termination of cross network
traffic.68 A Bill and Keep system will not be optimal in all circumstances.69
However, Bill and Keep moves prices closer to a situation where customers
pay for their own connection and face the cost of the choices they make. If
a customer chooses a wireless provider with per-minute rates as opposed to
a wireline provider with a higher fixed monthly fee, the customer making
the choice would be faced with the cost of that choice under the proposed
system. Also, current regulatory charges that are not cost based, such as
above cost per-minute access charges, create distortions in the marketplace
65. Letter from Gary M. Epstein & Richard R. Cameron, Counsel for The Intercarrier
Compensation Forum, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary for FCC, Notice of Ex Parte
Communication (Aug 16, 2004), https://neca.org/media/ICF082004.pdf.
66. Id.
67. See Patrick DeGraba, Bill and Keep at the Central Office As the Efficient
Interconnection Regime para. 15 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper, 2000),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp33.pdf (describing Bill and Keep
as a default internet connection regime not allowing a called party's carrier to charge an
interconnecting carrier to terminate a call and making the calling party's network
responsible for the cost of transporting the call).
68. Id.
69. For extensive discussion of the situations where optimality is and is not achieved,
see generally Patrick DeGraba, Reconciling the Off-Net Cost Pricing Principle with Efficient
Network Utilization, INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 475 (2004).
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that cause consumers to make inefficient choices. These distortions in
consumer choice ultimately lead to inefficient network design and
investment decisions as well. With a more cost-based system, competition
should minimize these inefficiencies, especially when firms have the ability
to negotiate alternative arrangements.
III. SERVICE COMPETITION
A. Openness
If access network providers have market power, the question arises as
to whether the access network will be open to all users and information
providers. At least three kinds of openness have provoked a great deal of
debate in the last decade. The first concerns whether software protocols for
using the network should be visible to new firms that might want to
emulate them and to application providers that might want to write
software that interoperates with such protocols. The second addresses the
ability of any firm, including a competitor of an access network proprietor,
to transmit over the access network-for example, whether anyone can
send an e-mail over a consumer's access network-or by contrast may the
access provider close the network to some would-be transmitters. The third
relates to whether any terminal, or customer premises equipment, can be
attached to the access network, or by contrast whether the access provider
may discriminate among different terminals. None of these questions is
easy because mandating openness even as to firms with market power may
deter investment by that firm or restrict its ability to provide services more
efficiently in an integrated manner.
As to the first question, the history of cellular argues for the merit of
relying on the marketplace to set standards, even if they are proprietary and
not open. The FCC chose the transmission standard for the first generation
of cellular service, analog.70 But subsequently, the government actively
declined to mandate a transmission standard.7' Qualcomm was able to
develop a proprietary standard from which it obtains license fees to this
day.72 Qualcomm's standard competes in the marketplace with other
70. Cellular Telephone Service, http://www.decodesystems.commt/96nov/ (last visited
Nov. 21, 2005); Gregory Rosston, An Economic Analysis of the Effects of FCC Regulation
on Land Mobile Radio (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University) (on file
with author).
71. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, paras. 159-
62 (1994).
72. Qualcomm Technology and Solutions, CDMA 101, http://www.qualcomm.com/
technology/cdmal0l.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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competitive standards. The returns to successful investment are consistent
with a market-based approach. We suggest then that with respect to
communications protocols, the government should permit and encourage
standards competition. However, if a standard achieves monopoly status,
apart from the limited terms of patent protection, it might frustrate new
entry and further standards competition. In that event, traditional antitrust
principles can be used to limit the effects of monopoly. In this respect,
antitrust officials must recognize that network effects can give an
incumbent substantial market power. In any event, interconnection policy,
as set forth below, will also be a necessary antidote to competition
problems.
The second kind of openness-non-discrimination as to content-has
been law with respect to the telephone network and practice, sans law, with
respect to the Internet. 7 Again, as of now, it appears that the government
need not mandate this kind of openness. However, the government should
reserve the right to declare it obligatory as a matter of law. Specifically,
that would mean applying Title II of the Telecommunications Act to all
networks, but forbearing from the specific enforcement of its provisions
unless and until inefficient results occur. 4
Two arguments are asserted in favor of ordering openness
immediately. First, some firms want access to physical portions of the
incumbents' access networks. In effect, this is a claim for partial leasing or
occasional wholesale purchasing, and harkens back to the problems of the
1996 Act illuminated above. Second, others-advocates of "net
neutrality"-ask for a government mandate that now and forever the owner
of the access network may not restrict the ability of its end user customers
to access specific content or to run particular applications.5
For those who are inclined to think instantly that this argument has
merit, consideration should be given to the fact that the government hardly
ever tells a retailer that it cannot refuse to put on its shelves anything any
73. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 12-13 (FCC, Office of
Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-
papers/oppwp31 .pdf.
74. This would mean that all of the networks would be considered telecommunications
services providers and potentially subject to regulation as such. By putting all networks
under the same framework, there would no incentive to try to distinguish one's network to
avoid regulation.
75. Franqois Bar et al., Defending the Internet Revolution in the Broadband Era: When
Doing Nothing is Doing Harm 4 (Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy,
E-conomy, Working Paper No. 12, 1999), http://e-conomy.berkeley.edulpublications/wp/
/ewpl2.pdf; see also Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (comparing the general approaches of broadband
regulation and favoring less intrusive measures).
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customer wants or ever tells a publisher that it must print any book any
reader asks for. Nevertheless, serious attention should be paid to the
contention that this form of openness would maximize both investment and
individual freedom.76 In addition, advocates of this approach assert that
content creation would be maximized if all information were accessible
without technical, substantive, or price alteration from the originator of the
information. 77 The direction of this argument is that high-speed access
facilities-the local cable, DSL, fiber facility, and in the future, wireless
carriers-should essentially be common carriers and should not be able to
exclude anyone or any content from the local or backbone portions of the
Internet.
The fear of "open access" advocates is that local broadband providers
such as DSL and cable modem services could be bottlenecks, threatening
the openness objectives. Of course, the pursuit of bottleneck status, from
which rents can be garnered, is in fact the goal of competitors in
competitive markets. Using law to preclude winning in competition can
discourage investment and hence lead to less efficient networks, producing
suboptimal results for the economy.
Nevertheless, the open access argument typically does not object to
an access network "winning" in competition, but instead to any network
provider marrying transmission with content.78 The objection has a "Back
to the Future" quality since its proponents object scarcely at all to
monopoly at the physical layer, or tangible access network, and protest
vigorously almost any unique commercial combination by the access
network provider of transmission with content, or even with the software
protocols that permit transmission.
Of course, insofar as a telephone call is content, telephone networks
have since Bell's patents combined content and conduit. Furthermore, the
open access argument requires not only open conduits, but also a legal
mandate that new versions of the Internet, or for that matter new versions
76. For general support that network neutrality will improve openness and investment,
see generally LAWRENCE LEsSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001); The Government's Role in Promoting the Future of
Telecommunications Industry and Broadband Deployment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 107 th Cong. (2002) (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Prof. of
Law, Stanford Law School), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/100102
lessig.pdf.
77. See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at the University of Colorado
School of Law Boulder: The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime
for the Internet Age 3 (Feb. 8, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DOC-243556Al.pdf.
78. See generally Bar et al., supra note 75, at 1 (arguing that FCC's enduring openness
and competition policy has created the widest array of choices for the consumer).
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of any network access, be subject to a legal decree that they be backwards
compatible. Only in this way can content on today's networks use
tomorrow' S.79
Currently, as discussed above, neither cable firms nor DSL companies
appear to be excluding content to a large degree. However, cable and DSL
firms have suggested that they might treat other content providers in a
discriminatory fashion, just as Microsoft has also done with respect to its
operating platform.8° Whether such discrimination, hypothetical or actual,
is anticompetitive, reasonable people have debated without reaching
consensus.
If open access becomes a large problem in the future, or if it becomes
clear that a single provider of broadband access will have a monopoly, then
policymakers should have the ability to step in to undertake corrective
measures at the time. To this end, the FCC should declare all access
networks subject to Title II regulation as discussed above. The FCC gains
maximum flexibility-it can and should forbear from regulation should the
market prove to be sufficiently competitive. At the same time, should
market power problems arise that can be safely solved with government
intervention, it has the flexibility to act.
The third kind of openness-the right to attach any appliance to the
network-has been advocated by the High Tech Broadband Coalition.8'
Consumers should be able to attach any device to the network that does not
harm the network and works within the rules of the service the consumer
has purchased. Similar issues have been debated in the past with respect to
the telephone network.82 When the FCC required AT&T to allow third
party equipment to hook up to the network, consumers benefited from the
79. See generally Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. Rosston, Local Broadband Access:
Primum Non Nocere or Primum Processi? A Property Rights Approach, (Stanford Inst. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-37, 2003), http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/
pdf/02-37.pdf (discussing the economics of open access).
80. See Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services Over
Cable, Comments of The National Cable Television Association 50 (Mar. 19, 2001) (arguing
that mandatory nondiscriminatory access policy is unconstitutional), http://ncta.com/pdf-
files/CSDock0 -7Comments.PDF.
81. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment For Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Cable Facilities, Comments of High Tech Broadband Coalition 9 (June 17, 2002),
http://www.ce.org/shared-files/recentactions75COM%2Cable%20Modem%20Service%
20FINAL.pdf.
82. Historically, AT&T blocked the attachment of "foreign" devices even though they
caused no harm to the network. See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266,
267-69 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The FCC later decided to allow non-AT&T equipment to be used
in the network. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service,
Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 426 (1968), reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
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additional competition and choice. 3 It may be reasonable for the network
owner to charge differential pricing for different services, but equipment
discrimination is less likely to have the same positive benefits so that this
openness should be adopted by law and regulation.
Before leaving this important topic, we should note that a different
way to discuss openness is the structural approach. Two varieties of
restructuring access networks can be identified. The first restructured
openness is the separation of any network between a firm owning access
and a firm owning the switch and the switch-to-switch connection. 4 This
separation roughly equates to edge as opposed to core portions of any
network. Some contend that law or regulation should mandate such
structural separation.5 The contention falters, however, on these points: (1)
cellular networks, for example, do not show such clean demarcation points,
and therefore, such a structural remedy might not be evenly applied to all
networks, raising the possibility that inefficient or biased competition
might result; (2) even if structurally separated, an access network owner
could attempt to exercise monopoly market power over termination and,
therefore, would have to be subjected to the regimes outlined above, raising
the possibility that the separation might be fruitless; (3) data traffic can be
routed in various ways that might defeat the goals of such separation; (4)
structural separation may cause more harm than good in terms of new
investment and efficiency because it would restrict integrated service
provision; (5) with competing networks structural separation may not
provide any consumer benefits that would offset the costs of
nonintegration.
The second kind of structural openness is the division of a network
into a physical layer, a communications protocol layer, and a service or
application layer. The contention here would be that the bottom layer could
be a regulated monopoly, the middle an open and free software stack, and
the top a field for unregulated competition. 6 This paradigm is appealing in
83. GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 181 (2003).
84. The switch-to-switch connection is loosely referred to as backbone. Kevin
Werbach, Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy 10-12 (FCC Office
of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 29, 1997), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/
working-papers/oppwp29.pdf.
85. Robert E. Hall & William H. Lehr, Rescuing Competition to Stimulate
Telecommunications Growth 28-31 (Sept. 28, 2001) (White Paper prepared on behalf of
AT&T), http://www.techcentralstation.com/media/docs/hlpaper.pdf.
86. See Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New
Communications Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM.
L.J. 587, 590-92 (2004) (discussing this view). But see Adam D. Thierer, "Net Neutrality"
Digital Discrimination or Regulatory Gamesmanship in Cyberspace, 507 CATO INST. POL'Y
ANALYSIS 1 (2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa507.pdf (advocating for
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the abstract, but plagued by the need for the same sort of regulations at the
physical layer as applied above to an integrated access network where one
firm owns all three layers. If this form of openness does not produce more
competition with less regulatory cost, perhaps it accomplishes less than its
advocates would prefer. In any event, this is a topic that should be studied
seriously by the proposed independent commission.
In that discussion, it is also important to note that, as with patent
policy, providing incentives for investment in the network is also
important. To the extent that profits at different levels provide the
necessary returns, then a structural openness policy may be
counterproductive.87 Also, structural separation may be difficult to
implement when network technology is in flux or may affect network
design while reducing the ability to coordinate product development across
layers.
B. VoIP as a Case in Point
Much regulatory angst and competitive fervor is currently engendered
by the 4 letters-VoIP. VoIP, Voice over Internet Protocol, is a way of
transmitting voice calls as data packets over the packet-switched Internet
data network, which is an alternative to routing voice calls as circuit-
switched calls over the telephone network. Companies like AT&T,
Vonage, Packet 8, and Skype are providing VoIP services. The incumbent
telephone and cable companies are also initiating VoIP offerings.88 These
generally offer a host of features along with attractive long distance calling
plans.
In the future, a larger portion of voice communications will be part of
the Internet data stream, along with music and movies. So in this sense
voice will go over the Internet, using Internet protocols to describe
beginning and ending calls, and to pick the route of the traffic on the way
from originator to terminator. Because voice traffic uses only a small
amount of bandwidth, especially compared with applications like music
and movies, the marginal cost of VolP voice traffic is likely to be
extremely low.
State regulators fear VoIP because, as currently priced and regulated,
it threatens the sources of funding for universal service programs.
Incumbent telephone service providers view VolP both as a threat and as
vertical integration).
87. See generally Owen & Rosston, supra note 79.
88. For example, Verizon is offering "VoiceWing." Verizon VoiceWing FAQs,
https://www22.verizon.com/ForYourhome/voip/FAQ.aspx?LOBCode--C&PromoTCode=V
WS02&PromoSrcCode=L&POEId=TLlFH (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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an opportunity. The threat is to their existing businesses; the opportunity is
in selling new services and having the ability to avoid entrenched
regulations.
Instead of treating VolP as a threat, regulatory authorities should view
it as an opportunity to reformulate the existing regulations that do not serve
the purposes of efficiency and social welfare. Instead of trying to push
VolP into the tent with historic switched access service and the attendant
inefficient access charge regime, regulators should explicitly and rapidly
rule out access charges for all traffic and move to a more efficient method
for revenue collection.
A revamped system would remove the fears of the regulators and
enhance the opportunity for providers and more importantly for consumers.
By setting a stable system that focuses universal service revenue and cost
in a directed system, the threats from arbitrage would be minimized. In
addition, the need for extensive programs would be reduced. In all, while
regulators would oversee smaller programs, these programs would be more
stable and more effective at achieving the goals of universal service.
IV. NETWORK EFFECTS, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, AND
UNIVERSAL SERVICE
A. More Valuable for All Users
According to a so-called law attributed to one of the founders of
modem Internet communication, Bob Metcalfe, the value of a network
equals the square of the number of users.89 This formula is more an opinion
than a mathematically valid proposition. However, it expresses the intuitive
observation that any new participant in any network adds to the value of the
network for each existing user because all the old subscribers now have one
new subscriber to call. Since the value of the network accretes as
subscribers are added, the willingness of subscribers to switch to a new
network declines unless an interconnection right, as described above,
exists. In addition, a network provider ought to be motivated to add new
subscribers at declining prices if the provider can charge less to the new
user than to the old ones. In fact, network operators have a strong
motivation to try to attract additional subscribers to increase the value to
existing customers, increasing existing customers' willingness to pay. In
89. More precisely, Metcalfe's law states that the number of connections is proportional
to the square of the number of users. The number of possible connections in a network is
N2-N, which approaches N2 as N gets larger. This does not place a value on the additional
connections. See NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 555-56 (16th 2 ed. 2000).
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unregulated markets-such as what communications should become-one
practical way for the seller to achieve this result is to use temporary
discounts, long-term contracts with scaled-up fee structures, and other
marketing and pricing techniques that in effect create differential pricing.
These tactics maximize value for the economy and society. Policy should
support, not ban, such means of delivering service.
Moreover, policy should aspire to induce subscriptions from those
who lack a willingness or capability to pay for network access because
even bringing the recalcitrant or impecunious user on to the network
creates more value for existing users. To this end, subsidy programs that
bridge the gap between what a customer can or will pay and the price
offered can be economically beneficial. From the perspective of social
benefits, delivery of such government services as medical advice,
education, public safety, and other services often can be done efficiently
over a network. Therefore, bringing everyone on to at least one access
network can serve social goals. Furthermore, a ubiquitous network can also
serve social goals.
The question, then, is not whether a universal service program-
defined as a network in which everyone can participate, anytime, from
anywhere-is a good idea, but how society, acting through government and
through private firms, can put in place such a program with the minimum
amount of money spent in order to achieve the maximum social and
economic benefit. Anyone can recognize that to meet this goal the social
benefit will have to be quantified, so as to be expressed in the same terms
as the cost and economic benefits. However, many tools exist to make such
quantifications, and this paper need not address that topic. Our concern,
instead, is that no such program has been proposed by the government.
Moreover, the existing mishmash of policies and programs that are called
universal service plainly fall grossly short of the desired goal.
The current universal service policies have many defects. They
include at least the following:
(1) The allocation of universal service objectives to both federal and
state jurisdiction produces confusing and inefficient practices and widely
varying outcomes in different states. 90
(2) In general, urban consumers pay more than they would in an
efficient market, and, in effect, pay an implicit tax that is awarded to rural
90. Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The 'State' of Universal Service, 12
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 261, 282 (2000), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?
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users who in turn are asked to pay less than they are willing to pay. This
transfer from urban to rural ignores the fact that many urban residents have
low incomes and many rural residents have high incomes. The result
overall is to reduce the amount consumers would be willing to pay for
communications services and the quantity of network usage.91
(3) Universal service programs create incentives for firms and
consumers to elect ways to bypass existing collection mechanisms, thereby
creating inefficient competition and inequitable collection of funds to pay
for social benefits.92
(4) Universal service subsidies in general perpetuate the maintenance
of the oldest features of communications services, instead of providing an
incentive for firms to build the most efficient networks.93
Congress should mandate a complete overhaul of universal service,
according to the precepts set by the independent commission proposed
herein. These precepts must include the following at an absolute minimum:
all implicit and indirect subsidies should be absolutely banned; all
jurisdiction for universal service funding should be vested in the federal
system; and all implementation should be done by state authorities,
according to federal guidelines. Social benefits must be quantified and
added by formula to economic benefits so as to be balanced with costs.
B. Most Efficient
A key to a wise universal service policy is to use funding to catalyze
the construction of the most efficient networks. In some cases the outcome
may be construction of all or mostly fiber networks to the premises of
users. In some instances wireless networks will be optimal. In still other
situations, a mixture of wire and wireless will be desirable.
In any case, auction techniques can be used to minimize universal
service subsidies while at the same time guaranteeing a level of service.
Many of these issues were explored by the FCC at the time of initial
implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.94 Auction
techniques show promise for substantially increasing the efficiency of
91. Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, Winners and Losers from the Universal
Service Subsidy Battle (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 99-8,
1999, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL: RAISING QUESTIONS, SEEKING ANSWERS IN
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 401-404 (Ingo Vogelsang & Compaine, eds., 2000).
92. Gregory L. Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC's of Universal Service:
Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and Competition, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 1586-88 (1999).
93. Hundt, supra note 5.
94. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
8776, para. 70 (1997).
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universal service payments.95 It is time to pursue these techniques.
Federal and state governments already provide a number of different
universal service programs. For example, low-income and high-cost
households, schools, and libraries are explicitly targeted as subsidy
receivers.96
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 created the schools and
libraries fund.97 Unlike the other subsidy funds, this fund is directly related
to Internet access. This amounts to $2.3 billion per year.98 This money has
connected the vast majority of classrooms in the country.99 The money is
currently being used to subsidize the costs of continuing the Internet
connections in the classrooms, substantially classrooms for schools in
lower income areas.' °° This program could be expanded to include funding
of broadband and equipment for classrooms. Among its positive attributes
are the use of competitive bidding to obtain the lowest price for access
services and the use of matching grants by end users so as to assure a
sincere desire for the access.
Universal service at any level will require funding. An essential
aspect of a wise policy is not to mandate that any service provider lower
prices or alter service offerings to achieve universal service. Nor should the
burden of providing universal service be assigned to one or more service
providers. Instead, funds should be placed in the hands of users, such as
95. See generally Paul Milgrom, Procuring Universal Service: Putting Auction Theory
to Work, Lecture at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Dec. 9, 1996) (providing an
optimal auction for universal service), http://www.market-design.com/files/milgrom-
procuring-universal-service.pdf.
96. Lifeline provides a subsidy, about $680 million per year, to reduce the cost of
monthly service for low-income households. INDUST. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, TRENDS
IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 19-12 chart 19.4 (2004), http://www.fcc.govlBureaus/Common-
Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend5O4.pdf. Federal Linkup, which provides about
$30 million per year for federal payments, matched by state subsidies, reduces the initial
hookup charges for telephone service for low income households. Id. The FCC and states
also have different high-cost fund subsidy programs. Currently, explicit high-cost funding is
$3.5 billion dollars per year. See Universal Service Fund: Estimated Annual Support
Amounts Based on Projections for 1st Quarter, 2004 (showing $3,584,403,813 for "All
Companies" "Total"), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-
03-407 1A2.xls (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
98. Universal Serv. Admin. Co., 2004 Annual Report 1, available at
http://www.universalservice.org/download/pdf/2004AnnualReport.pdf (showing "Schools
and Libraries Support" in billions of dollars) [hereinafter 2004 Annual Report].
99. Jay Rockefeller, Senator, U.S. Senate, Written Statement for Senate Commerce
Hearing on the E-Rate (Oct. 4, 2004) ('The most recent statistics for classroom connection
are amazing-92% of all classrooms are connected, and 89% of the poorest classrooms are
connected."), http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=erate&Template=/Content
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=77007.
100. 2004 Annual Report, supra note 98.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 2006 AND BEYOND
through assignable credits. To generate the funds, government should go to
a common pool of revenue that is drawn equitably from a base that is not
tilted toward or against any particular provider. The reason is to assure that
inefficient competition is not a byproduct of universal service.
Examples of reasonable funding sources include a flat tax on all
communications users, assignment of monies from a general pool of
revenues, a sales tax on all communications services, and tax credits
assignable to any and all providers through competitive processes.
V. PRACTICAL PROCESS
A. National Versus. State Jurisdiction
Seventy years ago, long before the Internet and even before
widespread long-distance calling, when communications were
predominantly local, Congress decided that communications should be
regulated primarily on a state level.' 0' But now, virtually all business and
consumer uses of communications freely and regularly cross state lines.
Under these circumstances, the right answer is to assign national decisions
to federal jurisdiction and local decisions to local authorities.
Federal regulatory authorities should set interconnection and
openness policies, should deregulate retail pricing, and should assure
procompetitive market structures. Local jurisdictions should assure that
rights of way and other public property rights are available to all service
providers, consistent with a general federal mandate. The physical
infrastructure is necessarily local, but the use of the system is inherently
national or even worldwide. In essence, consumers should now pay for
access to a network that allows them to communicate anything to anyone
anywhere. Far too much litigation has already consumed time and meaning
to no rational end result of jurisdictional allocation. It is time for Congress




The FCC has suffered, from time to time, a reputation for agency
capture by special interests, mind-boggling delay, internal strife, lack of
competence, and a dreadful record on judicial review. Much of the
101. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1046 (1934)
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2000)) (denying FCC jurisdiction over many carrier
issues).
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reputation is unfair; some is accurate. Reform steps have long been
discussed, but long delayed. An essential aspect of a wise communications
policy is the creation of an adept and effective regulatory, or rather,
deregulatory agency. To this end, the FCC should be about half the size,
and about half the personnel should be engineers, economists, and other
technical advisers, as opposed to lawyers. No field offices or other industry
support groups should exist.
Preferably, the agency should be headed by one commissioner and
not a group of five. The single commissioner ought to serve for a five-year
term and not be eligible for renewal. Also preferably, the job would be
nonpartisan. The commissioner should be given Chevron deference 0 2 by
the court of appeals, as a matter of congressional mandate. Congress should
annually review the commissioner's performance in a written assessment.
An independent bipartisan commission should review the same
performance every other year in a published, detailed report.
2. Gathering Data
The FCC should be more aggressive in its use of its ability to gather
and subpoena information. Subject to appropriate protections for
confidentiality, it should make such industry information available on a
timely basis. In addition it should publish detailed reports on an annual
basis concerning network usage, engineering efficiency, pricing for any and
all communications services, network outages, and other information
pertinent to any disinterested observer's scrutiny of the networks.
Instead, the FCC has limited exposure of network outages. 03 Either
the FCC or Congress has occasionally limited-officially or through
behind-the-scenes pressure-agency power to gather information.1°4 As
networks evolve, the FCC has done an increasingly poor job of gathering
and reporting information. That trend needs to be reversed.
The FCC's Web site is badly in need of change to make it more
accessible and easier for outsiders to find relevant information. Web links
should be mandated in all documents. Every party petitioning the FCC
should put its filings on its Web site in the same standardized, non-PDF
format, subject to open search techniques.
102. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103. New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to
Communications, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
F.C.C.R. 16,830, para. X, Order Granting Partial Stay, 19 F.C.C.R. 25,039, para. 3 (2004).
104. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Eighth Report, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,783, 14,927 (2003) (statement of Comm'r Copps,
concurring), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-03- 150A2.pdf
(discussing the FCC's inability to gather data).
[Vol. 58
Number 1] COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 2006 AND BEYOND
The Freedom of Information Act'05 should be amended to permit any
commissioner to discuss any matter confidentially with any other
commissioner, assuming that Congress fails to reduce the number of
commissioners to one.
3. Culture
The FCC's reversal rate in the courts is scandalously high.1
0 6
Congress should require quarterly reporting to the public on the reversal
rate. In the event that it rises above 50% for any three of four sequential
quarters, all commissioners sitting during those three quarters should be
obliged to leave office within a quarter thereafter.
Commissioners should be obliged to receive one month of intensive
training after confirmation before they can assume their seats and vote in
FCC matters. All commissioners should be instructed at least rudimentarily
in economics, antitrust, network operation, and administrative procedure.
Congress should be obliged by law to vote on confirmation of
commissioners within ninety days of their appointment.
The FCC's General Counsel should sign any decision by the FCC,
certifying that he or she believes that it complies with law.
The agency should be required by Congress to provide training funds
equal to a fixed amount per employee per year. Employees who do not
obtain training on a regular basis should be terminated. Every two years a
mandatory minimum number of employees-to be set by the proposed
independent commission-should leave the agency, either voluntarily or by
compulsion, and be replaced by new hires with up to date technical
competence in law, engineering, economics, or other appropriate
disciplines.
The agency should be reorganized forthwith according to functions
with industry silos disbanded. No employee should be permitted to remain
within a particular functional unit for more than five years.
C. Antitrust Enforcement
Communications, like all other sectors of the economy should be
subject to the antitrust laws. The Trinko0 7 decision notwithstanding,
Congress should make it clear that the Telecommunications Act and other
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
106. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding the
FCC's cross-media ownership limits decisions for justification or modification), cert.
denied, 125 S.Ct. 2904 (2005); U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(reversing major portions of the FCC's Triennial Order), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 313 (2004).
107. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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subsequent legislation does not give a free pass to companies that violate
the laws that protect consumers from anticompetitive practices.
From time to time, communications markets may not be perfectly
competitive. As a result, government should be more, not less, concerned to
disapprove mergers that lead to excessive concentration. Given the
dynamic nature of the industry and the structure of regulation, particular
concern should be given to mergers that not only result in a loss of actual
competitors, but also result in a loss of potential competitors. For example,
cable and telephone companies are competitors today in data services, but
they also appear to be likely competitors in voice and video services.
Ignoring the potential benefits from future competition would not be wise
antitrust policy.
In order to create a much wiser antitrust policy, the FCC and the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") every two years should publish a joint
analysis of structure, conduct, and performance of communications
markets. In this analysis, the FCC should publicly state its goals for the
next two years, and the DOJ should outline the sort of mergers it is likely to
approve and those it is likely to reject. This is little different from the
farsighted policies of Antitrust Division Chief William Baxter, who
supervised the breakup of AT&T under President Reagan. An independent
commission of bipartisan makeup should critique this analysis within three
months thereafter.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress and the FCC need to set an aggressive path for the near
future so that consumers can get the full benefits of the telecommunications
revolution. For far too long, the level of action has been reaction and
business as usual. With the advent of broadband and promise of wireless, a
new vision at the FCC is needed. Revamped pricing rules are needed so
that they reflect a true structure of competing networks, not a network of
adjacent monopolies. Congress also needs to act. It needs to ensure that the
regulatory structure is set in place for a world-class worldwide
communications system. This means alleviating all of the jurisdictional
infighting that throws sand into the gears of the system and ensuring that
the FCC has the mandate and authority to setup the necessary rules. It also
requires holding state and local authorities accountable for ensuring that
their citizens have access to the physical networks that will provide the on-
ramps to the information highway.
Because of the political baggage that has hampered the FCC and
Congress from doing an effective job in setting a market-oriented
communications policy, the first step should be the appointment of a
nonpartisan independent commission. This independent commission should
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have a clear charge with a limited time frame. The independent
commission's recommendations should form the basis for new laws and
FCC rulings that take effect within a very short time from the conclusion of
the independent commission's report.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic regulation has substantial effects on telecommunications
consumers in the United States. Regulation determines which services are
priced above cost, which services are priced below cost, and which
consumers will be overcharged in order to subsidize others. Regulation also
affects which kinds of technologies and services will be offered to
consumers and when, and whether consumers can decline to purchase
certain services. It even helps determine who is allowed to compete and
how.
Telecommunications companies, cable companies, Internet service
providers, equipment manufacturers, and various other interest groups
spend millions of dollars each year to bend regulations to their liking.
Number 1] COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATIONS
Economists have analyzed the effects of many individual regulations on
both consumers and producers. Despite the surfeit of interest group interest
and scholarly inquiry, no one has yet undertaken a comprehensive survey
of the costs and outcomes of federal telecommunications regulation. This
Article seeks to fill that gap by compiling scholars' estimates of the costs
and outcomes of these regulations, identifying gaps in knowledge, and in
some cases offering original estimates based on established methodologies.
The research covered includes studies published in academic journals and
books, academic working papers, and Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") reports. It includes studies sponsored by industry or
advocacy organizations only when they offer novel information, data
unavailable elsewhere, or empirical analysis based on academic work.
The focus here is on federal regulation of telecommunications. Key
issues of interest are the effects of regulation on the prices, quantity and
quality of service, along with the associated effects on consumer welfare
and overall economic welfare. Regulations that primarily affect
applications or uses of information that pass through the infrastructure are
outside the scope of this study.
As in a number of other regulated industries, the federal government
and states split jurisdiction. Traditionally, states have regulated intrastate
services, such as local telephone service and intrastate long-distance
service. The federal government regulates interstate services, such as
interstate long-distance, wireless, and Internet. The 1996
Telecommunications Act redrew these boundaries somewhat. Congress
prohibited states from giving local telephone companies exclusive
franchises; henceforth, states could no longer create barriers to entry.' To
stimulate competition, this legislation also requires incumbent local phone
companies to lease elements of their networks to competitors and permits
competitors to purchase their service at wholesale rates and resell it at retail
2
rates. The FCC decides which elements and services are subject to these
requirements and establishes pricing methodologies. State regulatory
commissions, however, determine the actual prices. Most recently, the FCC
decided that Internet telephony, or "Voice over Internet Protocol," service
is under federal rather than state jurisdiction.3
Part I of this Article outlines the principal effects of regulation
predicted by economic theory. Part II explains how the Article classifies
1. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)-(4) (2000).
3. See Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an
Order from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
19 F.C.C.R. 22404, para. 1 (2004).
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costs and outcomes, employing basic concepts from price theory. Part LII
presents estimates of costs and assessments of outcomes for ten types of
federal telecommunications regulatory activity: telecommunications
regulatory spending, long-distance access charges, universal service
funding, local number portability, enhanced 911, miscellaneous wireless
mandates, spectrum management, satellite regulation, unbundled network
elements, and resale of the incumbent's services. Part IV outlines the
principal conclusions one can draw, given the state of existing research.
II. THE BASICS: EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION
Economic theory suggests that price regulation can improve consumer
welfare when the regulated firm has monopoly power. If the firm charges a
price that exceeds the price it would charge if it faced competition, ideal
regulation can mimic the results of competition and force the firm to charge
the "competitive" price. When this occurs, regulation has two beneficial
effects for consumers. First, consumers who were already buying the
service receive it at a lower price; the gains to these consumers can be
measured by the amount of the price reduction multiplied by the amount
they were already buying at the monopoly price. Second, the lower price
induces consumers to purchase more, and this increased consumption
further increases consumer welfare. Conceptually, this gain to consumers
equals the difference between the regulated price the consumer pays and
the price the consumer would have been willing to pay, summed over all of
the additional units that are consumed.4
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 assumes that competition is
possible and desirable in all markets. In some cases, it directs the FCC to
promulgate regulations that are intended to move the industry from
monopoly to competition, rather than substitute regulation for competition.
To the extent that such regulations accomplish this goal, they should have a
similar effect on consumers as ideal regulation, reducing price and
increasing the amount of service purchased. In addition, the move from
monopoly to competition could produce other consumer benefits that
regulation rarely delivers, such as innovative new services.
Some regulations mandate that firms must offer, and consumers must
pay for, particular services or network functionalities. Examples include
911 emergency service and local number portability. Such mandates may
be intended to remedy market failures, such as public good problems or
market power. Alternatively, they may simply be adopted because
lawmakers and regulators believe they are good things that consumers
4. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 293-346 (2d Can. ed.
2001) (discussing a monopolistic scenario versus one of perfect competition).
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should have, even if there is no market failure.
Regulation is intended to make consumers better off by producing a
price equal to the competitive market price or by correcting for other
market failures.5 However, there is no guarantee that this will occur in
practice. There are at least five reasons: (1) prices below competitive
market levels can create shortages; (2) regulation can hold prices above
costs; (3) regulation and monopoly inflate costs; (4) regulation stifles
innovation and entrepreneurship; and (5) expenditures to acquire and
maintain wealth transfers increase costs.
A. Below Competitive Prices
If regulators set prices below the competitive level, they create
shortages. History suggests that regulators frequently succumb to this
temptation.6 The temptation is especially strong in capital-intensive
industries that require high up-front investments that have few good
alternative uses. After the investment is made, public policy can reduce
prices below the competitive level without immediately creating a shortage,
as long as the price is high enough to cover the firm's ongoing costs of
operation. Such prices harm consumers in the long run because firms will
refrain from investing if they expect the unremunerative prices to continue.
Eventually, this reduction in investment creates shortages, deteriorations in
the quality of service, or other problems that diminish consumer welfare.
5. For the sake of simplicity, this Article defines "competitive" price the same way as
most introductory economics textbooks do: as a single price charged by a firm whose
behavior is constrained by the presence of competitors. We must assume that a competitive
firm is already efficient, or else it would already have been displaced by competitors. We
must also assume that the competition is sufficiently strong that the firm cannot unilaterally
raise prices or earn profits that exceed its cost of capital. In an industry such as
telecommunications, which is undergoing rapid technological change, there are several
reasons why the concept of "competitive" price is more complicated. First, technological
improvements normally cause prices to fall over time; thus, it is more accurate to speak of a
competitive price path rather than a single competitive price. The more rapid the pace of
innovation, the more rapidly prices fall; but the more rapidly prices fall, the higher they
must be initially if firms expect to recoup their investments before competitors imitate or
out-innovate them. Second, diverse consumer wants can lead to product differentiation; in
such situations, the "competitive" price is actually a set of prices for different products and
services that are not perfect substitutes. Third, the possibility of innovation creates
substantial uncertainty as to how much consumers are willing to pay for a service, and for
how long. This uncertainty requires a higher level of profit to elicit investment than would
be required in the absence of uncertainty. For these reasons, "the competitive price" of a
telecommunications service or facility is likely to be a range of price paths that differ from
the price observed in a relatively stable, regulated market. To keep the language simple,
though, this study will continue to use the term "competitive price" to refer to this more
complicated, dynamic collection of prices.
6. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL
SERVICE?: WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT 112 (2000).
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B. Above Competitive Prices
Price and entry regulation imposed on a competitive industry can
actually increase prices and reduce consumption. This can occur either
because policymakers imposed regulation on a competitive industry
mistakenly or because they consciously did so in response to political
incentives.
Political incentives to regulate a competitive industry could come
from the industry itself, which may seek regulation in order to forestall
competition and increase profits. But political pressures may also come
from certain segments of customers, who use regulation to obtain service at
subsidized rates with the subsidies funded through excessive charges
imposed on other consumers. The history of telecommunications, as well as
the actual structure of telecommunications regulation, suggests that
policymakers have responded to both types of political pressures.
Traditionally, telecommunications regulation created market power, then
mandated that some of the monopoly overcharges must be used to make
local residential phone service available at prices that failed to cover
incremental costs. Mandated services and functionalities may also contain
an element of cross-subsidy. All consumers must purchase these services,
and consumers for whom the cost exceeds the value might subsidize those
for whom the value exceeds the cost. Regulation thus becomes an opaque
way of taxing some services to fund a highly visible "free lunch."7
When regulation elevates prices above costs, it reduces consumer
welfare both by increasing price and by reducing output. Cross-subsidies
can reduce producer welfare as well. If a monopolist is allowed to
overcharge and use the money to fund cross-subsidies, the firm sacrifices
some or all of the inflated profits. If regulators force competing firms to
overcharge consumers and then hand the money to some other firm to
subsidize its service, the firms forced to collect the excess charges will see
their sales and profits fall in response to the mandated price increase. This
latter example may appear fanciful in the abstract, but it happens quite
frequently in telecommunications regulation, as we shall see.
C. Inflated Costs
Cost-of-service regulation often distorts the regulated firm's choice of
inputs, so the regulated firm fails to produce at minimum cost. The
resulting rates might be considered "just and reasonable" because they
7. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. 22, 28 (1971). For
empirical research, see generally CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6; ROBERT W.
CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA
(1991).
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reflect costs, but the costs themselves are inflated.8 Competition creates
pressure for firms to squeeze out unnecessary costs and provide a
combination of price and quality that consumers prefer. Where monopoly is
expected to persist, both federal and state telecommunications regulators
have increasingly opted for "price cap" regulation, which caps the prices
firms can charge but allows them to earn additional profits by cutting costs.
Price caps can thus help avoid the cost-increasing incentives associated
with cost-of-service regulation.
D. Stifled Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Empirical studies frequently find that economic deregulation
generates larger price reductions and consumer benefits than economists
predicted based on pre-deregulation costs and market conditions.9 Such
findings underscore the importance of innovation and entrepreneurship in
improving economic welfare. As Winston noted, "Predictions of the effects
of deregulation were generally guided by static models that assumed
technology and operations would not be significantly affected by the
change in the regulatory regime."' Regulation diminishes entrepreneurial
incentives to lower costs, improve quality, and develop new products and
services.
Regulatory constraints on profits reduce the rewards for risky, but
potentially valuable, innovation. In theory, regulators could prevent this
problem by permitting the firm to earn a sufficient risk premium. In
practice, regulators face a continual temptation to disallow the risk
premium once an innovation is introduced and proven successful because
the successful innovation will likely remain in place even if regulation
8. See generally E. Ray Canterbery et al., Cost Savings from Nuclear Regulatory
Reform: An Econometric Model, 62 S. ECON. J. 554 (1996) (explaining how poor
management or faulty execution can lead to excess costs in the construction of power
plants); Leon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J.
ECON. 53 (1974) (assessing the impact of the Averch-Johnson effect as a factor in causing
companies to engage in inefficient behavior); Paul M. Hayashi & John M. Trapani, Rate of
Return Regulation and the Regulated Firm's Choice of Capital-Labor Ratio: Further
Empirical Evidence on the Averch-Johnson Model, 42 S. ECON. J. 384 (1976) (describing the
effects of the Averch-Johnson model in increasing costs); H. Craig Petersen, An Empirical
Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. EON. 111 (1975) (providing additional evidence
proving the Averch-Johnson effect); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and
Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. ECON.
38 (1974) (confirming the Averch-Johnson effect).
9. See Jerry Ellig, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. REG. ECON.
143, 164-65 (2002). See also Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic
Deregulation, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89, 91 (1998); Clifford Winston, Economic
Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, 31 J. EON. Lrr. 1263, 1285-86
(1993).
10. Winston (1998), supra note 9, at 91.
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reduces its profitability. After the fact, it is often difficult to distinguish
between high profits resulting from innovation and high profits resulting
from market power. Expropriating these profits, however, reduces
incentives for future innovation. And if profit regulation removes the
carrot, protected markets remove the stick-the competitive threat that
could otherwise spur entrepreneurship."
In addition to altering incentives for discovery, economic regulation
short-circuits the market's normal trial and error process. Real-world
competition is a dynamic process of trial and error. The purpose of
competition is to reveal what services, costs, and prices are possible.' 2 In
his dissent in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, a key case interpreting the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Justice Breyer noted:
The competition that the Act seeks is a process, not an end result; and a
regulatory system that imposes through administrative mandate a set of
prices that tries to mimic those that competition would have set does not
thereby become any the less a regulatory process, nor any the more a
competitive one. 3
If there is no competitive market, actual competitive prices cannot be
observed, but public policy regularly assumes that regulators can estimate
prices tolerably close to those that a competitive market would have
generated if it existed. In the absence of competition, we do not know for
sure what services, costs, and prices are possible; to estimate what
competitive prices would be, these things must be assumed, and the
assumptions may be wrong. In a very static industry, historical costs may
be a useful guide for calculating "competitive" prices. In a dynamic
industry, though, attempts to estimate competitive prices that do not
actually exist will be fraught with error.
Regulation can also stifle innovation more directly when firms must
obtain regulators' permission before entering new markets or offering new
services. In some cases, firms must wait for regulators to establish the legal
or institutional framework before they can deploy a new technology. 14 The
ten-year delay in allowing local Bell telephone companies to offer
voicemail, for example, cost consumers approximately $1.27 billion
annually, and regulation-induced delay in the introduction of cell phone
11. See Israel M. Kirzner, The Perils of Regulation: A Market Process Approach, in
DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 119 (1985).
12. See F. A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEw STUDIES IN
PHILOSOpHy, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179 (1978).
13. 525 U.S. 366, 424 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See Robert Crandall & Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice:
Lessons for the Electric Industry (1997), http://mercatus.org/pdf/materials/839.pdf (giving
examples from various industries).
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service cost consumers $50 billion annually in forgone benefits.15
E. Expenditures to Acquire or Maintain Wealth Transfers
Whether it curbs or creates market power, regulation transfers wealth.
The fact that regulation is a means of transferring wealth also implies
another effect on the welfare of both consumers and the regulated industry.
When wealth transfers are available, organized interests will expend
resources to obtain them. Regulated firms will spend money to retain
monopoly profits, or to protect themselves from below-competitive prices
that expropriate their assets. From a society-wide perspective, money spent
solely to capture wealth transfers is often considered pure waste. In some
circumstances, the total amount of money wasted may even exceed the size
of the wealth transfer.1
6
III. CLASSIFYING REGULATORY COSTS AND REGULATORY
OUTCOMES
Ideal economic regulation benefits consumers by reducing prices to
competitive levels or correcting for other market failures. In reality,
economic regulation may harm consumers by holding prices below
competitive levels, raising prices above competitive levels, increasing
costs, reducing innovation, or turning wealth transfers into social waste.
Identifying which of these things have occurred in practice is the key to
assessing the costs and consequences of economic regulation.
In practice, it is often easier to identify price changes and their
consequent effects than to identify forgone opportunities to cut costs or
introduce new innovations. Much of the empirical economics literature on
telecommunications regulation takes this approach. The virtue of this
approach is that it offers a simple and powerful framework for
understanding the effects of regulation. The principal drawback is that it
likely understates the costs of regulation. Nevertheless, the measured costs
are substantial.
15. See Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in 1997 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.
MICROECONOMICS 2 (Martin N. Baily et al. eds., 1998), available at http://econ-
www.mit.edu/faculty/download-pdf.php?id=470.
16. See Michael A. Crew & Charles K. Rowley, Toward a Public Choice Theory of
Monopoly Regulation, 57 PUBLIC CHOICE 49 (1988); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 39
(James Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
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A. Costs
This Article classifies regulatory costs into several categories based
on elementary price theory:
Wealth transfers: Economic regulation redistributes wealth from some
consumers and producers to other consumers and producers. Traditionally,
economic researchers have not regarded such transfers as a cost of
regulation, because one party's loss is another party's gain. However, if the
transfer process itself is wasteful, or if firms expend resources to capture or
defend themselves from wealth transfers, then some or all of the transfer is
a cost. The size of the wealth transfer is equal to the price change induced
by regulation times the number of units of output sold under regulation, or
p-Q.
Forgone consumer surplus: When regulation raises costs or prices,
consumers use less of the regulated service, and they are worse off as a
result. The value that consumers forgo, minus the price they would have
paid, is the forgone consumer surplus. The change in consumer welfare is
approximately equal to one-half of the change in price induced by
regulation times the change in quantity induced by the price change, or
.5-Ap-Aq.
17
Total cost to consumers: This is the sum of the wealth transfer
extracted from consumers plus the forgone consumer surplus, or p.Q +
.5.Ap.Aq. If some of the wealth is redistributed to consumers, it is counted
as a beneficial outcome, and estimating the net effect on consumers
requires a comparison of the total cost to consumers with the value of any
wealth transfers or other benefits that consumers receive.
Forgone producer surplus: When prices inflated by regulation prompt
consumers to use less of a service, producers sell less of it. The profits they
lose on the sales they do not make is called forgone producer surplus.
Forgone producer surplus is approximately equal to the change in quantity
induced by the regulation times the difference between the price that would
exist in the absence of the regulation minus the marginal cost, or Aq.(p-
In). 18
Value of forgone output: This is the sum of forgone consumer surplus
and forgone producer surplus that occurs when regulation reduces
consumption by raising prices. Mathematically, it is equal to .5-Ap-Aq +
17. See Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and
Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 19, 40 (1999).
18. Id.
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Aq.(p-m). Empirical studies frequently calculate this total sum rather than
breaking it up into the consumer and producer surplus components. The
value of forgone output is also called the "excess burden" of the regulation.
Wealth transfer plus forgone output: This is the widest measure of the
cost of regulation, equal to p.Q + .5.Ap.Aq + Aq.(p-m). It truly counts as a
measure of social cost if all of the wealth transfer is wasted. To the extent
that the wealth transfer is not wasted, adding the wealth transfer to the
forgone output overstates the cost of regulation.
The trickiest aspect of these calculations, aside from actually getting
the relevant data, is ascertaining how much of a change in quantity occurs
as a result of a regulation-induced price change. The change in quantity can
be calculated from the change in price with the aid of an estimate of the
price elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand measures how
responsive quantity is to price. It is equal to the percentage change in
quantity divided by the percentage change in price. The elasticity of
demand is defined as (Aq/q)/(Ap/p). 19 If one has an estimate of the elasticity
and also the values of p, Ap, and q, then one can solve for Aq.
All of the cost estimates in this Article are derived from these simple
mathematical relationships. In some cases, data or estimates of p, q, Ap,
and elasticities of demand were readily available from published studies or
FCC reports. In other cases, studies report only a figure for forgone
consumer surplus or total cost to consumers, but combining these study
results with data on other variables of interest allows one to calculate the
missing figures.
In some cases, the costs estimated in this Article emerge simply
because regulators set prices above or below competitive levels. In other
cases, wealth transfers and forgone consumer and producer surplus occur
because of regulation's more complicated effects on cost levels, innovation,
and entrepreneurship. The particular factors that underlie estimates of
regulatory costs will vary depending on the service studied, the nature of
the regulation, and the analytical method chosen by the authors of a
particular study.
Federal telecommunications regulations have significant costs, as
Table 2 on page 98, infra, shows. These regulations cost consumers at least
$25 billion annually in forgone consumer surplus, or as much as $100
billion if one includes the wealth transfers as a cost to consumers. Total
deadweight loss is approximately $41.7 billion annually. If all of the wealth
transfer is counted as a cost, the total social cost is approximately $118
billion annually. The figures fall only slightly if FCC regulatory
19. Lecture 4-Price Elasicity of Demand, DIGITAL ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2002,
http://www.digitaleconomist.com/DE-micro_4.pdf.
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expenditures are subtracted from the totals.
B. Outcomes
This study explicitly focuses on policy outcomes, rather than the more
common discussion of economic "benefits." Regulatory outcomes may be
positive or negative; all benefits are outcomes, but not all outcomes are
beneficial. It is much less awkward to speak of "outcomes," positive or
negative, than to use phrases like "negative benefits" or "dis-benefits."
The reason for focusing on outcomes is that some outcomes of great
interest to policymakers may not fit the economist's definition of benefits.
One goal of universal service programs, for example, may be to redistribute
wealth from the rich to the poor by subsidizing telephone service for the
poor. In conventional cost-benefit calculations, the wealth transfer would
not count as a benefit because one person's loss is another person's gain.
Nevertheless, policymakers may be quite interested in knowing how
effectively universal service programs accomplish the goal of progressive
wealth redistribution. Economic research can shed significant light on this
question. A focus on outcomes, rather than a narrower focus on benefits,
thus permits inclusion of a broader range of information about policy
results that economic research illuminates.
The key FCC document that identifies and assesses outcomes is its
annual Performance and Accountability Report.20 The Report articulates
the outcomes the FCC seeks to accomplish, and it also contains data on
outcome trends. The FCC has six strategic goals: broadband, competition,
spectrum, media, homeland security, and modernization. The first three of
these goals involve outcomes produced by FCC regulation of
telecommunications and the Internet. The fourth goal, homeland security,
involves several activities that affect the cost of telephone service, such as
deployment of Enhanced-911 and compliance with the Communications
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA").
For each strategic goal, the FCC lists performance goals, outcome
indicators, and performance measures. Virtually all of the performance
measures are FCC activities and outputs that are assumed to contribute to
accomplishment of the performance goals. Many of the performance goals
and outcome indicators articulate outcomes the FCC strives to produce for
citizens. Table 2 lists only those performance goals and outcome indicators
that identify actual outcomes of domestic U.S. telecommunications
regulation.
For each outcome indicator, the Report provides numerical data
20. FCC, Fiscal Year 2004 Performance and Accountability Report 115 (2004),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/ar2004.pdf [hereinafter Report].
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showing trends and progress. The accompanying narrative often mentions
specific regulatory initiatives that the FCC believes contributed to the
outcomes. However, there is little actual proof in the Report that the FCC
actions caused the measured outcomes, and no estimate of how much of
each outcome could be attributed to the FCC's actions.2'
Scholarly researchers have also assessed the outcomes of some FCC
regulations. The discussion of regulatory outcomes in this study presents
the results of such research, as well as relevant outcome information from
the FCC's Report.
21. In fairness, we should note that the FCC's Report is produced for a somewhat
different purpose than this study. The FCC's Report is intended to assess outcomes of all of
the FCC's major activities; it thus focuses on what the FCC has accomplished. In a number
of cases, such as spectrum auctions and reductions in long-distance access charges, market-
based modernization of the FCC's regulatory approach has generated significant benefits for
consumers and society. A comparison of the FCC's current approach with its approach ten
or twenty years ago would show significant improvement, and this improvement is reflected
in some of the favorable trends reported in the report. Conversely, this Article examines the
costs and outcomes of specific remaining FCC regulations. It thus focuses on opportunities
for improvement, rather than what the FCC has already accomplished. As a result, its tone is
necessarily more critical than the report.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
TABLE 1





* Broaden the deployment of technologies across the United States and globally.
, Outcome Indicators
* Increase access to broadband services;
• Increase access to broadband services and devices across multiple platforms: DSL,
cable modem, satellite, terrestrial wireless, etc.; and,
* Increase number of types of unlicensed and licensed wireless broadband devices.
Competition
* Performance Goals
• Ensure American consumers can choose among multiple reliable and affordable
means of communications; and,
* Ensure that all American consumers have and retain wireless and wireline phone
services.
* Outcome Indicators
" Increase percentage of households with competing providers for multichannel video
programming and information services;
* Increase numbers of consumers and businesses having a choice among wireless and
wireline service providers; and,
• Lower relative price for wireless and wireline services.
Spectrum
* Performance Goals
* Ensure that spectrum is used efficiently and effectively;
* Facilitate domestic and international deployment of new spectrum-based
technologies and services; and,
* Promote ease of access to spectrum by more users.
# Outcome Indicators
* Increase number of approvals for enhanced telecommunications equipment; and,




• Increase deployment of Enhanced-91 1.
22. This list includes only those items that clearly focus on outcomes. For a complete
list, see Report, supra note 20.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND OUTCOMES
A. Regulatory Expenditures
In theory, the easiest cost of regulation to identify is the money spent
to run the FCC. FCC outlays totaled $351 million in fiscal year 2003 and
are estimated at $361 million for fiscal year 2004.23
In addition to the direct cost to taxpayers, these expenditures create an
indirect cost: the reduction in economic output that occurs because of the
taxes necessary to raise the revenues. The value that this lost output would
have created for consumers and producers is called the "excess burden" of
the tax. Economic research suggests that general taxation usually involves
an excess burden of $0.25-$0.40 per dollar raised. 24 Multiplying $0.25-
$0.40 by $361 million in FCC outlays for fiscal year 2004 yields an excess
burden of approximately $90-144 million. Adding the excess burden to the
outlays results in a total cost of $451-505 million; the higher figure appears
in the "excess burden" column of Table 2. FCC outlays, which reflect
appropriations, may either over- or understate the FCC's expenditures on
telecommunications and broadband regulation. The FCC's appropriation
covers other regulatory initiatives, such as broadcasting, that are outside the
scope of this study. On the other hand, the FCC receives revenues from the
public in addition to appropriations, such as revenues from spectrum
license auctions, interest on loans to spectrum buyers, penalties, and
forfeitures. It retains some of these revenues to cover its costs.
The Report provides an alternative estimate of federal expenditures
on the regulations covered in this study. The Report breaks costs down by
strategic goal. The first three strategic goals-broadband, competition, and
spectrum-cover most of the regulations in this study. The combined net
cost of these three programs is approximately $1.2 billion.25 Obviously, not
all of this is financed by appropriations. If the excess burden associated
with the non-appropriated funds is also $0.25-$0.40 per dollar raised, then
the total excess burden is $300-480 million.26 Total spending of $1.2
billion plus the excess burden would be $1.5-1.7 billion.27 These are big
23. See SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, MERCATUS CTR. & WEIDENBAUM CTR.,
REGULATORS' BUDGET CONTINUES TO RISE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2004 and 2005 740 (2004), http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials796.pdf.
24. See Jerry Hausman, Efficiency Effects on the U.S. Economy from Wireless Taxation,
53 NAT'L TAX J. 733, 739 (2000).
25. Report, supra note 20, at 115. This figure excludes revenues and costs for the
Universal Service Fund, which are addressed separately, infra, Part IV.D.
26. The $300 million and $480 million figures are derived by multiplying $1.2 billion
times $0.25 and $0.40, respectively.
27. The $1.5 billion and $1.7 billion figures are derived when $300 million and $480
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numbers, but the costs that flow from FCC regulations far exceed the
FCC' s expenditures.
B. Long-Distance Access Charges
Long-distance telephone companies pay access charges to local
telephone companies. There is virtually unanimous agreement among
regulatory economists that, historically, these charges have been used to
subsidize local telephone service.28 Long-distance access charges are but
one example of the patchwork of charges that various carriers pay each
other when they exchange traffic. For interstate calls, these charges average
$0.01-$0.051 per minute, depending on the carriers. The FCC has an
ongoing proceeding that seeks to rationalize and simplify these charges.29
Many of these charges distort prices and generate costs for consumers. The
only one whose costs have been studied extensively, however, is long-
distance access charges. Cost figures for long-distance access charges
should, therefore, be taken as a lower-bound estimate of the costs generated
by the current intercarrier compensation arrangements.
1. Costs
A large body of empirical research estimates the effect of access
charges on consumer welfare by examining their effect on long-distance
prices and usage. Because consumer demand for long-distance service is
very responsive to price, access charge policies that inflate the price of
long-distance service generate significant reductions in consumer welfare.
When an artificial price increase leads consumers to cut back on
consumption by a large amount, it makes consumers substantially worse
off. Most studies find that the price elasticity of demand for long-distance
service is relatively large, in a range between -0.05 and -0.72; a 1%
increase in long-distance prices reduces use by about one-half to three-
million are added to $1.2 billion, respectively.
28. See Wayne Leighton, Consumers and Cross-Subsidies: An Interest Group Theory of
Telecommunications Regulation 67-69 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George
Mason University) (on file with the Author and the Federal Communications Law Journal).
The argument that long-distance service does not cross-subsidize local service is based on
the assumption that local loop costs are "common costs" of producing long-distance and
local service. However, the fact that customers might use local phone lines for both local
and long-distance calls does not mean that local loops are common costs for the phone
companies. A loop provides a customer with access to the telecommunications network. The
cost of any loop is incremental to the rest of the system, and a loop receives a subsidy if it
does not cover its incremental costs. See, e.g., Steve G. Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in
Telecommunications, 13 J. REG. ECON. 157, 169-70 (1998).
29. See Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685 (2005).
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quarters of 1%.30 A consensus estimate of the elasticity is -0.07.31 Hence,
long-distance access charges generate relatively large reductions in long-
distance usage and consumer welfare.
The most recent and extensive study that measures these welfare
impacts was published by the Brookings Institution in 2000. Using 1996
data, Crandall and Waverman first employed several different cost models
to estimate how much additional revenue local phone companies would
earn if they could eliminate cross-subsidies and price local phone service at
incremental CoSt. 32 They then estimated the effect on long-distance prices
and economic welfare if these additional revenues were used to reduce
long-distance access charges.3 3 Depending on the specific model and
assumptions, elimination of cross-subsidies increases consumer welfare by
between $1-3.7 billion annually. 34 Long-distance companies gain an
additional $1.6-3.4 billion annually, yielding a total increase in economic
welfare of between $2.5-7 billion.35 These estimates are consistent with
findings from earlier studies, conducted when access charges were much
higher, that showed repricing could increase economic welfare by $10-17
billion.36 The figures are net calculations that include changes in welfare
due to the price increases for local service.
These figures possibly overstate the current cost of interstate access
charges for three reasons. First, they are based on data from 1996, when
interstate access charges were higher, and monthly subscriber line charges
were lower, than they are today. Second, they likely include the effects of
reducing intrastate as well as interstate access charges. The estimates
assume that local service is priced at cost, and the resulting revenues are
used to reduce both interstate and intrastate access charges. Finally, the
resulting revenues in some cases exceeded actual access charges.37 This last
result probably occurred because local telephone service receives cross-
subsidies from other sources in addition to access charges. However, a
30. See Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 17, at 36-37.
31. See M. H. Riordan, Universal Residential Telephone Service, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMIcs 436 (M. Caves et al. eds., 2002).
32. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 109-12.
33. Id. at 113-15.
34. Id. at 120. Range of figures is derived by subtracting Crandall and Waverman's
estimates of the effect of repricing on long-distance companies' producer surplus from the
net effect on economic welfare.
35. Id. at tbls. 6-8.
36. See id. at 141. This range of figures results when one converts Crandall's 1988
estimate, as well as other estimates he cites for 1983 and 1985, into 1996 dollars (using the
Consumer Price Index) to make them comparable with the 1996 estimates in Crandall and
Waverman, supra note 7.
37. See id. at 113-15.
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rough calculation using national average data from 1996 suggests that
elimination of interstate long-distance access charges would increase
consumer welfare, on net, by approximately $1.9 billion and increase
producer welfare by $3.2 billion.38 These results suggest that inefficiencies
associated with interstate access charges are responsible for the bulk of
Crandall and Waverman's findings.
A similar rough estimate can be calculated using national average
data for 2002, the most recent year for which data are available. Interstate
access charges averaged between $0.01-$0.016 per domestic conversation
minute and generated approximately $3.3 billion in revenues. 39 In 2002,
there were 333.8 billion domestic conversation minutes, and average
revenue per minute was $0.07.40 The incremental cost of access is
measured in tenths of a cent, so most of the access charge subsidizes local
telephone service.4' A $0.01 interstate access charge reduces consumer
welfare by approximately $300 million and reduces producer welfare by
about $1.2 billion.42
2. Outcomes
The current system of access charges is intended to promote universal
service. The assumed public benefit is that more people subscribe to local
phone service because access charge revenues subsidize monthly local
rates. This outcome could be read as part of the FCC's competition
performance goals that focus on ensuring that all American consumers
have and retain phone service, and that all Americans have "affordable"
means of communications.
These outcomes may address a "market failure," reflecting the
internalization of a genuine externality, under three conditions: (1) the
value of telephone service to each subscriber rises when other subscribers
38. For calculation method, see infra note 293. For data source, see JIM LANDE &
KENNETH LYNCH, FCC INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
REVENUES 2002 30-31 tbl.10 (2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/telrev02.pdf. Using 1996 data, average
revenues per interstate domestic conversation minute (p) were $0.12, access costs plus
universal service contributions per average conversation minute were $0.049, and interstate
domestic conversation minutes totaled 286.8 billion. Id.
39. See id. (reporting that in 2002, interstate access charges per domestic conversation
minute averaged $0.01, and access charges per interstate 2-ended minute averaged $0.016).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Billy Jack Gregg, A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the
United States, THE NAT'L REG. RES. INST. tbl. 2 (July 2003) (showing in column G of Table
2A that cost-based unbundled network element switching rates are usually in tenths of a cent
per minute).
42. For calculation method, see infra note 293. For data sources, see LANDE & LYNCH,
supra note 38.
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join the network, (2) the increase in value is large enough that current
subscribers would be willing to subsidize these new subscribers, and (3)
individuals fail to take this increased value into account when they decide
whether to subscribe.43
Even if these conditions hold, a regulatory response may not be
necessary because the owner of the network has strong financial incentives
to maximize the value of the network by crafting subsidies to new
subscribers if subsidies are needed to internalize the externality.44
Alternatively, policymakers may believe that an increase in telephone
subscription rates is a good outcome even if there is no externality.45
Regardless of whether an externality exists, most research suggests
that cross-subsidies from long-distance to local service generate little
increase in telephone subscriptions. Consumer decisions to subscribe to
telephone service are not very sensitive to the fixed monthly charge. 46 In
other words, local service has a relatively low price elasticity of demand.
This elasticity appears to have fallen over time. Several recent studies using
census data, for example, have found that the elasticity in 1990 was about
one-third of the value in 1970, and in 2000 it was only one-eighth of the
1970 value.47 It may even be equal to zero in the United States and other
developed countries.48 Surveying the findings of multiple studies, Jerry
Hausman and Howard Shelanski note:
A comparison of price elasticities of demand for local and long-
distance telephone services thus reveals that an increase in long-
43. The first condition defines the existence of an externality. The second condition
determines whether it is a "Pareto-relevant marginal externality," an often-overlooked
precondition for a subsidy or regulatory action to improve consumer welfare. The third
condition is the familiar "external effect," which is not by itself sufficient to justify
government intervention. See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Simple Welfare
Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies, 13
J. REG. EcON. 245, 245-46 (1998).
44. See Stanley J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 94 (M. Caves et al. eds., 2002).
45. See John C. Panzar, A Methodology for Measuring the Costs of Universal Service
Obligations, 12 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 211, 213 (2000).
46. See Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 43, at 252-53; Riordan, supra note 31, at 431;
David L. Kaserman et al., Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications: Beyond the
Universal Service Fairy Tale, 2 J. REG. EcON. 231 (1990).
47. See Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Estimating Telephone Demand
with State Decennial Census Data from 1970-1990, 21 J. REG. ECON. 317, 326 (2002)
[hereinafter Garbacz & Thompson (2002)]; Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson,
Estimating Telephone Demand with State Decennial Census Data from 1970-1990: Update
with 2000 Data, 24 J. REG. ECON. 373, 376 (2003) [hereinafter Garbacz & Thompson
(2003)].
48. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 91; Christopher Garbacz & Herbert
G. Thompson, Universal Telecommunication Services: A World Perspective, INFO. EcON. &
POL'y 495, 497, 506 (2005) [hereinafter Garbacz & Thompson (2005)].
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distance prices is probably more harmful to society's economic welfare
than is an increase in local service prices. Long-distance demand, with
a price elasticity of -0.7, will contract substantially more in the face of
a price increase than will local-service demand, with a price elasticity
of -0.005.
These differing elasticities suggest that cross-subsidies from long-
distance to local service may at best generate small increases in telephone
subscription at the cost of a large reduction in consumer welfare due to
inflated long-distance prices.
Yet even this tradeoff may be an illusion. Higher long-distance rates
tend to reduce telephone subscription since consumers subscribe to local
phone service in part so that they can make long-distance calls. Some
studies find that subscription is more sensitive to changes in long-distance
rates than to changes in local rates.50 Therefore, a reduction in the cross-
subsidy from long-distance to local rates may actually increase telephone
penetration. The principal study examining these offsetting effects
estimated that the reduction in cross-subsidies that the FCC ordered
between 1984 and 1990 actually increased telephone penetration rates by
0.45%, bringing 450,000 additional households onto the telephone
network.5'
More recent studies using a variety of statistical techniques find very
little evidence that the cost of monthly service affects telephone penetration
rates, even for low-income households; in that case, access charges
generate consumer costs but simply fail to promote universal service. 52 In
short, the policy of cross-subsidizing local rates with revenues from long-
distance access charges generates little increase in telephone subscription
rates, and may even reduce them.
The principal indicator the FCC's Report cites as relevant to
"affordability" of telephone service is a 4% decline in the Consumer Price
Index for telephone services between 1998 and 2004.53 However, this index
includes long-distance and wireless service, as well as the local service that
gets subsidized in the name of "affordability." Clearly, telephone service
49. Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 17, at 39.
50. See Jerry Hausman et al., The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone
Penetration Rates in the United States, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 178, 182-83 (1993).
51. Id. Garbacz and Thompson also find that higher long-distance prices reduce
telephone penetration rates, and the size of the effect falls between 1970 and 2000. This is a
logical finding, given the large reductions in long-distance prices that occurred over that
period. Garbacz & Thompson (2002), supra note 47; Garbacz & Thompson (2003), supra
note 47.
52. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 94-104. See generally Garbacz &
Thompson (2005), supra note 48.
53. Report, supra note 20, at 33.
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has become more affordable. However, it is doubtful that access charges
have done anything to make telephone service more affordable. If anything,
it is the FCC's efforts to reduce access charges that have reduced the per-
minute cost of telephone service by enabling large reductions in long-
distance rates that spurred increased usage.
Another potential goal of the cross-subsidy may be to redistribute
income via the phone lines. The evidence suggests that the cross-subsidy is
difficult to justify on equity grounds. Even in households with incomes of
less than $10,000, long distance accounts for more than 40% of average
monthly telephone expenditures. 54 In all income classes, long-distance
usage is quite variable, with some households using a lot and some very
little.55 It is thus safe to say that many low-income households use a great
deal of long-distance service; consequently, the cross-subsidy may actually
diminish the welfare of these households.56 In addition, the local service
subsidy funded with access charges is not targeted based on income, in
marked contrast to the practice in other regulated utilities such as electricity
and natural gas. Rich and poor households alike are entitled to one cheap
57residential phone line-an odd way of redistributing income to the poor.
Crandall and Waverman's study found that cross-subsidies from long-
distance to local service transfer only $2 per month to low-income
households on average. Put differently, the nation forgoes $2.5-7 billion in
order to redistribute about $435 million to low-income households.5 8 The
authors note, "Regardless of the assumed cost model, this is a very costly
income redistribution policy. 59
C. Universal Service Funding
In addition to authorizing access charges on some carriers, FCC
regulations require universal service "contributions" from providers of
interstate and international telecommunications services to subsidize basic
phone service for low-income customers, subsidize high-cost phone
companies, provide reduced-price Internet service to schools and libraries,
and offer reduced-price telecommunications services to rural health care
facilities. Providers typically pass these charges through to consumers on
their bills.
The federal government spent approximately $5.4 billion on these
54. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 48.
55. Id. at 49.
56. Id. at 49-50.
57. See id. at 26.
58. Id. at 119-20.
59. Id. at 121.
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universal service programs in 2004.60 More than half of this money-$3.5
billion-went to subsidize high-cost carriers, and $759 million (14%) was
spent on programs for low-income customers that help pay initial
connection charges (Link-Up) and subsidize monthly phone bills
(Lifeline).61 Most of the rest ($1.2 billion, or 22%) subsidized internal
wiring, telecommunications, and Internet service to schools and libraries.62
Thus, about 80% of the funds were devoted to subsidizing basic telephone
service, with the remainder spent on the newer "universal service"
programs created by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which reduced the
cost of Internet service to specified types of institutions.
1. Costs
The contributions take the form of a percentage assessment against
sales of interstate and international services-primarily interstate long-
distance and wireless phone services. Readjusted quarterly, the universal
service "contribution factor" was 8.7% for the first two quarters of 2004
and 8.9% for the second two quarters.63 The FCC proposed a 10.7%
contribution factor for the first quarter of 2005, 11.1% for the second
quarter, and 10.2% for the third quarter.64 Though not formally called a tax,
the assessment has all the economic effects of a tax. This funding
mechanism for universal service programs generates substantial consumer
costs in addition to the revenue it raises to fund universal service. This
occurs because the contribution mechanism acts as a tax on services with
relatively high price elasticities of demand, such as long distance and
wireless.
Hausman and Shelanski estimated that the contributions required
from long-distance service to fund discount Internet service for schools and
libraries reduce the sum of consumer plus producer welfare by
60. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, 19-5 tbl.
19.1 (2005), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLinkIAD/
trend504.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Public Notice, FCC, Proposed First Quarter 2004 Universal Contribution Factor, 18
F.C.C.R. 25111 (2003); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Second Quarter 2004 Universal
Contribution Factor, 19 F.C.C.R. 4052 (2004); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Third Quarter
2004 Universal Contribution Factor, 19 F.C.C.R. 10194 (2004); Public Notice, FCC,
Proposed Fourth Quarter 2004 Universal Contribution Factor, 19 F.C.C.R. 18104 (2004).
64. Public Notice, FCC, Proposed First Quarter 2005 Universal Contribution Factor, 19
F.C.C.R. 24045 (2004); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Second Quarter 2005 Universal
Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. 5239 (2005); Public Notice, FCC, Proposed Third Quarter
2005 Universal Contribution Factor, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming 2006) (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/DA-05-1664A1 .pdf.
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approximately $0.65-0.79 for every dollar of revenue raised.65 The
marginal effect-that is, the effect of additional contributions-is even
higher: $1.25 for each additional dollar raised.66 Thus, in addition to the
$1.89 billion that Hausman estimated the program would transfer from
consumers of long-distance service to schools and libraries, the program
would cost the economy $2.36 billion annually due to reduced output of
long-distance service. 67
It is possible to construct a similar estimate for interstate long
distance using FCC data from the most recent year available, 2002. For
domestic interstate long distance, federal universal service contributions
averaged $0.08 per conversation minute. 68 This price increase raised
approximately $2.7 billion in revenues, but it also reduced consumption of
long-distance service. 69 As a result, the price increase reduced consumer
welfare by about $240 million and reduced producer welfare by about $920
million, for a total reduction in economic welfare of $1.16 billion.70
Like long-distance service, demand for wireless service is relatively
responsive to price, with U.S. demand elasticity most recently estimated in
the range of -1.12 to -1.29.71 Estimates using international data are even
higher, in the range of -1.71 to -3.62.72 Hausman estimated the impact on
65. Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 17, at 42-43.
66. Id.
67. Jerry Hausman, Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation, in 12 TAX POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 29, 31 (James M. Poterba ed., 1998).
68. See LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38, at 30. Universal service contribution per
interstate domestic conversation minute was calculated by subtracting $0.01 access cost per
interstate conversation minute in 2002 from $0.018 total access and universal service
contribution per interstate domestic conversation minute in 2002.
69. The $2.7 billion figure is the product of $0.008 per minute universal service
contribution times 333.8 billion interstate domestic conversation minutes, as reported. Id.
70. See infra note 294 for calculation method and data sources. Although the revenue
figure is larger than Hausman's estimate in 1998, the effects on economic welfare are
smaller than he calculated because this study uses average figures derived from an estimate
of the joint effects of interstate long-distance access charges and universal service
contributions. Hausman's figures are estimates of the marginal effect of adding the universal
service contributions on top of existing access charges. Since the efficiency loss associated
with raising additional dollars exceeds the average efficiency loss, Hausman's marginal
figures are higher.
71. J. Gregory Sidak, Is State Taxation of the Wireless Industry Counterproductive? 19
(2003), http://www.criterioneconomics.condocssidak-pacific-research.pdf. See also Jerry
Hausman, Cellular Telephone, New Products, and the CPI, 17 J. Bus. & ECON. STAT. 188,
191 (1999) (estimating a demand elasticity of approximately -0.5 with 1988-1993 data);
Mark Rodini et al., Going Mobile: Substitutability Between Fixed and Mobile Access 16-17
(Center for Research on Telecommunications Policy, Working Paper 58), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=379661 (estimating an overall price elasticity of demand of -0.6
with 2000-2001 data).
72. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & ROBERTO E. Mutoz, AEI-BRoOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR
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the economy of all taxes applied to wireless, including the universal service
contributions imposed by the FCC.73 He calculated that every dollar raised
reduced consumer plus producer welfare by approximately $0.53, implying
that wireless taxes cost the economy $2.56 billion annually in addition to
the $4.79 billion raised annually in the late 1990s. 74 Additional taxes or
contributions would, on average, entail a cost of $0.72 for each dollar of
revenue raised.
An adaptation of Hausman's method permits an estimate of the
effects of wireless universal service contributions in more recent years.
Universal service assessments on interstate wireless service raised
approximately $1.476 billion in 2004.7 5 These assessments created a
consumer welfare loss of $48 million and a producer welfare loss of $930
million for a total reduction in economic welfare of $978 million.76
2. Outcomes
The low-income and high-cost support programs are most closely
related to the FCC's goals of ensuring that all Americans have affordable
means of communication and remain on the telephone network. While
these programs clearly transfer large amounts of money between different
groups of users, the extent to which they promote universal service by
actually increasing subscribership is much less clear.
a. Low-Income Programs
A 1997 study by Christopher Garbacz and Herbert G. Thompson,
using data from the 1990 Decennial Census, found that expenditures on
Lifeline and Link-Up programs increase telephone penetration, but by very
small amounts.77 A 10% increase in expenditures would lead to less than a
0.1% increase in the percentage of households with telephones.78 Studies
by the same authors using 2000 census data estimate that Lifeline and
REGULATORY STUDIES, A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION POLICIES 15
(2004), http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1024; Gary Madden
& Grant Coble-Neal, Economic Determinants of Global Mobile Telephony Growth, 16 INFO.
ECON. & POL'Y 519, 531 (2004); Garbacz & Thompson (2005), supra note 48, tbl. 5
(finding a price elasticity of -0.45 with respect to the monthly charge using 1996-2001 data).
73. See Hausman, supra note 24.
74. Id.
75. See generally TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 60 (multiplying total
universal service outlays in tbl. 19.1 by the percentage of contributions from wireless service
providers in tbl. 19.15).
76. See infra note 295 for calculation method and data sources.
77. Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Assessing the Impact of FCC
Lifeline and Link-Up Programs on Telephone Penetration, 11 J. REG. ECON. 67, 77 (1997).
78. Id.
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Link-Up increase subscription at a cost of $1,581-$2,200 per additional
subscription.79 The authors conclude:
This is a direct result of the fact that a high proportion of program
monies go to households that are already on the network and do not
plan to leave. How to target those not on the network, while denying
payments to those already on the network who are in no danger of
leaving is a conundrum.
80
More recently, Garbacz and Thompson used the same method to assess the
effects of Lifeline and Link-Up separately. They found that Link-Up had
no effect on telephone penetration, and Lifeline was responsible for most
of the effect they previously attributed to both programs jointly.8'
A 2004 study confirms these estimates and inferences, finding that
Lifeline and Link-Up programs increased total subscribership by about
0.155% in 2000.2 Overall, the programs cost about $97 per household that
receives subsidies, but increased subscribership at a cost of approximately
$1,899 per additional subscriber.8 3
Finally, some studies find that the low-income programs have no
effect on subscribership at all. One of the most extensive recent studies
found that monthly charges have no influence on telephone penetration
rates, and Link-Up programs sometimes increase and sometimes decrease
penetration, depending on the data set used to estimate the relationship.84
Studies of phoneless households help explain these results. The most
common reasons that phoneless households give for not subscribing to
telephone service is concern about uncontrollable usage-based charges, not
the cost of basic local service. A path-breaking 1994 study of low-income
households in New Jersey found that the cost of usage-related charges and
optional services-such as long distance, collect calls, calling-card calls,
and voicemail-were the most common reasons that households lacked
phone service.85 Heads of households noted that other family members or
friends living with them had run up large usage-related bills in the past,
79. See Garbacz & Thompson (2002), supra note 47, at 320, 328; Garbacz &
Thompson (2003), supra note 47, at 377.
80. Garbacz & Thompson (2002), supra note 47, at 328.
81. Garbacz & Thompson (2005), supra note 48, at 508 n.14.
82. See Daniel J. Ryan, Universal Telephone Service and Rural America 17-18 (Apr.
30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.telecom-economics.com/papers/Paper3-
02-01-05.pdf.
83. Id. at 17-18.
84. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 94-104.
85. See Milton L. Muller & Jorge Reina Schement, Universal Service from the Bottom
Up: A Study of Telephone Penetration in Camden, New Jersey, 12 THE INFO. Soc'y 273,
274 (1996).
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often without their knowledge or approval.8 6 The authors concluded,
"Income, employment, and other measures of wealth or poverty are
strongly related to low penetration not because the price of basic local
phone service is too high, but because low-income users who run up large
usage-related bills are unable to cover them."87
A 1995 survey of Texas households without telephones found that
about half of them said the cost of local service makes it difficult to afford
a telephone, but about 80% said they could afford to pay $16 per month,
the actual average cost of local service in Texas at the time of the survey.
88
The primary barriers to phone service were the fact that long-distance
charges are variable and hence perceived as harder to control, the cost of
reinstallation for people who previously had service disconnected due to
nonpayment of bills, and difficulty in controlling who uses the phone.8 9
Overall, the low-income programs (particularly Lifeline) appear to be
a very ineffective way of increasing subscribership among low-income
households; they may have no effect at all. On the federal level, they
redistributed about $700 million to low-income households in 2003;90 thus,
only about 13% of total universal service funding was targeted to low-
income recipients. About 6.6 million Lifeline subscribers received an
average of $102.55, and 1.7 million Link-Up beneficiaries received one-
time payments averaging $18.13.91 Whether these programs are an efficient
means of redistributing income to the poor depends on how one defines
their cost and relevant alternatives.
All of these cost-per-additional-subscriber figures measure only
expenditures, not the additional loss of consumer and social welfare that
results from the assessments on long-distance and wireless service. If one
attributes 13% of the reduction in economic welfare caused by universal
service programs to the low-income programs, then they are responsible for
a $278 million reduction in overall economic welfare, or $0.40 per dollar
transferred.92
86. Id. at 283.
87. Id. at 287.
88. See John B. Horrigan & Lodis Rhodes, The Evolution of Universal Service in Texas,
Alliance for Public Technology (Sept. 1995), http://www.apt.org/policy/lbjbrief.html.
89. Id.
90. See FEDERAL-STATE JOINT BOARD ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE, UNIVERSAL SERVICE
MONITORING REPORT, tbl. 2.4 (2004), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ComimonCarrierl
Reports/FCC-StateLink/Monitor/mr04-0.pdf.
91. Id. at tbls. 2.1, 2.4.
92. Table 2, infra, indicates that universal service contributions from long-distance
service generated an excess burden of $1.16 billion, and universal service contributions
from wireless generated an excess burden of $978 million, for a total of $2.14 billion.
Thirteen percent of $2.14 billion is $278 million. Dividing $278 million by the amount of
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b. High-Cost Support
The high-cost support programs, which account for more than half of
the universal service fund's expenditures, appear to be a very costly way of
increasing subscribership. The most recent study on this topic estimates
that the cost of adding one subscriber through loop support was at least
$11,000 in 2000, up from $3,350 in 1990.93 The cost of adding one
subscriber through local switching support was $5,155, up from
approximately $2,000 in 1990.94 This cost is substantially higher than the
$666 estimated by another study for 1985-93.95
Another potential goal of high-cost support could be redistribution of
wealth to rural households. Superficially, the program appears to
accomplish substantial redistribution, with expenditures of $3.5 billion in
2004.96 Two factors, however, suggest that high-cost support is a highly
inefficient redistribution program. First, the payments go to telephone
companies, not households, and there is no guarantee that the $3.5 billion
subsidy actually creates $3.5 billion worth of value for rural households.
Many of the high-cost telephone companies are rural companies that still
operate under rate-of-return regulation, which is notorious for creating
incentives for inefficiency. Second, any resulting reductions in rural
telephone rates are funded in large part by universal service assessments on
long-distance and wireless. To the extent that rural subscribers use a
substantial amount of long-distance service-because many of the people
they call are outside the local calling area-or also subscribe to wireless,
the high-cost program merely rearranges figures on their phone bills rather
than providing any genuine savings. But because long-distance and
wireless uses are highly sensitive to price, universal service assessments on
those services reduce economic welfare substantially.
c. Schools and Libraries
The schools and libraries program might be interpreted as one means
of accomplishing the FCC's performance goal of increasing broadband
deployment. Outcome indicators in the Performance and Accountability
Report, however, focus on broadband deployment to homes and businesses,
so they provide no information about the effects of the schools and libraries
money transferred by low-income programs-$700 million--equals 40%.
93. See Ryan, supra note 82, at 19.
94. Id. at 21.
95. See R.C. Eriksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from
Post-Divestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Service, 41 J.L. & ECON. 477, 498 (1998)
(using data only for the Bell telephone companies, which receive a small portion of total
high-cost support and may not be typical).
96. See TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 60.
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program.9
7
The schools and libraries program is targeted in the sense that it gives
lower discounts to wealthier institutions, but it is not clear whether this
program has actually induced more schools and libraries to obtain Internet
access. The National Center for Education Statistics reports that Internet
access in public schools has increased steadily since 1994 to the point that
98% of schools now have Internet access. 98 Several of the center's
statistical releases speculate that the schools and libraries program may
have helped increase Internet access, but they provide no analysis
demonstrating that the program caused Internet access to be any higher
than it would have been in the absence of the program. 99 The most
sophisticated analysis of the program has been conducted by the Urban
Institute under contract to the U.S. Department of Education. This study
finds that Internet connectivity for both high-poverty and low-poverty
schools increased after implementation of the schools and libraries
program, but connectivity for both was also increasing prior to the
program. 1°° Funding is effectively targeted to high-poverty and rural
schools.' 0 ' Schools receiving subsidies report increases in deployment of
Internet technology. 102 The study contains no data or analysis
demonstrating that Internet connectivity is higher than it would be in the
absence of the program; indeed, several statistical tests in the study find no
effect.'0 3
Similarly, there are no studies demonstrating whether any increase in
Internet subscription or usage generated by the program has actually
improved educational outcomes. The Urban Institute study sought to
determine whether the technology subsidies have in fact expanded access
to the Internet, but it does not purport to assess whether Internet access in
schools has improved the quality of education."3 4 The Office of
Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool analysis
97. Report, supra note 20, at 24-25.
98. See Anne Cattagni & Elizabeth Farris Westat, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Internet Access
in U.S. Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994-2000, (2001), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2001/2001071.pdf.
99. See id.; see also Catrina Williams, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Internet Access in U.S.
Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994-99, (2000), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/
2000086.pdf.
100. See MICHAEL E. PUMA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE INTEGRATED STUDIES OF
EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: A FORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE E-RATE PROGRAM 21
(2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410579_ERateFinalReport.pdf.
101. Id. at v.
102. Id. at vii.
103. Id. at app. C.
104. See id. at 34.
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concludes that the results of this program have not been demonstrated,
awarding a score of 7 out of a possible 100 points for results and
accountability.'0 5 The "results not demonstrated" rating means that data or
measures are insufficient to permit assessment of whether the program has
accomplished intended results.
D. Local Number Portability
Regulation and legislation have mandated number portability for
different types of phone numbers at different times. In some sense, the
earliest form of portability occurred when long-distance service was
opened to competition in the 1970s, since customers did not have to switch
phone numbers when switching long-distance carriers. Phone numbers for
800-service, however, were not portable until May 1, 1993.1°6 Prior to then,
a business with an 800-number that wanted to switch long-distance carriers
had to switch phone numbers as well.
More recently, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the
FCC to make rules requiring wireline and wireless local service providers
to implement local number portability."' 7 Under the Act and the FCC's
rules, local number portability is defined as "the ability of users of
telecommunications services to retain, at the same location, existing
telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability, or
convenience when switching from one telecommunications carrier to
another."'
108
Wireline carriers were required to introduce local number portability
as early as February 1, 1999.109 Wireless local number portability began on
November 24, 2003.110 The purpose of local number portability is outlined
in the Commission's First Report and Order: 'The ability of end users to
105. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, OTHER INDEPENDENT AGENCIES PART ASSESSMENTS
58-60 (2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombbudget/fy2005/pma/agencies.
pdf.
106. V. Brian Viard, Do Switching Costs Make Markets More or Less Competitive?:
The Case of 800-Number Portability 4 (Sept. 9, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available
at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP 1773R2.pdf.
107. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (2000). See also Telephone Number Portability; CTIA
Petitions for Declaratory Ruling on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23697, para. 3
(2003) [hereinafter Telephone Number Portability].
108. 47 U.S.C. § 153(30) (2000). See Telephone Number Portability, supra note 107.
109. See 47 C.F.R. § 52.33(a)(1) (2004); see also FCC, CONSUMER INFORMATION: LOCAL
TELEPHONE NUMBER PORTABILITY (Jan. 1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-
Carrier/Factsheets/portable.html.
110. Thomas M. Lenard & Brent D. Mast, Taxes and Regulation: The Effects of
Mandates on Wireless Phone Users, PROGRESS ON POINT, Oct. 2003, at 10, available at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop10. 18wirelessmandates.pdf.
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retain their telephone numbers when changing service providers gives
customers flexibility in the quality, price, and variety of
telecommunications services they can choose to purchase."I''
Regulations requiring local number portability give consumers the
ability to keep their phone numbers when switching between local service
providers, be it a landline or wireless provider. The caveat, as the word
"local" indicates, is that the provider is only required to "port" the number
if the individual changes providers within the same metropolitan area."
2
An individual may switch from a landline provider to a wireless provider,
as well as between wireless and landline providers. Individuals switching
between wireless providers will also have to change phones, due to
differences in technology used by the different providers. FCC staff have
noted, "[e]ven if your phone could be reprogrammed to work on a new
network, carriers usually don't allow this."
' 13
The principal argument for local number portability is that it
facilitates consumer choice. If individuals are no longer required to change
phone numbers when switching carriers, they may be more likely to switch
carriers if they see enough benefit in doing so. Consumers who want to
switch no longer experience the inconvenience and other costs associated
with changing phone numbers. Instead, all consumers must pay for the
systems and software that give them the option of taking their phone
numbers with them when they switch carriers.
1. Costs
No research has assessed the costs of number portability in long-
distance service. Local number portability has generated more significant
debate and analysis. Local number portability requires phone companies to
purchase new software, acquire new equipment, construct new number
databases, perform intercarrier testing, and implement new business
procedures.' "4 Firms are allowed to charge a monthly fee to recover the
costs they will incur; they may itemize it as a separate fee on customers'
bills or include it in the monthly rate.11 5 Local wireline carriers were
permitted to implement a charge for local number portability as early as
111. Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, para. 30 (1996) [hereinafter First Report and
Order].
112. See A Conversation on Wireless Local Number Portability: Video Updated (FCC
May 24, 2005), http://wireless.fcc.gov/wlnp/ [hereinafter Conversation].
113. Seeid.
114. See Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 2 (indicating that these costs originally
applied only to wireless local number portability, but wireline carriers will experience these
same types of costs).
115. See Conversation, supra note 112.
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February 1999.' All other carriers-wireless and wireline-can recover
number portability costs however they choose, so long as they do not
violate other FCC regulations in the process. u7
a. Wireline Number Portability
Local wireline carriers have been allowed to collect a local number
portability charge since February 1999.18 In 1999, the FCC approved
residential number portability charges for major phone companies that
ranged from $0.23 to $0.48 per month.119 A web search performed in July
2004 found a variety of number portability charges in that range. In
addition, some phone companies charge businesses substantially more. It is
possible to calculate a conservative estimate of wireline number
portability's cost by assuming that the average wireline carrier charges
about $0.35 per month, per line-the midpoint of the figures allowed by
the FCC. Multiplying this figure by the number of incumbent and
competitor phone lines yields an annual cost between $762 million in 2003
and $809 million in 2000.120 The cost peaked in 2000 because the total
number of wireline phone lines has fallen every year since then.' 2' The total
cost over five years is approximately $4 billion. 122
After five years, the phone companies will, in theory, have to absorb
the cost of local number portability. It is not clear whether firms will really
bear the cost of portability after five years. The additional expenditures that
portability entails are a cost of doing business imposed on all competitors.
As a result, competitors whose rates are not regulated, such as wireless,
will likely pass these costs through to consumers in their prices even if they
cannot impose an explicit number portability charge. For incumbent
landline telephone companies subject to cost-based regulation, portability
costs will likely make their way into the general pool of costs that can be
recovered from consumers. The principal carriers unable to pass portability
costs directly through to consumers after five years may be the larger
116. 47 C.F.R. § 52.33(a)(1) (2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Public Notice, FCC, FCC Investigation Produces Lower Number Portability
Charges for Customers of U S West Communications, Inc., (July 9, 1999), http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/NewsReleases/1999/nrcc9O43.html.
120. There were 193 million wireline lines in 2000. That number fell to 181 million in
2003. See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2003, tbl.1
(2004),http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/ReportslFCC-
StateLink/IAD/lcom0604.pdf [hereinafter Local Telephone Competition].
121. Id.
122. Figure calculated by multiplying $0.35 times annual line counts from 1999-2003
that appear. Id.
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incumbents that are subject to price cap regulation rather than cost-based
regulation. To the extent that price caps are periodically adjusted, however,
even these incumbents may have some latitude to pass portability costs
through to consumers, though the pass-through would not be very
transparent.
As with other price increases, those caused by the costs of mandated
number portability will also tend to reduce consumer and producer welfare
by reducing use of the service. In the case of wireline telephone service,
this effect is likely negligible, since local wireline telephone subscription is
not very responsive to price changes. Therefore, the total cost to wireline
customers of number portability is likely just the cost of the monthly
charge.
b. Wireless Number Portability
Wireless local number portability charges are often opaque because
carriers sometimes combine them with other regulatory charges.123 In mid-
2004, Verizon Wireless listed a separate portability charge of $0.40 per
month, and one media report pegged Sprint's portability charge at $0.63
per month. 24 The other major carriers lump the portability charge in with
other regulatory charges. 125 In November 2004, Verizon Wireless
announced that it would eliminate its fee, and Sprint cut its fee to $0.25 per
month. 126 Verizon claimed that costs had fallen but also noted the change
would make its service more competitive with other carriers. 127 It is not
clear whether these changes in charges actually reflect cost changes or
simply reflect a decision to cut prices by eliminating an opaque fee that
annoys many consumers. Even if the fee falls to zero, consumers still pay
costs associated with number portability because the price of wireless
service is higher than it would be in the absence of these costs.
A study released the month before wireless number portability
became final used figures announced by major carriers to estimate the
123. See FCC Urged to Ban 'Misleading' Charges on Phone Bills, TELECOM. POL'Y
REPORT, Mar. 31, 2004, http://www.findarticles.comp/articles/mi-mOPJR/is-13_2/ai-
114794726 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) (national wireless carriers often list the charge
resulting from local number portability with other regulatory charges).
124. See Bruce Meyerson, Verizon Doubles Fee to Keep Number, MSNBC, Nov. 25,
2003, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3606462.
125. Fees vary among carriers and have changed over time. Carriers charged the
following fees as of July 2004: Cingular charged between $0.56 and $1.25, AT&T charged
$1.75, T-Mobile charged $0.86, and Nextel charged $1.55. Yuki Noguchi, Verizon and
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monthly cost per customer.128 The study estimated that the upfront costs of
portability averaged $0.213 per subscriber per month, amortized over three
years. 129 Ongoing costs averaged $0.285 per subscriber per month for the
first five years. 30 These figures are consistent with Verizon's and Sprint's
charges in July 2004.
The FCC reported that there were 159 million wireless subscribers at
the end of 2003 and 182 million at the end of 2004.131 Average
subscribership for 2004 was likely close to 170 million, the midpoint of
these two year-end figures. If the cost of wireless local number portability
is approximately $0.50 per subscriber per month, the total cost was $6 per
subscriber per year, or approximately $1.02 billion. Because demand for
wireless service is highly sensitive to price, these increased costs likely
reduce wireless subscription, consumer welfare, and producer welfare.
These effects are most accurately estimated as a proportionate share of the
effects of several regulatory changes that all began to affect wireless
service in 2003 and 2004. The price increases induced by wireless local
number portability reduced consumer welfare by approximately $28
million and reduced producer welfare by approximately $540 million, for a
total reduction in economic welfare of $568 million. 132
Some authors argue that the increased costs to firms associated with
customer switching, or "chum," should also be counted as costs of the
regulation. 133 Predicted rates of chum would increase the cost per customer
by $1 or more per month. 134 Like expenditures on new software and
databases, the marketing expenditures become an additional cost imposed
on all competitors. Since wireless service is relatively competitive, there is
no pool of excess profits that companies would compete away through
increased marketing efforts. Consumers would ultimately have to pay for
the bulk of any increased marketing efforts that companies take to retain
customers.
However, it is not clear how a significant increase in chum could be
consistent with the assumption that wireless is highly competitive. If
128. See Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 14.
129. Id. at tbl. 3.
130. Id. at 19.
131. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilitation Act
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming 2006), tbl 2 (2005),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-173A1 .pdf
[hereinafter Tenth Report].
132. For calculation method and data sources see infra note 296.
133. See Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 20-22.
134. Id.
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wireless is already highly competitive, then why would significant numbers
of customers suddenly choose to switch providers? Alternatively, a sudden
increase in churn associated with number portability would be consistent
with the theory that wireless providers were charging above-competitive
prices, at least to that segment of customers who refrained from switching
solely because numbers were not portable. For these reasons, inclusion of
churn as a cost of regulation is questionable.
2. Outcomes
The principal outcome regulators expect from local number
portability is increased competition, which should lower phone bills or
generate other consumer benefits. A sufficiently large increase in
competition could generate price reductions or other benefits that outweigh
the effects of local number portability's costs.
The FCC's Report describes number portability as "an important step
in promoting competition and customer choice."'135 The Report's outcome
indicators for competition show the following statistics: (1) the percentage
of U.S. population in areas with three or more wireline providers rose from
67% in 2000 to 84% in 2003; (2) the percentage of the U.S. population in
areas with three or more wireless providers rose from 91% in 2000 to 97%
in 2003; (3) the Consumer Price Index for telephone service fell by 4%
between January 1998 and May 2004; and (4) the average price of wireless
telephone calls fell from $0.18 per minute in 2000 to $0.10 per minute in
2003.136
Local number portability may contribute to price reductions, and it
may even increase the number of competitors if it makes market entry
worthwhile for some competitors who would not otherwise have entered.
The FCC's Report, however, provides no evidence that local number
portability caused the reported price reductions and increases in
competitive options. Indeed, wireless number portability could not have
caused any of the reported statistical results, since it did not become
effective until November 2003.
The FCC quoted several industry sources in its First Report and
Order that suggest the absence of number portability curtailed competition:
We note that several studies described in the record demonstrate the
reluctance of both business and residential customers to switch carriers
if they must change numbers. For example, MCI has stated that, based
on a nationwide Gallup survey, 83 percent of business customers and
80 percent of residential customers would be unlikely to change local
135. Report, supra note 20, at 32.
136. Id. at 32-33.
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service providers if they had to change their telephone numbers. Time
Warner Holdings states that consumers are 40 percent less likely to
change service providers if a number change is required. Citizens
Utilities notes that approximately 85 percent of the discussions that its
subsidiary, ELI, has with potential customers about switching
providers end when those potential customers learn that they must
change their telephone numbers. The study commissioned by Pacific
Bell concludes that, without portability, new entrants would be forced
to discount their local exchange service and other competing offerings
by at least 12 percent below the incumbent LECs' prices in order to
induce customers to switch carriers due to customers' resistance to
changing numbers. 1
37
Many customers balk at changing phone numbers because it is costly
to do so. A consumer who changes phone numbers needs to notify others of
the change. A business that changes phone numbers may need to advertise
the change and would likely need to print new letterhead, business cards,
etc. The absence of number portability thus creates a "switching cost" that
discourages consumers from switching carriers.
A number of theoretical studies examine the possible impact of
switching costs on competition and consumer welfare, both in general and
with respect to phone number portability. In theory, the absence of number
portability may or may not reduce consumer welfare. Switching costs
decrease demand elasticity and rivalry, essentially creating submarkets for
individual firms' products that could allow firms to charge higher prices.
"Differentiating functionally identical products through switching costs,
however, yields no benefits to set against the cost of restricted output."'
38
On the other hand, switching costs may intensify rivalry for new customers
because it is easier to retain these customers after they have signed up. Any
profit that firms hope to earn as a result of switching costs may in effect be
refunded to consumers in advance, when firms compete to sign up new
customers. These theoretical considerations suggest that mandated number
portability is less likely to benefit consumers when the market is already
competitive and more likely to benefit consumers when the market starts
out monopolized. 1
39
Few studies attempt to measure the effect of switching costs in
telecommunications. One presents empirical results suggesting that
switching costs impeded price reductions in long-distance service between
1984 and 1993.14 Another finds that lowering the price that U.S.
137. First Report and Order, supra note 111, para. 29 (citations omitted).
138. See Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. ECON. 375,
377 (1987).
139. See id.
140. See Christopher R. Knittel, Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs, Switching
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consumers pay when they switch long-distance carriers from $5 to $2-and
making up the difference through increased access charges-could increase
consumer welfare by several hundred million dollars, largely by
redistributing wealth from long-distance companies to consumers. 41 This
kind of change is similar to mandated number portability because it
converts a cost borne by customers when they switch carriers into a cost
that all customers must bear, regardless of whether they ever switch.
Another recent study estimated that the net effect of 800-number portability
was to reduce the price of toll-free service by approximately 14%.142 This
result implies that the procompetitive effects of 800-number portability
outweighed any associated costs.
Unfortunately, no data or studies assess the extent to which local
number portability has affected competition or prices. As of September
2004, the FCC saw no evidence that customer chum increased following
implementation of wireless local number portability. 143 The FCC did,
however, cite media and analyst reports suggesting that wireless firms
launched aggressive customer retention efforts when portability was
imminent. 144
Raw FCC data show that porting of telephone numbers has steadily
increased. 145 The number of numbers ported to a wireline carrier rose from
80 in 1997 to 6.8 million in 2003.' 46 Wireless portability started in
November 2003, and 807,802 numbers were ported to wireless carriers in
the fourth quarter of 2003.' 47 These figures are a small fraction of the 180
million landlines and 157 million wireless lines reported for the year. 148 In
any case, it would be a mistake to infer that the number of ported phone
numbers measures the effect of portability on competition, or even on
customer switching. To find the effect of portability on switching, one
would need to estimate how many of the customers who ported phone
numbers would have refrained from switching carriers in the absence of
number portability. To assess the ultimate effect on consumers, one would
need to determine whether portability caused any price reductions or other
consumer benefits to occur.
Costs, and Market Power, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 519 (1997).
141. See Douglas A. Galbi, Regulating Prices for Shifting Between Service Providers, 13
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 181, 194-96 (2001).
142. Viard, supra note 106, at 17.
143. See Tenth Report, supra note 131, para. 165.
144. Id.
145. See TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 8-11 tbl. 8.8.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Local Telephone Competition, supra note 120.
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E. Enhanced 911 Service
Basic 911 service requires wireline and wireless carriers to route 911
calls to a "Public Safety Answering Point."'' 4 9 Enhanced 911 requires the
carrier to identify the caller's location to emergency dispatchers. 150
1. Costs
We found no estimates of the costs wireline carriers incur to provide
enhanced 911. The cost issues are more serious for wireless carriers, since
their phones are mobile. Wireless carriers can implement enhanced 911 by
using either network-based or handset-based technology, such as global
positioning systems in mobile phones. Wireless carriers had to be ready to
offer some aspects of enhanced 911 service in 1998. Cost data are sketchy,
but a Progress and Freedom Foundation study estimated that implementing
enhanced 911 would cost wireless carriers approximately $0.61 per
subscriber per month during the first five years.' 5' Multiplying this figure
by the estimated average of 170 million subscribers in 2004 yields a total
annual cost of $1.25 billion. If this cost is passed through to consumers, the
price increase would reduce consumer welfare by $34 million annually and
reduce producer welfare by $659 million annually, for a total annual
reduction in economic welfare of $693 million.1 52
In May 2005, the FCC decided that Voice over Internet Protocol
("VoIP") providers must include enhanced 911 as part of their standard
service package. 153 No cost estimates are available for this mandate. The
FCC surely reduced the cost by declining to require VolP providers to
automatically identify the customer's location. For the time being, the
customer is responsible for inputting and updating this information.
54
2. Outcomes
To assess the outcome of its wireless enhanced 911 initiatives, the
FCC tracks the number of 911 answering centers, or "Public Service
Answering Points," that receive more precise "Phase II' location
information from wireless providers.' 55 This figure grew by 444%-from
149. Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 34.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 38.
152. Infra note 298 (describing the calculation method and data sources).
153. See Public Notice, FCC, Commission Requires Interconnected VolP Providers to
Provide Enhanced 911 Service (May 19, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-258818A 1.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Report, supra note 20, at 59.
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350 to 1,904-between February 2003 and August 2004.156 The Report
provides no statistics that put these figures in context, so it is not clear
whether a substantial percentage of Public Service Answering Points or
population is now covered. In addition, this information says nothing about
the beneficial outcomes that occurred for citizens as a result of expanded
911 coverage.
One economic study has assessed health and hospital cost outcomes
that could be attributed to enhanced 911 service. 157 It examines effects
solely for cardiac patients, for whom timeliness of emergency care can be a
crucial survival factor. 158 Data for the study cover several years but were
gathered prior to 2000, so it can best be interpreted as a study of the effects
of wireline enhanced 911.159 Enhanced 911 reduced the risk of death within
six hours of the emergency phone call by 60%, and reduced the risk of
death within 48 hours by 35%. 16° Even assuming a relatively low value of
life saved ($450,000), the authors estimated annual benefits of $684,000 for
a typical county, compared to an estimated annual cost of $800,000.161 In
addition, adoption of either basic or enhanced 911 lowered hospitals'
average total costs of treating cardiac patients by 16%-about $1,000 per
patient, or $304,000 for the average county.' 62 The combination of risk and
cost reduction suggests that enhanced 911 reduced the need for more
extensive treatment by enabling patients to receive care sooner. Since
cardiac emergencies account for less than 10% of all 911 calls, these
figures suggest that the benefits of wireline 911 are substantial. 63 The
finding is consistent with a 1985-89 study in Iowa, which found that
cardiac patients with ordinary 911 service were 1.62 times more likely to
survive than patients without 91 1.'64
No studies assess whether similar benefits flow from wireless 911.
Consumers clearly make an increasing number of emergency calls from
wireless phones, but it is not clear whether these are the same types of
emergencies for which wireline 911 has generated benefits. 165
156. Id.
157. See Susan Athley & Scott Stem, The Impact of Information Technology on
Emergency Health Care Outcomes, 33 RAND J. EcON. 399 (2002).
158. Id. at 401.
159. Id. at 400.
160. Id. at 427.
161. Id. at428.
162. See id. at 427-28.
163. Id. at 428.
164. Sue A. Joslyn et al., Survival from Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest: Effects of
Patient Age and Presence of 911 Emergency Medical Services Phone Access, 11 AM. J.
EMERGENCY MED. 200, 203 tbl. 5 (1993).
165. See Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 39-40.
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F. Miscellaneous Wireless Mandates
Two other regulatory mandates currently have more of an effect on
the cost of wireless service than on the cost of wireline service: number
pooling and CALEA. The FCC started wireless number pooling in
November 2002.'66 CALEA applies to both wireline and wireless carriers,
but the legislation appropriated $500 million to help cover the cost of
necessary modifications to equipment installed prior to 1995.67 Thus, it is
likely that taxpayers rather than wireline telephone subscribers bore most
of the costs CALEA imposed on wireline carriers, and these costs are
largely in the past. Wireless subscribers, on the other hand, receive no
similar benefit. No federal appropriation subsidizes the CALEA-related
expenses of wireless firms. Since all wireless carriers must bear these costs,
it is likely that they are passed on to consumers.
1. Number Pooling
Number pooling means the assignment of wireless phone numbers to
companies in blocks of 1,000 instead of 10,000. The FCC did this because
carriers were using fewer than half of their assigned numbers, and they
were running out of area codes. When numbers were assigned in blocks of
10,000, all numbers under the same "central office code," the first three
local digits of the number, were assigned to the same company. With
pooling, multiple companies may use the same central office code within
an area code.
Number pooling requires network upgrades to route calls to the right
company sharing a central office code. Cost estimates are even less exact
than for enhanced 911. The principal economic study estimating the costs
finds that they would average $0.168 per customer per month during the
first five years. 168 Multiplying this figure by the estimated average number
of subscribers in 2004 yields a total annual cost of $348 million. If this cost
is passed through to consumers, the price increase would reduce consumer
welfare by $9.5 million annually and reduce producer welfare by $184
million annually, for a total annual reduction in economic welfare of $193
million.1 69 We found no estimates of the benefits of number pooling.
166. See id. at 23.
167. Id. at 29.
168. See id. at 27.
169. Infra note 299 (describing the calculation method and data sources).
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2. CALEA
CALEA requires telecommunications firms to modify their networks
to permit electronic surveillance by law enforcement officials.170 The
estimated monetary cost is $0.238 per customer per month during the first
five years.17' Multiplying this figure by the estimated average number of
subscribers in 2004 yields a total annual cost of $491 million. If this cost is
passed through to consumers, the price increase would reduce consumer
welfare by $13 million annually and reduce producer welfare by $259
million annually, for a total annual reduction in economic welfare of $273
million. 172 No estimates are available of the additional costs borne by law-
abiding citizens who have their privacy invaded unnecessarily. 173
Beneficial impacts of CALEA would be improvements in law
enforcement and national security. Statistics show that the number of
wiretaps has increased steadily over the past several decades, but it is not
obvious from the raw data that CALEA has affected this trend.174 The
FCC's Report mentions CALEA-related activities but provides no
information about relevant outcomes.1 75 An assessment of outcomes would
need to demonstrate not just that CALEA improved law enforcers' ability
to gather information through wiretaps, but also that such information has
had a material effect on public safety or national security.
G. Spectrum Management
Electric and magnetic fields produce waves that move through space
at different frequencies. A wave's frequency is the number of times that its
crest passes a given point in a period of time. The electromagnetic
spectrum is the set of all possible frequencies, and the radio spectrum is the
set of frequencies used for radio, broadcasting, and other
communications. 76 The FCC manages and allocates portions of the
spectrum used by parties other than the federal government.
Technically, the FCC does not assign, allocate, auction, or license
spectrum. Rather, it licenses devices that use various portions of the
170. Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 27-28.
171. See id. at 29.
172. See infra note 300 (describing the calculation method and data sources).
173. See id. at 30.
174. Id. at 30-33.
175. Report, supra note 20, at 56.
176. Electromagnetic spectrum, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic-spectrum
(last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
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spectrum. 177 FCC spectrum policy affects telecommunications competition
and consumer welfare in two ways. First, an FCC rulemaking determines
the amount of spectrum that can be used for a given purpose, such as
broadcasting or wireless communications, and myriad other details.
7 8
Second, the FCC's method for issuing licenses to use spectrum determines
who receives licenses, and how quickly.
A major improvement in spectrum management occurred when
Congress authorized the FCC to auction licenses in 1993. Prior to 1981, the
FCC decided whose equipment could use which spectrum through
"comparative hearings." In 1981, Congress authorized the FCC to allocate
licenses through lotteries. 179 The methods used to award licenses prior to
auctions cost consumers billions of dollars due to delayed adoption of
wireless communications services.18 0 Lottery entrants, for example, had to
manufacture applications that "proved" they were qualified to operate
wireless telecommunications systems, at a cost of $500 million to $1
billion between 1986 and 1989.181 Most licenses awarded by lottery were
then resold. Auctions eliminated such waste. The first license auctions
occurred 34 years after they were proposed by Nobel Laureate Ronald
Coase, who was asked by an FCC commissioner when he testified on his
proposal before the FCC in 1959, "Is this all a big joke?' 8 2
Spectrum has not, however, been privatized; the auction winners
simply get to operate equipment that uses the spectrum for specified
purposes. 183 Formally, spectrum is owned in common by the American
177. Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 'Big Joke,': An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy 102 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. on Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper No. 01-02, Jan. 2001), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/
page.php?id=140.
178. Id. at 40 (The rulemaking "defines the service allowed, what business model that
business will be conducted under (common carrier, private carrier, broadcaster, etc.),
technical standards, the number of competitors in the marketplace, geographic size of
licenses, terms of license renewal and license transfer, and myriad business details.").
179. Id. at 41.
180. See id. at 41; see also FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Report, 13
F.C.C.R. 9601, 9612-14 (1997) [hereinafter Spectrum Auctions Report].
181. SeeHazlettetal.,supranote 177, at I11.
182. Id. at 5.
183. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, Comments of 37 Concerned Economists 3 (Feb. 7,
2001), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=176,
which states:
[A]uctions for licenses have not changed the underlying system of spectrum
allocation. Radio frequencies are allocated to services by an FCC rule making.
The opportunity cost of spectrum is evaluated not by market participants but by
regulators. With few exceptions, spectrum continues to be offered to the market
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public, and the FCC merely regulates its use by issuing licenses. 184 The
design and implementation of license auctions has generated substantial
scholarly research and commentary, often focused on whether the design of
the auction ensures that each license will go to the bidder that values it
most highly. Aspects of the FCC's auction design have generated
substantial criticism, but there appears to be a general consensus among




Spectrum management policy, however, continues to generate
substantial consumer costs. Licenses have become somewhat more flexible
in recent years. Nevertheless, FCC decisions, rather than market
transactions, determine the general uses to which various blocks of
spectrum will be put.' 86 Defense and local government get to use large
only as allocated and no price can be offered to reallocate it from the officially
designated use.
See also Hazlett, supra note 177, at 102, which states:
Indeed, to be issued an FCC license, an applicant must first certify that it will not
assert any propertied interests in radio spectrum. This is so fundamental to U.S.
communications law that it predates the 1927 Radio Act, being enacted in Senate
Joint Resolution 125, signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge on Dec. 8,
1926.
(citations omitted).
184. See Hazlett et al., supra note 177, at 41-42.
185. See generally Lawrence M. Ausubel et al., Synergies in Wireless Telephony:
Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 497 (1997);
Mark M. Bykowski et al., Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem,
17 J. REG. EcON. 205 (2000); Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 605 (Martin Cave et al. eds., 2002); Thomas W. Hazlett,
Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for 'Open Access' to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 805 (1998); HAZLETr & Mulqoz, supra note 72; Evan R. Kwerel & Gregory L.
Rosston, An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions, 17 J. REG. ECON. 253 (2000);
ANTHONY M. KWASNICA ET AL., INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC SCIENCE, A
NEW AND IMPROVED DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECT ITERATIVE AUCTIONS (2002),
http://www.ices-gmu.org/pdf/materials/372.pdf; Patrick S. Moreton & Pablo T. Spiller,
What's In the Air: Interlicense Synergies in the Federal Communications Commission's
Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 677
(1998); DAVID PORTER ET AL., INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC SCIENCE,
COMBINATORIAL AUCTION DESIGN (2003), http://www.ices-gmu.net/pdf/materials/419.pdf;
DAVID PORTER, INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER FOR ECONOMIC SCIENCE, AN EXPERIMENTAL
EXAMINATION OF DEMAND REDUCTION IN MULTI-UNIT VERSIONS OF THE UNIFORM-PRICE,
VICKREY, AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS, http://www.ices-gmu.net/pdf/materialsl403.pdf;
Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 180.
186. See Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market
Allocation of Spectrum 4 (Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 38, 2002),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228552AI.pdf. See also Arthur De
Vany, Implementing a Market-Based Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & ECON. 627 (1998).
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blocks of spectrum for free, and as a result such spectrum is often used
inefficiently. 187 As the FCC's Spectrum Policy Task Force noted:
As a general proposition, flexibility in spectrum regulation is critical to
improving access to spectrum. In this context, "flexibility" means
granting both licensed users and unlicensed device operators the
maximum possible autonomy to determine the highest valued use of
their spectrum, subject only to those rules that are necessary to afford
reasonable opportunities for access by other spectrum users and to
prevent or limit interference among multiple spectrum uses. . .. In
most instances, a flexible use approach is preferable to the
Commission's traditional "command-and-control" approach to
spectrum regulation, in which allowable spectrum uses are limited
based on regulatory judgments.' 88
The FCC affects the price of wireless telephone and data services by
determining how much spectrum can be used for each service. The fact that
spectrum users must now purchase licenses through auctions does not
increase the prices consumers pay for wireless services; auctions merely
allow the government to collect some of the profit from the firms using the
spectrum. 189 But, by creating an artificial scarcity of spectrum, a critical
input, regulators increase the prices that wireless firms can charge
consumers by reducing the supply of wireless services. These price
increases and resulting consumer welfare losses would occur regardless of
whether the FCC awarded licenses through auctions, hearings, or lotteries.
The explosive growth of wireless service in the 1990s demonstrates
how spectrum policy can have large effects on consumer welfare. In the
1980s, the federal government licensed only two cellular providers in each
market. 19° In 1993, Congress directed the FCC to begin to auction
spectrum, and the FCC responded by auctioning almost twice as much
spectrum as it had already allocated to cell phone service, effectively
making room for at least six wireless providers. 191
187. See Jerry Hausman, From 2G to 3G: Wireless Competition for Internet-Related
Services, in BROADBAND: SHOULD WE REGULATE HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ACCESS? 106, 120-
21 (Robert W. Crandall & James H. Alleman eds., 2002).
188. FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT 16 (2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542Al.pdf. See also FCC, SPECTRUM PoLIcY TASK
FORCE: ONE YEAR LATER 7 (2003) (updating the FCC initiatives implementing the Task
Force's recommendations as of 2003), http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/fileslpresentation-
11 1303.pdf.
189. See EvAN KWEREL, FCC, SPECTRUM AUCTIONS Do NOT RAISE THE PRICE OF
WIRELESS SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2000), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/
papersAndStudies/SpectrumAuctionsDoNotRaisePrices.pdf.
190. Robert W. Crandall & Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in U.S. Telecommunications
Services: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES:
WHAT'S NEXT? 102 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000).
191. Id. at 102-03.
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Between 1984 and 1995, when there were just two cell phone
companies per market, inflation-adjusted rates fell by an average of
between 3 and 4% annually. 192 Entry of new competitors prompted price
reductions averaging 17% annually between 1995 and 1999.193 More recent
trends show up in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' index of wireless
telecommunications prices, which begins in 1997. During the past six
years, inflation-adjusted wireless prices have fallen by approximately
40%. 194 The value that wireless telephone service has created for
consumers is truly staggering. One estimate suggests that consumers valued
the first generation of cell phone service at $50 billion per year. 95
Currently, approximately 170 MHz of radio spectrum are used for
wireless service. 196 Some additional spectrum is currently unused because it
was purchased when the FCC auctioned 120 MHz of spectrum for wireless
in 1994, but the winning bidders went bankrupt and the spectrum was tied
up in bankruptcy proceedings. 197 The FCC regained these licenses and
reauctioned them in early 2005.198
Various FCC reports have identified between 183 and 438 MHz of
unused or little-used spectrum that could be reallocated for mobile phone,
fixed wireless telephony, and wireless broadband.' 99 Even the larger figure
represents only 23% of the most valuable spectrum.2°° A 2004 study
estimates the effect on consumer welfare of reallocating up to 200 MHz of
that spectrum to mobile phone service.2 Industry sources have suggested
that 200 MHz would be needed to complete nationwide rollout of "third
generation" wireless services.202 The per-minute price of wireless service
would fall by 50%, generating an increase in consumer welfare of $77.4
203billion per year.
192. Id. at 103.
193. Id.
194. ROBERT W. CRANDALL & JERRY ELLIG, TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, TEXAS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: EVERYTHING'S DYNAMIC EXCEPT THE PRICING 10 (2005),
http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2005-01-telecom.pdf.
195. See Hausman, supra note 15, at 2.
196. See Thomas W. Hazlett et al., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMM., SENDING THE RIGHT
SIGNALS: PROMOTING COMPETITION THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 69 (2004),
http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/et3cydgjpIrxcg7goxb5tlflazo2tw5hghhyplt7cu6w
ooge3bcnpqzx4bjeqb7ws5xqmgohikgclahn77gydqmnvb/0410_telecommstudy.pdf.
197. Hazlett et al., supra note 177, at 122-24.
198. For full information on "Auction 58," as this auction is known at the FCC, see
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction-sumrnary&id=58.
199. See Kwerel & Williams, supra note 186.
200. See id.
201. See Hazlett et al., supra note 196, at 69.
202. Id. at 100.
203. Id. at 69.
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From the data and results in this study, one can also calculate the
separate effects on consumers and producers. A 50% price reduction would
save consumers approximately $54 billion on the amount of wireless
service they used in 2003.204 Consumers would gain an additional $23.4
billion from the increased wireless usage that would accompany the price
reduction. °5 The increased usage would also increase wireless firms'
profits by about $6.6 billion, for a total increase in economic welfare, or
reduction in excess burden, of $30 billion.206 Many wireless firms would,
however, be worse off if more spectrum were allocated to wireless for two
reasons. First, $54 billion of the reduction in consumers' bills would come
out of wireless firms' revenues.20 7 Second, since the new licenses would be
auctioned, wireless firms would pay some of their $6.6 billion in expected
new revenues to the U.S. Treasury. The firms most likely to gain from
more liberal spectrum allocation would be new entrants or incumbents that
need more spectrum to expand services. This may explain why
liberalization has been slow in coming despite the enormous consumer
benefits.
All of these figures are based on an international statistical analysis
which estimates the elasticity of demand for wireless service of between
-1.71 and -3.62.2o8 This range exceeds the most recent measures of the
elasticity calculated using U.S. data, which range between -1.12 and
-1.29.209 The larger elasticity based on the international data leads to a
larger predicted change in consumer welfare when prices fall. Even if the
true change in consumer welfare is only half as large, that is still billions of
dollars-much larger than the effects of many other telecommunications
regulations.
The foregoing estimate involves only 200 MHz of spectrum and
assumes it would be used for wireless telephony. Several hundred more
MHz are likely available, and these could also be used for broadband or for
fixed wireless to provide the "last mile" of local telephone service.
Unfortunately, no estimates of the impact of such increases in competition
or consumer welfare are available.
The costs of current spectrum allocation policy can be expected to fall
sometime after 2006 if the FCC carries through on its plan to auction an
additional 90 MHz of spectrum in that year.10 More fundamentally, the




208. HAZLETr & Mutnoz, supra note 72, at 15.
209. See Sidak, supra note 71, at 19.
210. See Public Notice, FCC, FCC to Commence Spectrum Auction that will Provide
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multi-billion dollar figure cited above should only be taken as a rough
approximation of the negative effect of spectrum allocation policy on
consumer welfare. A truly market-based approach would allow market
transactions to allocate spectrum rather than licenses. Potential users could
buy or lease spectrum, then choose how to use it. The amount of spectrum
allocated to wireless telephone, broadcasting, broadband, and other services
would be determined by market transactions and decisions of users, rather
than by regulatory proceedings. As Ronald Coase noted in 1959:
Certainly, it is not clear why we should have to rely on the Federal
Communications Commission rather than the ordinary pricing
mechanism to decide whether a particular frequency should be used by
the police, or for a radiotelephone, or for a taxi service, or for an oil
company for geophysical exploration, or by a motion-picture company
to keep in touch with its film stars or for a broadcasting station. Indeed,
the multiplicity of these varied uses would suggest that the advantages
to be derived from relyingl on the pricing mechanism would be
especially great in this case.
The FCC's mid-2004 decision regarding 190 MHz of spectrum
allocated for use by educational institutions and wireless cable illustrates
the difference.212 On the one hand, the decision gives license holders
greater flexibility in leasing spectrum to others and expanding new uses,
such as wireless broadband.21 3 These are positive steps. On the other hand,
the decision still provides that this spectrum can only be used for the range
of purposes the FCC specifies, and the decision reshuffles allocations of
frequencies within the range in an attempt to ensure that adjacent spectrum
can be utilized efficiently.21 4 The latter provisions would be unnecessary if
license holders were actually spectrum owners. Owners could either decide
how to use their spectrum or sell it to someone else, and the efficient
reallocations that the FCC seeks to achieve through administrative
procedures would occur through market transactions.
Under market-based allocation, the FCC, a court, or another
American Consumers New Wireless Broadband Services (Dec. 29, 2004) (auctioning cannot
occur until June 2006 because the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act of 2004 requires
the FCC to notify the National Telecommunications and Information Administration at least
18 months prior to the auction of any frequencies mentioned in the legislation so that any
public sector users can be relocated to other spectrum), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-
public/attachmatch/DOC-255802Al.pdf [hereinafter Spectrum Auction Public Notice].
211. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L & ECON. 1, 16
(1959).
212. See Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74, and 101 of the Commission's Rules to
Facilitate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. 14165 (2004).
213. Id. para. 6.
214. Id.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATIONS 83
government body would still have a significant role in preventing signal
interference, but they would not decide which bits of spectrum could be
used for which purposes. In theory, an accurate measure of the effects of
spectrum policy would compare the effects of current allocations to the
effects of the allocations that a competitive market might be expected to
produce.
2. Outcomes
The FCC's strategic goal for spectrum is to "[f]acilitate the highest
and best use of spectrum domestically and internationally to promote the
growth and rapid deployment of innovative and efficient communications
technologies and services. 215 Performance goals focus on efficient and
effective use of spectrum, deployment of new technologies and services,
and promotion of ease of access to spectrum by more users.21 6 The FCC's
Report offers two outcome indicators. The first, increasing the number of
approvals for enhanced telecommunications equipment, is actually an
output measure, but the Report argues this is a leading indicator of new
devices on their way to the market. 17 The data indicate that, while the FCC
made about as many new equipment authorizations in 2004 as in 2003,
certification bodies approved by the FCC made about 900 more
authorizations in 2004 than in 2003, an 18% increase.218 The second
indicator, facilitating deployment of new or existing services that make
efficient use of spectrum, could be characterized as an outcome, but the
accompanying text principally outlines ongoing changes in FCC policies
and procedures that the FCC believes will lead to more flexible use of
spectrum for new technologies and services, avoid signal interference,
encourage "intense and efficient" spectrum use, award licenses as rapidly
as possible, and ensure that licensees actually use the spectrum in a timely
fashion.219 The Report describes a large number of activities and initiatives
but does not indicate whether the listed outcomes for the public have
actually been achieved.22°
In the past, having the FCC allocate spectrum to various uses was
purported to advance several policy outcomes. These included promotion
of the "public interest," promotion of consumer welfare, and prevention of
signal interference when different parties try to use the same frequency at
215. Report, supra note 20, at 11.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 38.
218. Id. at40.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 40-41.
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the same time.
At least in the FCC context, the "public interest" implies no specific
outcome. A number of FCC chairmen, general counsels, and legal experts
have noted that the "public interest" standard means precisely what its
author, Senator C. C. Dill, said it meant: "It covers just about
everything. '22' Thus, the public interest standard is too broad to provide a
definition of specific outcomes that FCC spectrum allocation policy might
be intended to affect.
Another possible outcome is promotion of consumer welfare, as
opposed to the welfare of the regulated industry. However, the research
cited above suggests that FCC spectrum allocation often reduces consumer
welfare by reducing competition.222 Consumers benefit when license
holders have more flexibility to choose which services they will offer,
which technologies they will employ, and which business model they will
follow. The more flexibility license holders have to use spectrum as they
see fit, the more competitive are the markets for services that use the
spectrum. Consumers receive more service at lower prices, and license
holders pay less for licenses because restrictions on the uses of spectrum no
longer protect license holders from competition. Empirical research using
data from more than 1,400 license auctions in 27 countries finds that liberal
policies allowing license holders to determine services, technologies, and
business models reduce the price paid for licenses by 38%.223 A more
liberal spectrum regime is also associated with lower retail prices for
224
wireless service.
The classic argument for government ownership of the airwaves, and
administrative allocation of licenses to use spectrum, was that regulation is
needed to prevent interference between parties attempting to use the same
frequency.225 A "chaotic" period in 1926, when 200 new radio stations
were established and operators used any power or frequencies they desired,
is often cited as proof.226 However, the chaos during that period resulted
from courts interpreting the 1912 Radio Act to prevent the Commerce
Department from issuing exclusive licenses for particular wavelengths in
221. See Hazlett et al., supra note 177, at 43; HAzLErr & MUloz, supra note 72.
222. See Hazlett et al., supra note 177.
223. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Property Rights and Wireless License Values 4 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-08, 2004),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=519602. Four countries-Australia,
New Zealand, Guatemala, and El Salvador-leave these decisions to the license holder
rather than the regulator. Id.
224. Id. at 25.
225. Hazlett et al., supra note 177, at 19.
226. See e.g., Coase, supra note 211, at 5.
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227order to prevent interference. The problem during that period was the
absence of any method for preventing interference in the use of
frequencies. The 1927 Act establishing the Federal Radio Commission
allowed the Commission to prevent interference, but also gave it the
discretion to award licenses only when the "public interest, necessity, or
convenience would be served" and prohibited licensees from asserting any
ownership claim over the airwaves.228  Regulators could prevent
interference by issuing licenses to use particular frequencies without
specifying how much of which frequency bands must be devoted to which
types of services. Therefore, avoiding interference cannot be an outcome
attributed to spectrum allocation.
H. Satellite
The FCC licenses non-defense satellites for a variety of purposes,
including television broadcasting, subscription television, radio, telephone,
Internet, and various private communications. Satellites can be either
geostationary, which remain in a fixed position above the earth, or non-
geostationary, which travel around the earth on a fixed path. The FCC
licenses the spectrum that satellites use to communicate with transmitters
and receivers on earth. In addition, a satellite owner who wants to use an
orbital slot or path allocated to the United States by international agreement
must obtain an FCC license. In practice, the satellite operator's license
specifies both the satellite's location and the communications spectrum it
uses.
FCC decisions thus affect the supply of and competition in satellite
services. For example, the FCC recently issued a Public Notice seeking
comment on proposals to allow geostationary direct broadcast satellites, the
type used to provide consumers with television and broadband Internet
service, to be spaced more closely than nine degrees apart.229 If regulators
find this proposal feasible and adopt it, substantially more satellite capacity
could be available for television and broadband Internet service.
When awarding certain types of satellite licenses, federal regulators
are constrained by a provision of the legislation that privatized Intelsat and
Inmarsat. The Act explicitly states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commission shall not
have the authority to assign by competitive bidding orbital locations or
spectrum used for the provision of international or global satellite
227. Id. at 4-5.
228. Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
229. See Public Notice, FCC, International Bureau Seeks Public Comment on Proposals
to Permit Reducing Orbital Spacings Between U.S. Direct Broadcast Satellites, 18 F.C.C.R.
25683 (2003).
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communications services. The President shall oppose in the
International Telecommunication Union and in other bilateral and
multilateral fora any assignment by competitive bidding of orbital• 230
locations or spectrum used for the provision of such services.
The Report mentions several satellite-related projects and initiatives
but offers no outcome goals or measures focused specifically on
satellites.231 No studies assess the effects of the law or FCC satellite
regulations on competition in broadband service or telephone service.
Satellite telephone service is much more expensive than wireless phone
service, but an increase in satellite capacity for television and broadband
could spur telephone competition in several indirect ways. More intense
video competition from satellite-based providers could prompt greater
packaging of satellite video with landline telephone service. In addition,
widely available and inexpensive satellite broadband service could give
consumers, especially rural consumers, another conduit for Internet
telephony.
L Unbundled Network Elements
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent telephone
companies to lease parts of their networks, "unbundled network elements,"
to competitors at regulated rates.232 The most obvious example of a
network element might be the local "loop," the wire that connects a home
or business to a switch located in the phone company's central office.2 33 A
competitor leasing only local loops would install its own switches in the
incumbent's central office and make its own arrangements to transport calls
between its switches. In addition to individual network elements, the FCC
also required incumbents to lease the entire set of network elements
necessary to provide local service, the "unbundled network element
platform., 234 Leasing the unbundled network element platform is
equivalent to buying the incumbent's service at a wholesale discount. In
December 2004, the FCC effectively decided to stop forcing incumbents to
lease the unbundled network element platform to competitors after a one-
230. 47 U.S.C. § 765(0 (2000).
231. See generally Report, supra note 20.
232. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
233. Jerry Ellig & James Nicholas Taylor, The Opportunity Costs of Unbundled Network
Element Platform Regulation 2 (Mercatus Center, Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://www.mercatus.orgpdf/materials/980.pdf.
234. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533
(2005) at note 526. [hereinafter Unbundling Obligations]. The unbundled network element
platform has generated substantial debate. For a more detailed discussion, see Ellig &
Taylor, supra note 233.
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year transition period. 2" If the new rules are upheld, the platform would be
phased out over one year.
Prices for network elements, determined by state commissions, are
based on a method called Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
('TELRIC") pricing. TELRIC pricing is based not on the incumbent firm's
actual historical costs, but rather on regulators' estimate of the costs that
would be borne today by a hypothetical firm building the most efficient
network regulators believe is possible.236 Proceedings to calculate TELRIC
prices have generated significant disagreement.
237
Unbundling affects both consumer and business telecommunications
services. Most studies focus on unbundling as it relates to ordinary
telephone service for residential and small business customers.238 Price and
quantity data for more complex services to businesses, or service to large
businesses, are often confidential.
1. Costs
The Telecommunications Act mandated wealth transfers from the
incumbents. These transfers create some unusual types of costs due to the
structure of telecommunications regulation. The purpose of unbundling is
to encourage competition in local telephone service. Local residential
service, however, has traditionally been priced below CoSt. 239 By regulating
the price that incumbent telephone companies charge for network elements,
regulators seek to encourage competition, and hence lower prices, for some
services that are already sold below cost.240 And by mandating price
reductions for unbundled network elements, policymakers forego the
opportunity to reduce the prices of services that have traditionally been
"taxed," such as long distance and wireless, in order to subsidize local
service.24' In other words, instead of trying to reduce the price of local
service, policymakers could have reduced long-distance access charges or
universal service contributions from long distance or wireless. The price
reductions and increases in economic welfare that could have been created
235. See generally Unbundling Obligations, supra note 234, paras. 199-219.
236. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, para. 669 (2003) [hereinafter Review of Section
251].
237. See id. para. 675. In 2003 the FCC began a proceeding to reconsider how the
TELRIC pricing methodology deals with the firm's cost of capital and depreciation. Id.
238. See Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233.
239. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 9-10.
240. Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233.
241. See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 20-21.
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through these alternative policies are the opportunity cost of unbundled
network element regulation. These opportunity costs should be weighed
against benefits to determine whether consumers and society are better or
worse off.
In a recent book, Robert Crandall examines the effects of the
Telecommunications Act's unbundling provisions.242 Using rather generous
assumptions, he estimates that in 2003 unbundling may have transferred
approximately $1.3 billion from incumbent phone companies to residential
and small business consumers and $8.4 billion to large business customers,
for a total of $9.7 billion.243 These benefits come at an opportunity cost.
Instead of transferring the money to consumers by mandating low
unbundled network element prices, regulators could. have reduced access
charges and universal service contributions from long-distance and wireless
carriers. A $9.7 billion reduction in these charges would generate a $1.4
billion increase in consumer surplus, for a total gain to consumers of $11.1
billion.2" Overall economic welfare would have increased by $5.9
billion.245 Thus, the opportunity costs of unbundling have been substantial,
and they should be weighed against any savings consumers received.
For purposes of regulatory accounting, it is necessary to determine
whether these opportunity costs are new, or if they are already incorporated
in previous estimates of the effects of access charges and universal service
funding. If platform regulation merely redistributes the incumbent's
monopoly profits, or forces a reduction in excessive costs, then no
additional cross-subsidies are required to allow the incumbent to maintain
the local telephone network. Platform regulation still entails an opportunity
cost because there are more efficient ways of redistributing that wealth to
consumers. However, this opportunity cost would already be captured in
estimates of the consumer welfare cost of existing cross-subsidy
242. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, BROOKINGS INST., COMPETITION AND CHAOS: U.S.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SINCE THE 1996 TELECOM ACT, (2005).
243. Id. at 54, 56.
244. For calculation methods and data sources see infra note 302.
245. Id. The calculations assume that unbundling resulted in a dollar-for-dollar transfer
from incumbent phone companies to consumers. Ellig & Taylor, however, found that for
every dollar transferred from the incumbent, less than a dollar reaches consumers.
Therefore, the actual amount of money transferred from incumbents likely exceeds $9.7
billion, and the opportunity cost in terms of forgone consumer and producer surplus would
be concomitantly larger. Actual interstate access and universal service charges may
currently be less than $9.7 billion. However, there is still room to reduce these kinds of
charges by that amount. States also impose access and universal service charges on
intrastate long-distance and wireless service, and intrastate long-distance access charges per
minute are typically higher than federal charges. See Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233. See
generally CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra note 194 (analyzing intrastate issues).
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schemes.2
Suppose, on the other hand, the incumbent was operating efficiently
and earning no monopoly profits. In that case, the wealth transfer caused by
platform regulation would have to be replaced by additional cross-subsidies
if the incumbent is expected to maintain the local telephone network. These
additional cross-subsidies would create additional reductions in consumer
welfare, on top of those created by previously existing cross-subsidies. In
this case, the opportunity cost of platform regulation would be added to the
existing costs of cross-subsidies.
A final possibility is that the incumbent had some monopoly profits or
excess costs, but the size of the wealth transfer from platform regulation
exceeds these. In that case, some of the opportunity cost of platform
regulation would already be reflected in the costs of existing cross-
subsidies, and some of the opportunity cost would correspond to additional
cross-subsidies needed to ensure that the incumbent can maintain the
network. Only a portion of the opportunity cost would be added to the other
costs of telecommunications regulation.
The bulk of published academic research suggests that TELRIC
prices calculated with FCC cost models are 19-67% below competitive
levels, depending on the specific network element.247 These results imply
that the platform prices mandated by state regulators are also likely below
competitive levels, though it is not clear how much below. Therefore, at
least some of the opportunity cost calculated above is likely a new cost, in
addition to previously estimated inefficiencies of access charges and
universal service policies.
2. Outcomes
The desirable outcomes associated with unbundling would be
increased competition and, ultimately, the lower prices or other consumer
benefits that competition traditionally brings. The FCC's Report shows
data on trends in the telecommunications consumer price index and on the
percentage of households with access to three or more wireline
telecommunications providers. 248 By these measures, competition has
increased and prices have fallen over the past several years.249 The Report
does not offer evidence of a causal link between the FCC's unbundling
policies and these favorable trends.
246. For discussion, see Part IV.B & C, supra, on Long-Distance Access Charges and
Universal Service Funding, respectively.
247. See Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233.
248. Report, supra note 20, at 32-33.
249. Id.
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FCC statistics reported elsewhere show that the number of lines
served by competitors using unbundled network elements rose from about
2 million in 1999 to almost 19 million in June 2004.250 These lines
accounted for 61% of all competitors' lines in 2004.251 As the number of
lines served with unbundled network elements rose significantly, the
number served by non-cable competitors using their own facilities rose by
only 1 million between 2000 and 2004.252 Facilities-based lines fell from
33% of competitors' lines in 1999 to 23% in June 2004.253 The remaining
16% of competitors' lines are resold pursuant to other provisions of the
Telecommunications Act, discussed infra, Part IV.J.
Most of the available empirical studies suggest that unbundling has
largely led to a substitution of one type of competition for another.
Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer examined the effect of regulated rates for
unbundled loops, the wires that connect individual customers with
telephone company switching facilities.254 Loops are arguably the most
likely network element to be a natural monopoly. They found that regulated
loop prices prompt competitors to lease loops rather than build their own.255
Employing 1997-2000 data from markets where the Bell companies
are the incumbents, Eisner and Lehman found that lower unbundled
network element prices do not increase the number of lines served by
competitors using unbundled network elements, but they decrease
facilities-based entry.2 6 Section 271 approval, which indicates that
regulators believe the Bell incumbent has unbundled sufficiently to open
the local market to competition, is associated with a 260,000-336,000
increase in lines served by competitors using unbundled network
elements.257 Since the incumbents are Bell companies and Section 271
proceedings tended to reduce unbundled network element rates, this
variable may be picking up the effects of unbundled network element
pricing. Lower residential rates are often associated with less facilities-
based competitive entry, but lower business rates are not a logical finding
given that business rates are usually higher than residential rates.258
250. See LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION, supra note 148, at tbl. 3.
251. Id.
252. For calculation of data, see id. at tbls. 3, 5.
253. Id. at tbl. 3.
254. See Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC
Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 ToPics IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1136 (2004).
255. Id. at 1138.
256. See James Eisner & Dale E. Lehman, Presentation at the 14th Annual Conference
Center for Research in Regulated Industries: Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry
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Analyzing data from 1998-2000, Crandall found that competitors
whose revenues per dollar of assets grew the fastest were those that built
their own networks, not those that relied on unbundled network
elements. 259 There was no difference in performance between competitors
targeting business or residential customers.2 ° Competitors using a mixed
strategy of leasing some network elements and building some of their own
network did better than those that relied wholly on unbundled network
elements, but worse than those using their own network entirely.26' This
result may occur because the typical competitor seeks to offer local
telephone service in combination with other services, such as long distance,
Internet, high-speed data connection, or video. A competitor building its
own network can offer a wider array of services, using newer technology,
than one relying heavily on the incumbent's older network, which was
originally designed to carry voice traffic only. These results do not mean
that a competitor that failed to invest in its own network could not be
successful. The results simply mean that those firms that did not invest in
their own facilities were less likely to succeed. The existing research on
competition suggests that unbundled network element regulation
encourages entrants to use unbundled network elements, but discourages
them from building their own facilities.
A small number of studies examine the direct impact of unbundling
on prices or other variables of interest to consumers.2 62 It is doubtful that
unbundling has reduced the price of basic local telephone service.263
Crandall offers the most recent comprehensive estimate of the
benefits of unbundling. He argues that the previously cited $1.3 billion in
savings for residential and small business customers generates no increase
in use of local service by these customers since their demand is very
inelastic. 264 Because large business demand may be more responsive to
price changes, Crandall estimates that the $8.4 billion in price reductions to
large business generates an additional $800 million in consumer surplus
due to increased usage. 265 Thus, the total benefits of unbundling to
telecommunications users total $10.5 billion.26
259. See generally Robert W. Crandall, An Assessment of the Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers Five Years after the Passage of the Telecommunications Act, CRITERION
ECONOMICS, Jan. 2002, http://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/Crandall%20CLEC.pdf.
260. Id. at 41-42.
261. Id. at 41.
262. See Crandall, supra note 242, at 44; Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233.
263. See Crandall, supra note 242, at 44; Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233.
264. Crandall, supra note 242, at 54.
265. Id. at 56.
266. Id. at 56.
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These benefits are less than the $11.1 billion opportunity cost to
consumers calculated in Part V.J.1, supra. They are also less than the
expenditures incurred by competitive local telephone companies to produce
the benefits. Crandall conservatively estimates the competitors' capital
costs at $8 billion annually, and his data suggest that their selling, general,
and administrative costs would total about $8.9 billion annually, for a total
of $16.9 billion.267 Unbundling required the nation to spend $1.74 to
transfer each dollar to consumers, and $21 to produce a dollar's worth of
consumer surplus.2 8
Several other studies published by various think tanks or coalitions,
and several working papers on Web sites, estimate consumer savings or
consumer benefits for particular states or segments of consumers. 269 These
consumer benefits, however, are smaller than the consumer benefits that
would result if regulators had simply reduced long-distance access charges
or universal service contributions. The latter policy is superior for two
reasons. First, it involves a direct wealth transfer from incumbent phone
companies to consumers, thus ensuring that consumers actually receive all
of the wealth that is transferred from incumbents. Under platform
regulation, consumers receive only a fraction of the wealth that gets
transferred from incumbents. The direct transfers also generate larger
increases in consumer welfare as a result of lower long-distance prices. The
net result is that platform regulation actually reduces consumer welfare,
compared to what would occur if the wealth transfer were accomplished
through a reduction in long-distance access charges.
Competition often offers nonprice benefits, such as innovative new
services, but such benefits are unlikely to occur under platform regulation.
Since competitors leasing the platform do not build their own local
facilities, platform regulation offers them no opportunity to offer local
services different from those offered by the incumbent. In theory, platform
regulation might eventually open the door to innovative new services if
competitors use the platform as a transitional strategy to enter the market
before building their own facilities. In practice, empirical research shows
that platform regulation has precisely the opposite effect because it serves
as a substitute for facilities-based competition. Either the "transition"
theory is wrong, or platform regulation was not given enough time to work.
267. Id. at 54-56 (reporting that competitive local exchange carriers received $17.7
billion in revenues in 2003, and industry analysts estimate that they spent about half their
revenues on selling, general, and administrative expenses).
268. $16.9 billion in costs divided by $9.7 billion transferred to consumers equals $1.74
per dollar transferred $16.9 billion in costs divided by $800 million in consumer surplus
equals $21 per dollar of consumer surplus.
269. See Ellig & Taylor, supra note 233 (discussing the limitations of these studies).
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J. Resale of Incumbent's Services
Resale is provided for in section 251 (c)(4) of the Telecommunications
Act.27° Subpart (A) declares that it is the duty of incumbent local phone
companies "to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications
service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not
telecommunications carriers .... ,,271 Subpart (B) states that incumbents are
"not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory
conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service
.... ,272 Subsection (3) of Part (d) deals with wholesale pricing:
For the purposes of section 251(c)(4) of this title, a State commission
shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to
subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding
the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection,
and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.
2 7 3
There was precedent for the Telecommunications Act's resale
provisions. A similar policy, adopted to open the long-distance market to
competition from firms like Sprint and MCI in the 1980s, seemed to work
well.274 In the local market, however, few competitors now seem to regard
resale as the preferred business strategy. AT&T, for example, found within
a year after passage of the Telecommunications Act that offering local
service through resale was unprofitable, despite a wholesale discount of
275
approximately 17%.  In most cases, regulated wholesale discounts have
averaged between 15 and 25%.276
1. Costs
No studies have directly estimated the costs or benefits of resale. To
do so, one would need to compare actual, regulated wholesale prices with
economically efficient wholesale prices. An efficient wholesale price
would provide a discount equal to the costs that the incumbent actually
avoids by selling at wholesale. One can calculate a rough estimate of the
"opportunity costs" of resale in a manner similar to the calculation of the
opportunity costs of unbundled network elements.
The policy redistributed between $4.5 million and $21 million from
270. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000).
271. § 251(c)(4)(A).
272. § 251(c)(4)(B).
273. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (2000).
274. See, e.g., Yale M. Braunstein, UNE-P Benefits in Verizon's New Jersey Territory
(Mar. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley), http://sims.
berkeley.edu/-bigyaleUNE/UCB NJUNE..studyMar._2004.pdf.
275. See Crandall, supra note 259, at 32.
276. Crandall & Hausman, supra note 190, at 84.
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incumbents to competitors in 2004.277 If this money were used to reduce
long-distance access charges, it would create approximately that size
increase in consumer welfare and a $7.5-35 million increase in social
welfare.278
2. Outcomes
Resale might be expected to generate several pro-competitive
outcomes. First, competitors could combine the incumbent's local service
with their own unique services, such as long distance, to offer a package
better than the incumbent's. Second, competitors might use resale as a
transitional strategy to build market share before undertaking the expense
of building their own local facilities.
A few studies have assessed the causes and consequences of resale.
They suggest that resale is unlikely to produce these benefits because it has
not turned out to be a very effective business strategy. Employing 1991-
2000 data from markets where the Bell companies are the incumbents,
Eisner and Lehman found no statistically significant relationship between
the size of wholesale discounts and the number of lines served by
competitors via resale.279 This finding is consistent with the theory that
resale discounts have not been large enough to make resale profitable.
Using 1998-2000 data, Crandall found that competitors relying on resale
had only average revenue growth per dollar of capital assets, a finding that
does not bode well considering that competitors' "average" financial
performance has not been very good.28°
Reports that incumbent carriers file with the FCC indicate that there
were 1.7 million resold lines in December 1997, rising to a peak of 5.4
million in December 2000 before falling back to 1.6 million in June
2004.281 Competitors' numbers are somewhat different; they reported
acquiring 3.5 million resold lines in December 1999, rising to 5.1 million in
282June 2004. Despite the disparity in numbers, the competitors' figures
suggest that resale has become less popular, as the percentage of their lines
accounted for by resale fell steadily from 42.9% in December 1999 to
16.1% in June 2004.283
One explanation is that wholesale discounts are not large enough to
277. For calculation method and data sources see note 303, infra.
278. See id.
279. See Eisner & Lehman, supra note 256, at B2-B3.
280. See Crandall, supra note 254, at 4-5.
281. See LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITON, supra note 148, at tbl. 4.
282. Id. at tbl. 3.
283. Id.
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permit effective competition against the incumbent's local rates, which are
often below incremental cost because they benefit from cross-subsidies.
Another possibility is that the unbundled network element platform's
regulated prices, which are equivalent to wholesale discounts of more than
45%, have made unbundling more attractive than resale from the
perspective of competitors. 284 A final explanation is that resale forces the
competitor to offer a service identical to that offered by the incumbent. The
most successful competitors, however, have developed their own networks
that can offer innovative new services, or at least better service.285
Therefore, resale is not a very attractive option for these competitors. A
competitor can market resold services along with its own, such as long-
distance service, but resale offers no cost or quality advantages from
producing services using a different type of network. Crandall concludes,
"Just changing the nameplate on the service is not typically a very good
strategy for attracting customers. 286
V. CONCLUSION
Federal telecommunications regulation costs consumers at least $25
billion annually in forgone consumer surplus, or as much as $100 billion if
one includes the wealth transfers as a cost to consumers.287 Total
deadweight loss is approximately $42 billion annually. If all of the wealth
transfer is counted as a cost, the total social cost is approximately $118
billion annually.
The costs associated with federal telecommunications regulation far
exceed the FCC's estimated expenditures in fiscal year 2004. The cost of
regulation to consumers is more than 60 times this amount, and the cost
excluding spectrum management is more than 15 times the cost of FCC
regulatory spending.
Aside from the total costs, a truly remarkable finding is the
percentage accounted for by federal spectrum allocation policies. Although
the FCC has tried to increase the flexibility of spectrum allocation policy in
recent years, it remains true that regulators, rather than market transactions,
determine how broad swaths of spectrum will be used. Even if the $77
billion figure overestimates the consumer benefits from making an
additional 200 MHz of spectrum available, it suggests that the benefits
284. See Robert S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in
Telecom Networks 7 (Verizon Communications, Inc., Working Paper No. 10,287, 2004),
http://web.mit.edu/rpindyck/wwwVZ.UNE.Pindyck0104.pdf.
285. See Crandall, supra note 254, at 23-32.
286. Id. at 42.
287. The total figures are sums of the costs of individual regulations; thus, they ignore
any interactions between regulations. See Table 2, infra.
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from wholesale overhaul of spectrum policy would be huge. If the actual
costs of U.S. spectrum allocation policy were only one-tenth the size that
scholars estimate, they would still account for more than 20% of the total
consumer cost of federal telecommunications regulation.288
Federal telecommunications regulation redistributes wealth
inefficiently. Economists often compare the efficiency of taxes and other
policies by comparing the excess burdens as a percentage of the wealth
transfers. The excess burden percentages in Table 2, infra, show how the
efficiency of regulations compares to the efficiency of direct wealth
transfers through taxation. In all but one case, these percentages exceed the
25-40% excess burden attributed to direct taxation. The one exception is
wireline local number portability, which generates little inefficiency
because it increases the price of a service with a very low elasticity of
demand. The federal government could accomplish all of the other wealth
transfers at lower total cost to society through general taxation. It could
minimize the social cost by funding the transfers with flat-rate charges on
local phone bills, similar to the federal subscriber line charge.
Two previously announced changes should substantially reduce some
of the regulatory costs within a few years. The federal government's
decision to auction an additional 90 MHz of spectrum for wireless
communications in 2006, while a far cry from wholesale overhaul of
spectrum policy, should, nevertheless, generate large consumer benefits.
28 9
The FCC's decision to phase out the unbundled network element platform,
if upheld, should also substantially reduce the amount of money
redistributed via regulation and encourage facilities-based competition in
local phone service.290 The effect of this decision on competition will
ultimately depend on how Congress and the FCC treat emerging
competitors, such as VolP and wireless.
Research on outcomes is much less extensive than research on costs.
One regulation, enhanced 911, has clear evidence of positive outcomes.
Enhanced 911 significantly reduces both cardiac risk and hospital costs,
and these benefits likely exceed the costs of the regulation.
Some regulations achieve positive outcomes, but not very effectively.
There is some evidence that universal service programs may increase
telephone subscriptions, but at a cost of thousands of dollars annually per
additional subscriber. Regulations requiring incumbent local telephone
288. Jerry Ellig, The Economic Cost of Spectrum Misallocation: Evidence from the
United States (June 9-10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author and the
Federal Communications Law Journal).
289. See Spectrum Auction Public Notice, supra note 210.
290. See generally Unbundling Obligations, supra note 234.
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companies to lease the local network to competitors transfer $9.7 billion
annually to consumers and businesses, but much less effectively than
alternative policies. Such regulations also reduce competitors' investments
in building their own networks, undermining the FCC's oft-articulated goal
of encouraging facilities-based competition.
Many regulations have negligible effects on the outcomes they are
intended to influence. These include interstate long-distance access
charges, low-income universal service programs, high-cost universal
service programs, spectrum allocation, and resale of incumbent local
exchange carrier services.
For some regulations, outcomes are effectively unknown. No studies
or data establish that the regulations have accomplished desired outcomes
for the schools and libraries universal service program, local number
portability, number pooling, satellite regulation, or CALEA for wireless
communications.
The FCC's Report generally does a good job of identifying the
outcomes regulators are trying to achieve. However, the Report fails to
demonstrate how, or how much, existing regulation has contributed to
those outcomes. Scholarly research occasionally fills this gap, but not
frequently enough to provide a comprehensive understanding of all of the
effects of telecommunications regulation.
Despite the gaps in knowledge, the empirical research on the effects
of federal telecommunications regulation is impressive in its scope and
sophistication. If such studies can help achieve even a small percentage
reduction in regulatory costs or improvement in regulatory outcomes, the
benefits to society will likely outweigh the costs of the data collection and
research.
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291. Outlays: See DUDLEY & WARREN, supra note 23. Value of forgone output: Assumes
each dollar of outlay generated an excess burden of $0.40. See Hausman, supra note 24, at
17 tbl. A-l. Excess burden percentage is from Hausman. Id. at 740.
292. Outlays: Report, supra note 20, at 115. Value of forgone output: Assumes each
dollar of outlay generated an excess burden of $0.40 and excess burden percentage is from
Hausman, supra note 24.
293. Wealth transfer: $0.01 per minute access charge times 333.8 billion interstate
domestic long-distance minutes. LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38. Forgone consumer
surplus: Calculated assuming price of $0.07 per minute and demand elasticity of -0.7. See
id. Elasticity estimate: Riordan, supra note 31, at 436. Value of forgone output: Assumes
marginal cost equals .25.p. See Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 17, at 42. To accurately
measure the effect of access charges in a study that measures the impact of all regulatory
charges added to the cost of long-distance service, one must calculate the changes in
consumer and producer welfare caused by access charges and federal universal service
contributions together, then allocate the amounts to access charges and universal service
contributions in proportion to their share of the total price change. Excess burden percentage
is value of forgone output divided by wealth transfer.
294. Wealth transfer: Universal service contribution of $0.08 per conversation minute
multiplied by 333.8 billion interstate domestic conversation minutes. LANDE & LYNCH,
supra note 38. Universal service contribution per interstate domestic conversation minute
calculated by subtracting $0.01 access cost per interstate conversation minute in 2002 from
$0.018 total access and universal service contribution per interstate domestic conversation
minute in 2002. Forgone consumer surplus: Calculated assuming price of $0.07 per minute
and demand elasticity of -0.7. These data are derived from LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38.
Elasticity estimate: Riordan, supra note 31, at 436. Value of forgone output: Assumes
marginal cost equals .25.p. See Hausman & Shelanski, supra note 17. To accurately measure
the effect of universal service charges in a study that measures the impact of all regulatory
charges added to the cost of long-distance service, one must calculate the changes in
consumer and producer welfare caused by access charges and federal universal service
contributions together, then allocate the amounts to access charges and universal service
contributions in proportion to their share of the total price change. Excess burden percentage
is value of forgone output divided by wealth transfer.
295. TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 19-4 tbl. 19.1. Figure calculated
by multiplying total universal service outlays in tbl. 19.1 ($5.4 billion) by the percentage of
contributions from wireless service providers in tbl. 19.15 (32.6%). Forgone consumer
surplus: Calculated assuming price of $0.092 per minute and demand elasticity of -1.12.
Tenth Report, supra note 131, at tbls. 1, 9. Elasticity estimate: Sidak, supra note 71, at 22.
Value of forgone output: Assumes marginal cost equals $0.05 per minute. See Hausman,
supra note 24, at 737. To accurately measure the effect of multiple mandates in a study that
measures the impact of all regulatory charges added to the cost of wireless service, one must
calculate the changes in consumer and producer welfare caused by five regulatory mandates
on wireless together: universal service, local number portability, number pooling,
Enhanced-9 11, and CALEA. Then one allocates the amounts among the five mandates in
proportion to their share of the total price change. Data source are derived from costs of
local number portability, number pooling, enhanced 911, and CALEA. Lenard & Mast,
supra note 110. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by wealth
transfer.
296. Wealth transfer: $0.35 per minute cost times 181 million wireline phone lines.
These data are derived from $0.35 per minute as being the midpoint of wireline local
number portability charges approved by the FCC. See Public Notice, FCC, FCC
Investigation Produces Lower Number Portability Charges for Customers of U S West
Communications, Inc. (July 9, 1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/News-
Releases/1999/ nrcc9O43.html. For phone line data, see LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION,
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supra note 120. Forgone consumer surplus and forgone output: Equals zero because
assumed elasticity of demand for local wireline phone service is virtually zero. See
CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 6, at 91; Garbacz & Thompson (2005), supra note 48.
297. Wealth transfer: Calculated from subscriber data in Tenth Report, supra note 131, at
tbl. 9, and cost estimate in Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at tbls. 3, 5. Forgone consumer
surplus and value of forgone output: Calculated using methods and sources of data
described supra note 295. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by
wealth transfer.
298. Wealth transfer: Calculated from subscriber data in Tenth Report, supra note 131, at
tbl. 9, and cost estimate in Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 38. Forgone consumer surplus
and value of forgone output: Calculated using methods and data sources described supra
note 295. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by wealth transfer.
299. Wealth transfer: Calculated from subscriber data in Tenth Report, supra note 131, at
tbl. 9, and cost estimate in Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 24-26. Forgone consumer
surplus and value of forgone output: Calculated using methods and sources of data
described supra note 295. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by
wealth transfer.
300. Wealth transfer: Calculated from subscriber data in Tenth Report, supra note 131, at
tbl. 9, and cost estimate in Lenard & Mast, supra note 110, at 29. Forgone consumer surplus
and value of forgone output: Calculated using methods and data sources described supra
note 295. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by wealth transfer.
301. The starting point for these calculations is a study that estimated the benefit to
consumers from making an additional 200 MHz of spectrum available for mobile phone
service. Since this benefit would occur naturally and swiftly under a more flexible spectrum
policy but will take years under current policy, this Article assumes that this forgone benefit
is a good proxy for the costs of current spectrum policy. All of the costs of spectrum policy
can be calculated using the mathematical relationships defined in supra Part III.A. The
forgone benefit, or total consumer cost, is $77.4 billion. The calculations that generated this
figure imply a price reduction of 50%, or $0.056 per minute. See Hazlett et al., supra note
196. The $54 billion wealth transfer was calculated by multiplying $0.056 times the 966
billion wireless minutes used in 2003. Wireless minutes were calculated from subscriber and
use data in Tenth Report, supra note 131, at tbls. 2, 9. The forgone consumer surplus figure
was calculated by subtracting the $54 billion wealth transfer from the $77.4 billion total cost
to consumers. Forgone producer surplus is equal to Hazlett et al.'s estimated price of
wireless under a more flexible spectrum policy ($0.056 per minute) minus the marginal cost
of wireless ($0.05 per minute) times the estimated increase in the number of minutes due to
the price reduction. Marginal cost is from Hausman, supra note 24, at 737. The increase in
the number of minutes is estimated using a demand elasticity of -2.32. HAZLETr & MLtuoz,
supra note 72, at 15. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output divided by wealth
transfer.
302. Wealth transfer: CRANDALL, supra note 242. at 54-56. Forgone consumer surplus:
Assumes wealth transfer could have been used to reduce access and universal service
charges on long distance. Calculated assuming price of $0.07 per minute and demand
elasticity of -0.7. LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38. Elasticity estimate: Riordan, supra note
31. Potential change in long-distance price is estimated by dividing $9.7 billion wealth
transfer by 333.8 billion domestic interstate conversation minutes. These data are derived
from LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38. Value of forgone output: Calculation assumes $9.7
billion wealth transfer would have been used to reduce universal service charges on long
distance and wireless. Each dollar of wealth transfer generates $0.65 of excess burden for
long-distance and $0.53 for wireless. To determine how much of the wealth transfer should
be allocated to each service, the $9.7 billion wealth transfer was divided between long-
distance and wireless proportionate to their contributions to the federal Universal Service
Fund. See Hausman, supra note 67, at 40; Hausman, supra note 24, at 735. Long distance
and wireless contributions to federal universal service fund are from TRENDS IN TELEPHONE
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SERVICE, supra note 60, at tbl. 19.15. Excess burden percentage is value of forgone output
divided by wealth transfer.
303. Wealth transfer: The amount of wealth transferred from the incumbent to
competitors equals L.(R-W-C), where L is the number of lines the incumbent leases
competitors at a wholesale discount, R is the revenue per leased line that the incumbent
would have earned if it had sold the line to a retail customer, W is the wholesale price per
line received by the incumbent, and C is the cost per line that the incumbent avoids when it
leases a line instead of selling it to a retail customer. Wealth transfers were calculated on a
state-by-state basis and then summed to produce the total. Data sources: L is from LOCAL
TELEPHONE COMPETITION, supra note 120, at tbl. 10. R is from Gregg, supra note 41. W is
75% of L, assuming a 25% wholesale discount. See Crandall & Hausman, supra note 190, at
84. C is from AT&T, UNE-P vs. 271 LD Entry: What's the real tradeoff for the RBOCs? 6,
8 (Sept. 17, 2002), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prodlecfslretrieve.cgi?native-or .pdf=pdf&
id_document--6513293103. Forgone consumer surplus: Assumes wealth transfer could have
been used to reduce access and universal service charges on long distance. Calculated
assuming a long-distance price of $0.07 per minute and demand elasticity of -0.7. These
data are derived from LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38. Elasticity estimate: Riordan, supra
note 31. Potential change in long-distance price is estimated by dividing $21 million wealth
transfer by 333.8 billion domestic interstate conversation minutes. These data are derived
from LANDE & LYNCH, supra note 38. Value of forgone output: Calculation assumes $21
million wealth transfer would have been used to reduce universal service charges on long
distance. Each dollar of wealth transfer generates $0.65 of excess burden for long distance.
Excess burden figure is from Hausman, supra note 24. Excess burden percentage is value of
forgone output divided by wealth transfer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach the ten year anniversary of the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"),' a fairly broad consensus
has emerged that the existing "stovepipe" regulatory framework contained
in the statute is woefully outdated and an impediment to the development
of sound communications policy. 2 So, Congress is beginning to consider
*Randolph J. May is Senior Fellow and Director of Communications Policy Studies at The
Progress and Freedom Foundation, Washington, D.C.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1063 (2004); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network
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whether new communications legislation is needed to supplant the 1996
Act. In light of the profound technological and marketplace changes that
have occurred in the last decade, especially those attributable to the
accelerating proliferation of digital technologies and services, any new
legislative reform effort should include an examination of the division
between federal and state regulatory authority, the amalgam of subsidies
known as the Universal Service system, and management of the spectrum.
But there is nothing more important to the project to conceive a new
act than the replacement of the existing statute's stovepipe regulatory
model with a new framework that reflects today's digital age competitive
marketplace realities. Indeed, this effort has to be at the heart of any serious
effort to write what one might call a new Digital Age Communications Act.
The purpose of this brief essay is to show why a replacement
regulatory regime is needed. Its purpose is not to prescribe what the new
model should look like, although I will conclude by suggesting that some
form of market-oriented model should be adopted.
II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: VERTICAL
STOVEPIPES BASED ON TECHNO-FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
Stovepipe regulation refers to the fact that (1) the act contains
definitions for variously denominated communications services, such as
"telecommunications," "information services," "cable service," "mobile
service," "broadcasting," and "open video system," and (2) different
regulations apply depending upon a service offering's classification.
Hence, the stovepipes, or vertical "silos" or "smokestacks" as some prefer,
refer to the distinct sets of regulations that attach to a service offering once
it is classified under one definition or the other.
The existing stovepipe regulatory framework no longer makes sense.
With a bit of poetic license, you might say the fires of the digital revolution
have destroyed the stovepipes. In any event, the point is that the old
stovepipe paradigm, with its origins rooted in the original Communications
Act enacted in 1934 ("1934 Act"), is now obsolete.
The current regime is obsolete because the statutory definitions found
in the 1996 Act that are the foundation of the existing regulatory model rest
upon what I have called "techno-functional constructs."3 These techno-
functional constructs simply no longer work well in a digital world.4 These
Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of
Regulation and Interagency Governance, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 701.
3. Randolph J. May, Calling for a Regulatory Overhaul, Bit by Bit, CNET NEws, Oct.
19, 2004, http:llnews.com./Calling+for+a+regulatory+overhaul%2C+bit+by+bit/ 2010-
1028_3-5415778.html.
4. Christopher Yoo has put it this way: "Gone are the days in which each
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particular techno-functional constructs are necessarily implicated in many
of today's most hotly contested regulatory battles, for example, those
involving the statutory definitions of "telecommunications" and
"information service."
Telecommunications is defined as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.",5 An information service is "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications ... but
does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of
a telecommunications service., 6 Now, these definitions are nothing if not
grounded firmly in techno-functional constructions: transmitting
information among points "specified by the user,"7 "without a change in
form or content," "generating," "storing," "processing," "retrieving,"
"transforming" information, and so on.
8
Think for a moment about the meaning these words convey. What
does it mean to say "transforming" information, or transmitting information
between two points "without change in the form or content" of the
information? For example, I send you an instant message, or "IM," typing a
letter in one font on my keyboard. As a result of your or my terminal
settings or Internet Service Provider's protocols, the letter appears on your
screen in another font, or without the smiley face I attached to it. Has there
been a change in form or content of the information sent or received? Has
there been a transformation of the information?
communications technology could be regarded as occupying a separate regulatory silo. The
impending shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to complete the
collapse of any remaining attempt to base regulation on differences in the means of
transmission." Yoo, supra note 2, at 714 (citation omitted).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
6. § 153(20).
7. § 153(43).
8. § 153(20). The definitions found in the 1996 Act of "telecommunications" and
"information service" essentially track the "basic" and "enhanced" services definitions
developed in the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") landmark Computer Il
proceeding to distinguish between regulated transmission services and unregulated online
services employing computer processing. Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer I]. They have been interpreted by the FCC to
extend essentially to the same functions so that all of the services the FCC previously
considered to be "enhanced services" are "information services." See Implementation of
Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11
F.C.C.R. 21905, paras. 102--04 (1996).
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This surely is the stuff of digital age philosophers. That is why, in
early 2004 in connection with thinking about the then just-over-the-horizon
but sure-to-come fights regarding the new Internet telephony, or Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services, I referred to the distinctions to be
suggested and argued for purposes of regulatory classification as
metaphysical. Certainly, the statute's definitions are in accord with
Webster's definition of metaphysics: (1) "of or relating to what is
conceived as transcendent, supersensible, or transcendental;" (2) "highly
abstract or abstruse;" (3) "expressions of attitudes about which rational
argument is impossible." 9 In fact, so convinced was I of the importance of
hastening an understanding that the current techno-functional regulatory
regime rested on collapsing ground that I could not resist dashing off a
brief commentary entitled, only half facetiously, The Metaphysics of
VoIP.
°
It is not only the telecommunications and information service
stovepipes which rest on techno-functional constructs. Consider the
statute's "mobile services" definition, which includes terms such as "a
regularly interacting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated control
and relay stations . . ." and so on." The definition of "cable service" turns
on whether the transmissions are "one-way," and either "video
programming" or "other programing service[sl," and whether any
"subscriber interaction" is required for the selection of such video
programming. 12 Whether a transmission is "broadcasting" or not depends
on whether radio communications, which itself turns on whether the
transmission by radio is of writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of
all kinds, "intended to be received by the public," are disseminated,
whether "directly or by the intermediary of relay stations."'
13
However serviceable these definitional constructs may have been at
an earlier time, when analog systems were by far the prevalent
communications transmission mode, they no longer are serviceable in a
9. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1420 (1993).
10. Randolph J. May, The Metaphysics of VoIP, Jan. 5, 2004, CNET NEWS,
http://news.com.com/The+metaphysics+of+VoIP/2010-7352_3-5134896.html. For anyone
interested in immersing him or herself more deeply in communications law metaphysics, I
suggest reading some of the orders in the FCC's almost decade-long effort to settle on a
classification of protocol processing and protocol conversion services. To begin such a
metaphysical feast, sample Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to
Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, paras. 49-52 (1998) [hereinafter Federal-State Joint Board]
(dealing with the struggle to classify services under the 1996 Act's definitions and the
FCC's Computer II regime).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 153(27).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000).
13. § 153(6).
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world in which digital technology is rapidly displacing analog. The old
saying "a bit is a bit is a bit" really does have important implications from a
regulatory policy perspective. It is economically, if not technically,
infeasible to distinguish among voice, data, and video bits that travel along
in the same communications stream. In other words, "[o]nce all
communications are reduced to bits and bytes, all media will constitute
substitutes for one another, and attempts to segment markets based on the
means of conveyance will become increasingly problematic.'
14
I do not mean to deny the regulators' ingenuity or their good
intentions in creating these definitional constructs, or in striving to render
them serviceable for as long as possible. Take the FCC's landmark
Computer H proceeding from the early 1980s.15 It was then, when data
processing capabilities and communications services first were becoming
intertwined in nascent online applications such as e-mail and data retrieval,
that the FCC created the regulatory distinction between basic and enhanced
service. And it was this distinction that was carried over into the 1996 Act
in the form of the current "telecommunications" and "information services"
definitions. 16 In essence, a basic service was pure transmission capacity
while enhanced services were applications with computer processing
capabilities dependent upon telecommunications to be carried from one
place to another.
17
The FCC's purpose in creating this new distinction was salutary: if
the new online services had been classified as just another form of basic
communications, the services would have been subject to public utility-
style regulation under the common carrier mandates of Title 1I of the 1934
Act.' 8 The FCC thought, correctly, that online services could and would
develop on a competitive basis, and therefore, should be free from the
economic regulation to which common carders were subject.19
Acting under the constraints of the 1934 Act, the FCC's Computer II
decision was sound policy. Online services, from the early CompuServe
and Prodigy services, to the upstart America Online, and on through the
birth and spread of the ubiquitous World Wide Web, did indeed flourish on
14. Yoo, supra note 2, at 714.
15. Computer Ii, supra note 8.
16. See id. and accompanying text.
17. Id. paras. 95-97.
18. Id. para. 114; see also IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 19
F.C.C.R. 4863, para. 25 (2004) [hereinafter IP-Enabled Services] ("Providers of 'basic'
services were subjected to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Act.... [T]he
Commission declined to treat providers of enhanced services as 'common carriers' subject
to regulation under Title II of the Act.") (citations omitted).
19. See Computer H, supra note 8, para. 101; Speta, supra note 2, at 1084.
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an unregulated basis. Without any real controversy, Computer I's "basic"
and "enhanced service" definitions were embodied in essentially the same
form in the 1996 Act as "telecommunications" and "information services."
III. THE PROBLEM: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND ABUNDANT
BANDWIDTH UNDERMINE THE STOVEPIPES
What once may have been wise policy, and manageably serviceable,
in a predominantly narrowband communications environment is much
more problematic today as broadband networks become more ubiquitous.
Recall that in the narrowband world, at least as a matter of shorthand, we
could, commonly if not universally, equate voice with telecommunications,
data with information services, and video with cable service. For a long
time, limited bandwidth in the narrowband world masked the inherently
problematic nature of the separate techno-functional boundaries upon
which both the 1934 and 1996 acts' regulatory boundaries rested.
The abundant bandwidth of broadband networks, which enables fast-
growing services such as Internet access and VoIP Internet telephony to be
technically and economically viable, tugs mightily at the regulatory mask.
Is high speed cable modem Internet access service "cable,"
"telecommunications," or an "information service"? The FCC deemed
cable modem service an unregulated information service under the 1996
Act's definitional scheme. In June 2005, a divided Supreme Court handed
down a decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v.
Brand X Internet Services, which reversed an appeals court decision
holding that cable modem service is a combination of
"telecommunications" and "information service" potentially subject to
public utility-type regulation.20 What about the high speed Digital
Subscriber Line ("DSL") Internet access services offered by the traditional
telephone companies? Until September 2005, when the FCC finally
reclassified it as an unregulated information service not long after the
Brand X decision was handed down,21 DSL was classified a regulated
telecommunications service.
Next, consider the VoIP Internet telephony services. The FCC has
20. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002), vacated in part and remanded sub nom. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F. 3d
1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded, National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X
Internet Servs., Nos. 04-277 and 04-281, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5018 (June 27, 2005), 125 S.Ct.
2688 (2005) [hereinafter Brand X1.
21. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. (forthcoming
2006), 236 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 944 (2005).
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ruled that pulver.com's "Free World Dialup" ("FWD") service, which is a
"computer-to-computer" voice application that does not use ordinary
telephone numbers or originate or terminate calls on the public switched
network, is an information service.22 Following the 1996 Act's formulation,
the FCC concluded that FWD "is an information service because FWD
offers 'a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications.' 23 The FCC added that the fact that FWD happens
"to, among other things, enable members to talk over the Internet," 24 rather
than, for example, play video games, does not affect its characterization as
an information service.
How does the FCC classify the VoIP offering by Vonage, a company
that bills itself as "the broadband telephone company"? 25 Vonage's Digital
Voice customers, who must have access to a broadband connection to
subscribe, make calls that use ordinary telephone numbers and may either
originate or terminate on the public network. The FCC recently acted to
preempt state economic regulation of Vonage's Digital Voice and other
VolP services with similar characteristics, such as those offered by cable
companies, by ruling that they are interstate services.2 6 Pointing to its
already initiated rulemaking regarding VoIP and other IP-enabled services,
the FCC refrained from addressing the classification of Vonage's Digital
Voice and similar services for federal regulatory purposes. But note that the
FCC did point out that Vonage's service "resembles the telephone service
provided by the circuit-switched network.
' 27
In its IP-Enabled Services rulemaking notice, the FCC explains how
the greater bandwidth of broadband networks encourages the introduction
of services "which may integrate voice, video, and data capabilities while
maintaining high quality of service. 28 Then, in a truism, the FCC adds:
"[1]t may become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
'voice' service from 'data' service, and users may increasingly rely on
22. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither
Telecomm. Nor a Telecomm. Serv., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307
(2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs,-public/attachmatchlFCC-04-27A1.pdf
[hereinafter Pulver.com Petition].
23. Id. para. 11 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)).
24. Id. para. 19.
25. Vonage Home Page, http://www.vonage.com.
26. Vonage Holdings Corp. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-267A1 .pdf
[hereinafter Vonage Petition].
27. Id. para. 4.
28. IP-Enabled Services, supra note 18, para. 16.
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integrated services using broadband facilities delivered using IP rather than
the traditional PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network)., 29 At the end
of 2004, there already were almost thirty-eight million high-speed
broadband Internet connections in service, an increase of 34% during just
that year.30 Analysts project that as soon as 2009 there will be twenty-seven
million VoIP lines in service.3'
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES: COMPARABLE SERVICES ARE
REGULATED DIFFERENTLY UNDER THE STOVEPIPE REGIME
But does it matter that, according to the FCC's own characterization,
Vonage and other providers of similar Internet telephony services that
"enable [users] to talk over the Internet"32 and "resemble" 33 what we used
to call POTS, or "plain old telephone service," may be regulated very
differently? Does it matter that broadband Internet access services provided
by cable television and telephone companies (and perhaps soon to be
provided by satellite and power companies) may be regulated differently,
even while they already compete vigorously with each other?
Of course it matters. Providers of telecommunications services are
generally subject to price and entry regulation as common carriers;
information services providers are not.34 Telecommunications services may
be required to be unbundled so that competitors may access the unbundled
network elements at regulated rates.35 Information services are not subject
to mandatory access requirements. Telecommunications services are
subject to certain social obligations, such as universal service contributions
and tax payments, from which non-telecommunications services presently
36are exempt. Telecommunications services also are subject to certain
health and safety mandates. For example, telecommunications services
must provide enhanced 911 ("E9 11") service, and are subject to disability
and wiretap capability requirements that are not generally applicable to
non-telecommunications services.3 7 Cable operators are subject to certain
29. Id.
30. See Press Release, FCC, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on
High-Speed Internet Access Services (July 7, 2005) (explaining that the number of high-
speed lines in service at the end of 2004 reported to be 37.9 million).
31. net2phone, 2005 Annual Report 3 (2005), available at http://web.net2phone.com/
about/investor/2005AR.pdf.
32. See Pulver.com Petition, supra note 22, para. 19 and accompanying text.
33. See Vonage Petition, supra note 26, para. 4.
34. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 18, paras. 24-25.
35. Id. para. 26.
36. See generally Federal-State Joint Board, supra note 10; see also IP-Enabled
Services, supra note 18, paras. 63-66.
37. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 18, paras. 26, 45-60.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] MARKET ORIENTED COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 111
regulatory obligations that do not apply to non-cable services, such as
obtaining a local franchise and paying local franchise fees.38 States and
localities impose different rights-of-way obligations and fees, depending on
how a service is classified.39
Thus, services that are comparable, at least from the consumers'
perspective, and that compete head-to-head against each other in the
marketplace, are subject to different regulatory requirements based solely
on how the service offerings are classified. For example, despite the fact
that cable operators have had close to twice as many broadband Internet
access subscribers as do the telephone companies, 40 until very recently the
broadband offerings of cable and telephone companies were subject to very
different regulatory regimes.41 In short, the existing service classifications
based upon techno-functional characteristics have little or nothing to do
with how consumers perceive the services or the marketplace position of
the service providers.
V. THE SOLUTION: A NEW MARKET-ORIENTED MARKET
PARADIGM
It should be obvious that a new regulatory framework is needed for
communications policy. My purpose here has been to provide the
background and context for understanding why a new paradigm is needed
rather than to offer any detailed prescription for such regulatory
framework. Nevertheless, in concluding, some general thoughts about the
direction such change should take may not be out of order.
First, what should be avoided is a new framework that just substitutes
one set of techno-functional constructs for another. For example, MCI's
Senior Director for Global Policy and Planning, Richard Whitt, has
proposed that policymakers "adopt a comprehensive legal and regulatory
framework founded on the Internet's horizontal network layers.' ' 2 He
identifies four layers-content, applications, logical, and physical-that he
claims comprise the Internet's architecture.43 He urges that public policy be
formulated to respect the integrity of the distinct layers for purposes of
determining whether regulation is needed of providers of services within
38. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (2000) (authorizing local governments to award
franchises for the provision of cable service and to require payment of franchise fees).
39. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 50-State Survey
of Rights-of-Way Statutes, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm.
40. See Press Release, FCC, supra note 30.
41. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
42. See Whitt, supra note 2, at 591.
43. Id. at 592.
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the layers.44
Whitt then suggests that the two lower layers, the logical and
physical, should be targeted for discrete regulation based on his claim that
significant market power resides in these layers.45 The physical layer
roughly corresponds to the network facilities of the cable, telephone,
satellite, wireless, and other companies that transport information. The
logical layer roughly corresponds to the software codes and protocols, such
as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP"), that
interface with the physical layer below and the applications and content
layers above. Whitt calls this proposed layers model "a horizontal leap
forward.
' 46
But turning stovepipes on their side is not necessarily a leap forward;
rather, it is an invitation to stultify the continued evolution of our physical
networks and the service applications that may be integrated into such
networks. It is difficult to predict, especially in a technologically dynamic
environment, how network platforms, or the Internet, really an
interconnected network of network platforms, will evolve on a technical or
functional basis. Today's seemingly discrete Internet layers may be
obsolete, or at least meaningfully altered, tomorrow.
What is needed is a new market-oriented model that breaks with the
past, not a replacement regime based on just another set of techno-
functional constructs.47 A market-oriented model that employs antitrust law
or antitrust-like principles would focus on the structure of the marketplace:
whether individual service providers possess market power that should be
constrained by some form of regulation, and whether such constraints
generally should be applied in the form of ex ante proscriptions or more
narrowly-tailored ex post remedial orders. Such a market-oriented model
would put the focus on the consumer-and consumer welfare-where it
belongs, not on distinctions grounded in particular technology platforms or
arcane functional characteristics that have little to do with existing
marketplace realities. It would greatly reduce the opportunities for
regulatory gaming that are inherent in the current regime.
Thus, under this approach, comparable services ("substitutable"
services in antitrust parlance) from the consumers' perspective would not
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 587.
47. What is also needed is a slimmer, more efficient, and more accountable regulatory
agency with jurisdiction over communications, in other words, a transformed and reformed
FCC. But that is another story unto itself. See Randolph J. May, The FCC's Tumultuous
Year 2003: An Essay on an Opportunity for Institutional Agency Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
1307 (2004).
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be subject to differential regulatory treatment just because they are
delivered over different technology platforms or employ different
functional bells and whistles. By the same token, comparable services
might be subjected to differential regulatory treatment if there is a market-
oriented reason to do so in order to enhance consumer welfare.
After all, any regulatory regime ultimately should be judged based on
whether or not it advances or impairs marketplace competition and
promotes consumer welfare, not on whether it advances or impairs the
prospects of particular competitors, or protects the jobs of current
regulators.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") promises to upend a century-
old model of voice telephony by creating a more dynamic marketplace and
by changing the point of control from the central office switch to the end
user's device. The transformation to VoIP is only in its very early stages,
and it will ultimately impact all sectors of the telecommunications services
industry, including traditional incumbent local exchange carriers, cable
providers, wireless service providers, and emergency service providers. In
fact, all of the relevant stakeholders affected by VoIP (e.g., service
providers, hardware and software vendors, customers, and governmental
agencies) share a great need to analyze the issues raised by the transition
from the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") to a
packet-switched, Internet Protocol-based ("IP") architecture. For example,
service providers and hardware and software developers are struggling to
understand and take advantage of opportunities in this area involving new
technology prospects (e.g., integrated messaging and mobile collaboration).
Moreover, business, governmental, and residential consumer users of
telecommunications equipment and services are seeking guidance on when
and how to upgrade to a new technological frontier. Finally, governmental
agencies are struggling to ensure that social policy concerns will be
addressed in this very different technological environment.
The social policy implications of VoIP present regulators and
incumbent businesses with an unusual dilemma, forcing them to choose
from amongst mutually exclusive-and equally unfavorable--options.
Under the current PSTN-based voice telephone network, many critical
policy goals, such as the provision of reliable emergency services, are
implemented effectively and reliably. However, most VoIP services, at
least as they exist today, do not deliver the same level of quality and
dependability as emergency services. In response, some state regulators
have considered passing regulations requiring VoIP to meet legacy and
other requirements, regardless of the dramatic differences in the VoIP
service's technical and business models.' The Federal Communications
1. Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D.
Minn. 2003). Note that newer service providers have already started to tell consumers that
VoIP services may not meet traditional Emergency 911 ("E911") expectations, although
they have not yet described what the alternative expectations might be. For example, an
AT&T spokesperson, referring to the company's consumer VoIP service, indicates, "We
make very clear to our customers that our CallVantage Internet phone service does not work
the same as traditional landline 911." 911 Calls Made Over Internet Often Get Lower
Priority, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/
2004-10-12-voip-trouble x.htm.
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Commission ("FCC") has only begun to develop its regulatory VoIP
strategy, although former Chairman Michael Powell made it clear that the
strategy would need to differ from the legacy model used in the PSTN
context, a position likely to continue in successor FCC administrations.2
With these thoughts in mind, it is unclear how VoIP services might evolve
in a meaningful and timely fashion.
In a number of specific circumstances, however, self-regulation can
be a viable alternative to government regulation. Certification, in particular,
can be provided by a self-regulatory body as evidence of conformance to
required attributes, practices, or policies. Self-regulation has a number of
potential advantages, and in the case of VolP emergency services, we are
particularly interested in recognizing information asymmetries between
industry and government, given the increase in complexity and
heterogeneity inherent in the move from PSTN to VolP. In order for self-
regulation to be viewed as a credible alternative and in order for it to
ultimately succeed, it needs to be situated within a careful institutional
framework that includes (1) a clear and consistent external motivation (e.g.,
an incentive in terms of third-party liability); (2) a process for determining
the specifications to be certified; (3) identification of certifiers and
determination if a competitive market for certification exists; (4) reference
to an appropriately neutral accrediting party-a role that government can
but does not have to fill; (5) communication of certification to users; and
(6) policing of certification. The telecommunications industry has
repeatedly demonstrated the ability to self-regulate in areas of
interoperability where economic motivation can be relied on to incentivize
the activity. In this case, though, the industry should self-regulate in order
to address a social policy goal. Success in this area could even help self-
regulation become a tool that could be applied in other areas of social
policy, especially in the development of new policy initiatives that would
otherwise be imposed through government regulation of
telecommunications, as has traditionally been the case.
The particular technical challenges surrounding VolP emergency
services arise from two major drivers: variability and location. VolP can be
seen as a much more variable service than traditional PSTN-based
telephony, and many new business models and technical combinations are
emerging in which quality, methods of initiating and terminating calls,
integration with other messaging technologies,3 and types of terminals
2. Written statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, on Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-244231 A 1.pdf.
3. Indeed, we should ask to what extent social policy expectations of emergency
services' response to voice communications should also apply to the many other modes of
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(e.g., phones, PDAs, and PCs) have all become heterogeneous. For
emergency services in particular, IP networks are fundamentally location
independent, and VolP services may run on IP networks over many
different types of wired and wireless access.4 As a result, these realities
challenge a fundamental modem expectation: that an emergency services
dispatcher can identify the caller's location even if the caller does not know
the location or is not able to describe it. Although substantial technical
progress is being made regarding the provision of emergency services in
various VolP settings, users may not be able to determine prior to an
emergency whether the particular service they are employing is capable of
emergency service. Accordingly, labeling should be used as a means of
specifying the particular level of emergency service capability provided, in
recognition of the fact that VoIP's diversity will preclude a single common
requirement for all possible VoIP services. Also, an emergency service
testing capability should be made available to the end user.
This Article will describe the technical issues surrounding emergency
service in VoIP, examine the status of proposed technical strategies, 5 and
identify candidate criteria to be used in certification. Furthermore, this
Article will examine the theories behind and examples of successful
certification within self-regulatory regimes, including (1) the use of
certification in product safety; (2) the use of certification in particular by
Underwriters Laboratories acting as certifying institutions; (3) ISO 9000
quality system certification; (4) interoperability certification within the
telecommunications industry through Cable Television Laboratories and
Telcordia; (5) the Wi-Fi Alliance as a consumer-oriented certification
communication that are now popular or that may become popular, such as e-mail, instant
messaging, and video telephony. Given the possible breadth of regulation implied by such
an increase in scope, we submit that the option of effective self-regulation would be even
more valuable for all of these services than for telephony emergency services alone.
4. For example, VoIP is increasingly carried over Wi-Fi wireless local access
networks, and dual-mode phones that can switch between VoIP/Wi-Fi and cellular service
are now being marketed. See Corie Lok, One Person, One Phone, TECH. REV., Mar. 2004;
Marguerite Reardon, Wi-Fi and VoIP: Is Sum Greater Than Parts?, CNET.cOM, Mar. 1,
2004, http://news.com.com/2102-7352_3-5167782.html.
5. VoIP has a number of different signaling frameworks, including the Session
Initiation Protocol ("SIP") and H.323. For the most part, we attempt to proceed in a
framework-independent manner in this paper; however, in cases where the framework is
relevant, we focus on the SIP framework. We fully acknowledge that development of actual
certification standards will need to consider multiple frameworks. Our emphasis on SIP is
motivated by technical, market, and policy issues that are outside the scope of this Article.
See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28,
2003, at G3 (explaining in basic terms how a SIP phone works). For a good overview of SIP
located at the Internet Engineering Task Force Web site, see generally Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Charter, http://www.ietf.orgfhtml.charters/sip-charter.htm (last visited Nov.
16, 2005).
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consortium; and (6) general experience with self-regulation in
environmental policy. In the end, this Article will synthesize these insights
in order to propose specific recommendations on institutional design,
technical criteria, and the certification process.
I. EXISTING MODELS FOR CERTIFICATION
This Part presents the results of secondary research into existing
certification processes. Drawing on historical analysis and literature review
techniques, this research incorporates the collection and analysis of original
descriptions, outcomes research on certification processes, and research on
the manner in which these processes have been embedded in overall policy
systems including government regulation. In the end, this Part offers an
overall model for successful certification tailored to the particular technical
and industrial circumstances of VoIP.
A. Theory and Practice of Certification
Well-established certification processes are used in professions, such
as medicine and law to accredit practitioners, in securities markets by
underwriters and auditors, and in product safety and compatibility arenas.
More recently, certification and, more broadly, self-regulation have
emerged in new social policy settings (e.g., the certification of a
manufacturer's compliance with labor practice expectations in developing
countries or with specific environmental practices). Substantial research
has created a reasonable understanding of the purpose of certification, as
well as of its challenges and drawbacks.
Certification can have both economic and social policy goals. In
economic terms, products or services may have attributes, such as quality
or safety, that buyers have difficulty ascertaining prior to the purchase. As
a result, consumers oftentimes cannot distinguish between products, a
situation that leaves little incentive for companies to include the attributes
in the first place. Although reputation, brand, and warranties may mitigate
this effect, such factors fall short if they are inconsistent or if customers
find it too difficult or costly to apply the factors as a recourse. Certification
can thus provide an alternate method for reliably signaling attribute
distinctions. 6 For social policy, certification, as an aspect of self-regulation,
can serve as an alternative or complement to government regulation. In
other words, certification can be used as a means of avoiding the
overproduction of negative social externalities (e.g., pollution) and the
underproduction of positive social externalities (e.g., safety policies).
6. Gian Luigi Albano & Alessandro Lizzeri, Strategic Certification and Provision of
Quality, 42 INT'L ECON. REv. 267, 268 (2001).
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Moreover, certification can offer important advantages over direct
"command-and-control" regulation. For example, certification can reduce
the demand on government services and, consequently, on required levels
of taxation; put another way, certification can better accommodate a neo-
liberal reduced-government capability. It can also exploit information
asymmetries in which industry participants have more (and better)
information than a potential government regulator. The direct use of
industry information may increase the rate at which regulation can adapt as
circumstances change and may also subsequently reduce the need to
enumerate all conceivable contingencies, resulting in more flexible and
lighter-weight regulation.8 Furthermore, preemptive self-regulation may
eliminate the need for industries and their opponents to make politically
motivated investments in regulatory policies. 9
Self-regulation can also have a moral and cultural effect by
inculcating an ethical component in institutional self-image that induces
behavior that exceeds mere compliance with the letter of the law. °
Conversely, imposition of rigid regulation instead of self-regulation on
sectors that have a strong anti-authoritarian tradition, as commentator
Darren Sinclair notes, "can 'destroy virtue in the business community."
'' 1
We believe that it is far too early to suggest that the telecommunications
industry is incapable of producing its own solutions.
On the other hand, certification can have undesirable side effects that
should be anticipated in institutional design. If certifiers are under the
7. See generally Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of
Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979).
8. Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry,
23 J. REG. ECON. 5, 7 (2003).
9. In this case, the end result is a Pareto improvement in welfare. See John W.
Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon, & Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The
Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 583 (2000). See also
Economist.com, Research Tools Economics A-Z http://www.economist.coml
research/Economics/, which defines Pareto efficiency as follows:
A situation in which nobody can be made better off without making somebody
else worse off. Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1843-1923), an Italian economist. If
an economy's resources are being used inefficiently, it ought to be possible to
make somebody better off without anybody else becoming worse off. In reality,
change often produces losers as well as winners. Pareto efficiency does not help
judge whether this sort of change is economically good or bad.
10. See Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command-and-Control:
Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19
LAW & POL'Y 415 (1997); Simon Ashby, Swee-Hoon Chuah, & Robert Hoffmann, Industry
Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance, 11 INT'L
J. EcON. Bus. 91 (2004) (discussing self-regulation in terms of strategic interactions).
11. Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 LAW & POL'Y 529, 537 (1997).
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control of the body being certified, certification may be deliberately
structured to restrict new entrants and extract monopoly rents for already
certified parties, 2 an attribute of guilds that continues in contemporary
professions that require certification.1 3 A parallel social policy concern
relates to the credibility of the certifier, who may be perceived as being too
tightly controlled by the certifying body. 14
Ironically, though, should certification preempt some other form of
regulation and succeed in spurring innovation and even new entrants, it is
quite possible that incumbents would view the previous form of regulation
as preferable even though a broader social perspective would favor
certification. For this reason, we cannot conclude with assurance that all
industry players will prefer certification even if it benefits both industry as
a whole and society at large.
If the certification capability is limited to a single or small number of
suppliers of certifications, the certification process itself might capture
monopoly rents to the detriment of suppliers or consumers. More generally,
even a competitive certifier market can exhibit peculiarities depending on
the level of certifier liability, the regulation of the certifier market, and the
amount of competition 5 (e.g., situations in which certifiers do not provide
12. See Richard H. Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 1229, 1259 (1986) ('The incentives provided by the prospect of monopoly rent are
the principal rationale for persuading society to permit innovators in technology to exact
some monopoly rent.") Also note that Leland provides a more nuanced analysis of whether
licensing results in standards that are too high in order to restrict competition: "If a
professional group or industry is allowed to set minimum quality standards (self-regulation),
these standards may be set too high or too low. On balance, however, there is some reason
to expect too-high standards to be the more likely case." Leland, supra note 7, at 1342. See
also Ulrike Schaede, Industry Rules: From Deregulation to Self-Regulation, 28 JAPANESE
ECON., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 35, 37-38 (pointing out that a related problem in which apparent
deregulation in Japan, replaced by industry self-regulation, did little to weaken trade
barriers).
13. Bernardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini, Barriers to Entry and the Self-
Regulating Professions: Evidence from the Market for Italian Accountants, in ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION 131, 132 (Bemardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini eds.,
Oxford University Press 1999); Roger Van Den Bergh, Self-Regulation of the Medical and
Legal Professions: Remaining Barriers to Competition and EC Law, in ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION 89, 111-16 (Bemardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini
eds., Oxford University Press 1999).
14. In social policy regulation, critics are quick to question the extent to which firms
and industries will truly restrict themselves, notwithstanding their stated intentions. To some
extent, this debate rests on questions as to whether firms optimize shareholder wealth or
take a stakeholder perspective. See Javier Ndfiez, A Model of Self-Regulation, 74 ECON.
LETTERS 91 (2001) (discussing the lack of incentives to expose fraud in self-regulation). See
also Maxwell, et al., supra note 9, at 584 (stating self-regulation is the alternative to
political regulation).
15. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Imperfect Competition in Certification Markets, in
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION 158, 159-60 (Bemardo Bortolotti & Gianluca
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all information or choose to provide noisy information). 16 The structure of
the certifier market is consequently a non-trivial consideration.
The insurance industry plays a special role in certification as well,
especially since certification may signal lower insurance risks, which may
then be reflected in lower premiums. Not unexpectedly, insurers need to be
able to rely on certifiers' independence from producers. For example,
certifiers that vigorously compete for producer business may compromise
the accuracy of certification, such as has happened with recent auditing
scandals.
17
Closely related to the role of insurance in certification is the role of
liability. Liability, of course, already works in partnership with regulation
when safety issues come into play, for neither liability nor regulation by
itself is generally sufficient to produce socially desirable levels of care.' 8
From a producer's perspective, self-regulation that results in an active
compliance activity may provide protection against imputation of "intent"
to undertake unlawful acts.19 In product liability, for example, a showing of
negligence usually requires all of the following elements to exist and
requires all of the associated questions to be answered in the positive:
(1) duty (did the vendor use "reasonable care"?), (2) breach of duty (was
there unreasonable conduct involving an act or a failure to act?),
(3) foreseeability (was the problem foreseeable?), (4) proximate cause (did
the breach cause the damage?), and (5) damage (did the conduct cause
physical injury or some other loss?).2o A widely accepted industry
certification or a government-endorsed certification, along with a vendor's
consistent effort in securing such certification, can aid a defense on
questions of duty and breach of duty.
A critical question in self-regulation is the appropriate role of
Fiorentini eds., Oxford University Press 1999).
16. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman & Ronald J. Gilson, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing inefficiencies in certification markets).
17. As another example, periodic softness in the market for maritime insurance leads to
lax responses to negative certification signals from insurers. See Frank Furger,
Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry, 19 LAw
& POL'Y 445,465 (1997).
18. See generally Steven Shavell, A Model for the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety
Regulation, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 271 (1984) (constructing a model showing that regulation
does not result in appropriate risk reduction, nor does liability result in that outcome).
19. See also John C. Ruhnka & Heidi Boerstler, Governmental Incentives for Corporate
Self-Regulation, 17 J. Bus. ETHics 309, 310-11 (1998) (analogizing self-regulation to
certain consequences that can be found in criminal antitrust cases).
20. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY (1998); see also
Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Guide to Its
Highlights, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 85 (1998) (providing a more in-depth discussion of the
RESTATEMENT).
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government. Pure self-regulation (i.e., regulation without any external
influence) is usually rejected based on the lack of evidence showing that
this mode naturally arises or is effective.2' Conversely, a broad correlation
between evidence of governmental incentives for the creation of self-
regulation and self-regulatory activity seems to suggest that successful and
credible self-regulation is consistently coupled with some form of influence
or oversight, leading to a model that might be described as co-regulation.22
Such external influences may come from government entities or, as is
apparent in certain contemporary social policy cases, independent
nongovernmental organizations with political influence or influence over
consumer choice. 23 When influencing the formation of self-regulatory
bodies, the government's manner of signaling its intentions can be
important. In fact, game theory suggests that the government should firmly
demonstrate zero tolerance of undesirable behavior and immediately
invoke direct regulation if such behavior is observed.24 On a more positive
21. See generally Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary
Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 POL'Y STUD. J. 417 (2004) (noting
that, absent oversight, a firm that joins a self-regulatory body may actually have a tendency
to under perform when compared with firms that do not join, thus effectively deriving
membership benefits without actually investing in the area subject to self-regulation).
22. Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control?: Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 LAW & POL'Y 529, 537 (1997). As Sinclair points out, the tendency in some
of the literature to paint command-and-control regulation and self-regulation as stark and
distinct alternatives is overly restrictive:
Those who are locked into a paradigm which incorrectly assumes that choices
have to be made between artificially restrictive models of self-regulation and
command and control regulation are unlikely to be capable of appreciating the
more nuanced opportunities for achieving both efficiency and effectiveness, which
arise from complementary combinations of components of both types of
instruments.
Id. at 532. Sinclair goes on to list the following four key components, which can be
modulated to select a policy on the spectrum between command-and-control and self-
regulation: "[T]he nature and extent of regulatory compulsion; the extent to which
regulatory flexibility allows firms to accommodate their individual circumstances; the
opportunity for industry design input into the negotiation and development of regulation;
and the extent to which win-win outcomes are the focus of regulation." (emphasis in
original) Id. at 533. The legal and regulatory incentives used to influence self-regulation
have traditionally been, and often continue to be, primarily "punitive" in nature, though
some more recent cases are shifting towards positive incentives that reward corporations for
actions that encourage or assist desirable behavior. See Ruhnka & Boerstler, supra note 19,
at 309.
23. Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of
Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1, 3-5 (2003); see also Tim Bartley,
Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private
Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & Soc'Y. 433 (2003)
(discussing how social movement campaigns in a neo-liberal context lead to the emergence
of private certification).
24. See Ashby, et al., supra note 10, at 102-04.
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note, the government can also encourage self-regulation through a variety
of positive signals regarding preferential treatment for diligent self-
regulators.
25
Three processes that are commonly present in social regulation are
also potentially applicable to co-regulation. These three processes are as
follows: (1) prior approval, in which firms obtain approval before engaging
in an activity; (2) mandatory standards, in which firms are required to
comply with the regulation and undergo monitoring; and (3) information
disclosure, in which firms are required to disclose facts to buyers that they
might not otherwise choose to disclose.26 Interestingly, the framework by
which self-regulation is invoked can also result in unanticipated effects. For
example, a government-crafted "voluntary agreement" may reduce industry
efforts to engage in industry-devised self-regulatory activities, reducing
profits and, thus, general welfare.27 This point again suggests that
government should apply credible pressure in order to motivate self-
regulatory activity, while also exploiting the potential advantages of self-
regulation, particularly information asymmetries between industry and
government.
On a related note, another necessary element for the industrial self-
regulatory component is coherent industry representation. 28 Possibilities
include bodies establishing standards, industry associations, and the
increasingly evident consortia in the information and communication
technology industries. Care must be taken, however, especially in the latter
29group, to mitigate the potential for exclusion and reduced competition.
On a final note, software, an increasingly important product and
component, differs greatly from many of the other types of products that
25. Ruhnka and Boerstler give as examples: (1) the recognition of compliance with self-
regulation as a mitigating factor for corporate regulatory violations by regulating agencies,
(2) state and federal prosecutors, and (3) in jury instructions and sentencing guidelines, the
recognition of self-reporting as a mitigating factor by prosecutors and regulators and the
substitution of internal compliance for agency monitoring. Ruhnka & Boerstler, supra note
19, at 314-21.
26. A. Ogus, Regulatory Institutions and Structures, 73 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND
COOPERATIVE ECON. 627, 631-34 (2002).
27. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Self-Regulation, Taxation, and Public
Voluntary Environmental Agreements, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1453 (2003).
28. See generally, Frank Welsh, Self-Regulation: The True Key to Success of Physician-
Directed Networks, 23 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 1, 3 (1996) (describing the results of self-
regulation in the medical profession and pointing out that increased participation through
physician-led efforts is a key to success in self regulation in that field).
29. Richard Hawkins, The Rise of Consortia in the Information and Communication
Technology Industries: Emerging Implications for Policy, 23 TELECOMM. POL'Y 159, 172
(1999).
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have traditionally been certified. 30 Because software can directly affect
safety, software reliability is increasingly scrutinized. Certification thus can
serve the dual economic purposes of signaling quality to users and reducing
the liability of producers.31 Software often has an iterative and incremental
design character, so delaying certification testing until the completion of
software implementation can be quite inefficient. Consequently,
certification testing is better introduced as an integral part of the internal
and regression-testing stages of software design.32 Interestingly, an
organization that embeds certification testing throughout the design cycle
can inculcate a culture in which the criteria used for certification become
implicit organizational values (e.g., by embedding security certification
testing, an organization can help foster a "security culture").33 However,
implementation of broad software certification processes poses significant
challenges. For instance, an organization may find it infeasible to maintain
adequate criteria to certify products that change rapidly in function and
capability. In such cases, certification may be practical only if it is
restricted to aspects of the system that undergo fewer changes and that can
be reasonably isolated. Moreover, different types of certification give rise
to different challenges. Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane Internet
Security, Inc., a managed security company in San Jose, California, points
out that certifying for security-where threats are active, intelligent, and
hostile-is more challenging than certifying for safety, where threats are
usually passive and random.
34
B. Certification Examples
In order for us to appreciate the value that we can derive from a
private model of certification, in this Subpart we will review several
30. Software has been subject to certification in a number of areas, most notably in the
area of security. The U.S. government developed a set of security certification techniques
referred to as the Orange Book. See Reid Skibell, The Phenomenon of Insecure Software in
a Security-Focused World, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 107, 127 (2003) (describing the federal
government's Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, which is also referred to as the
Orange Book Program).
31. Producers of software already have a history of limiting liability through the terms
of software licenses. In light of this fact, some advocate an insurance-industry-driven
certification regime akin to Underwriters Laboratory-style safety certification. Harold W.
Lawson, Infrastructure Risk Reduction, COMM. OF THE ASS'N. FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY,
June 1998, at 120.
32. See Patricia Rodriguez-Dapena, Software Safety Certification: A Multidomain
Problem, IEEE SOFrWARE, July-Aug. 1999, at 31, 33.
33. See Greg Goth, Will the Cyber-UL Concept Take Hold?, IEEE SOFTWARE, July-
Aug. 2002, at 12, 13.
34. See Scott Berinato, A UL-Type Seal for Security? Don't Bet on It, EWEEK, Oct. 16,
2000, at 11, 15.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] VOIP MODEL FOR EMERGENCY SERVICE
examples of private and non-governmental organizations that have been
successful in this field. By reviewing how other bodies have dealt with
self-certification, we will be able to see that our proposal-while relatively
new in the software world-is by no means a matter of first impression for
technology companies.
1. Underwriters Laboratories and Product Safety Certification
Underwriters Laboratories ("UL"), incorporated as a nonprofit
organization in 1901, was initially funded by the National Board of Fire
Underwriters to prepare lists of safe products, thus demonstrating the
potential benefits derived from linking certification to insurance.35 When
insurance industry funding ceased in 1916, UL became a self-sustaining
organization through the collection of testing fees.36 Today, manufacturers
are motivated to seek UL certification because (1) some customers require
it; (2) many consumers recognize it as an indicator of product safety; and
(3) it can reduce manufacturer liability by supporting reasonable care
claims.
Safety co-regulation by government agencies and an industry
certifier, Underwriters Laboratories, is apparent in two distinct models. On
the one hand, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") sanctions Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories through
an explicit accreditation process, 37 UL was originally the only such lab;
now it is but one of several.38 OSHA regulations thus compel
35. Courts have held that Underwriters Laboratories owe a duty of care to consumers:
The raison d'etre of the UL mark is to show that a product has met safety
standards. By offering its mark to manufacturers, UL has placed itself into the
stream of commerce .... In some segments of the marketplace, the UL mark has
great importance. Manufacturers desire UL approval, and their customers expect
it. [P]ilaintiffs... should be able to seek recovery against UL where it ... has been
negligent. The UL seal does not guarantee that a manufacturer has acted with
ordinary care but sound public policy requires that UL act with ordinary care in
the conduct of its own business--the certification process.
United States Lighting Service v. Llerrad Corp., 800 F.Supp. 1513, 1517 (N.D. Ohio 1992),
vacated by agreement, 807 F.Supp. 439 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
36. See Underwriters Laboratories Home Page, http://www.ul.com/about/history/l910/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (noting that in 1916 "[d]irect financial support from the
insurance industry is discontinued. UL becomes self-sustaining on income from testing fees
paid by manufacturers of products submitted for certification.").
37. Accreditation fees for test laboratories are on the order of $10,000. See Nationally
Recognized Testing Laboratories; Fees; Reduction of Public Comment Period on
Recognition Notices, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,098 (proposed Aug. 18, 1999) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910), available at http://tinyurl.com/3nl4o.
38. OSHA's decision in 1988 to create a competitive market for testing could not be the
result of a strict profit motive on the part of UL because UL is a nonprofit organization.
However, absent the discipline of competition, even a nonprofit organization may not
evolve or diligently pursue efficiency initiatives. Current UL management is undertaking a
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
manufacturers to produce and buy certified products from accredited
laboratories. The Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), 3 9 on
the other hand, has a less formal relationship with UL. The CPSC actively
contributes to the content of UL standards in cases where the CPSC has a
direct interest.4° In other cases, the CPSC may use public feedback as a
mechanism for influencing UL practices. 1 UL, for its part, actively invests
in the government and regulator services it offers. For example, UL makes
its information and consulting services available only to regulators.42
2. Telecommunications Certification: CableLabs and Telcordia
Historically, most U.S. social policy goals have been advanced
through governmental regulation rather than through self- or coregulation.
In fact, for decades antitrust laws in the United States have provided a
significant deterrent to industry development of common standards.43
European and other international companies, on the other hand, have a
long-standing tradition of working together to form common solutions. In
1984, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA")
in recognition of the fact that U.S. industry can benefit through
participation in collaborative standards-setting activities. 44 Accordingly, the
major effort to modernize and increase efficiency in the organization. See UNDERWRrrERS
LABORATORIES INc. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 1-2 (2004), available at
http://www.ul.com/infofULAR_2003.pdf. See also Brett Nelson, Under Fire, FORBES, June
21, 2004, at 103, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0621/103-print.html.
39. See generally U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Home Page,
http://www.cpsc.gov (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
40. The CPSC also participates in defining standards of other "voluntary" safety
standards-setting organizations, such as ASTM International. See Geraint G. Howells, The
Relationship between Product Liability and Product Safety-Understanding a Necessary
Element in European Product Liability through a Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39
WASHBURN L.J. 305, 310 (2000) (describing the role of voluntary standard-setting and
compliance and asserting that the CPSC works the most with the American Society for
Testing and Materials, Underwriters Laboratories and ANSI). Further, the CPSC has the
authority to directly regulate in cases where it sees sufficient safety risk by "issuing and
enforcing mandatory standards or banning consumer products if no feasible standard would
adequately protect the public." U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission: Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.cpsc.gov/BUSINFO/faq.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
41. See Underwriters Laboratories Has Been Coming Under Fire, CONSUMERS' RES.
MAGAZINE, Jan. 2000, at 40.
42. See Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.: Regulatory Authorities, http://www.ul.coml
regulators/; see also https://www.ul.com/auth/codereq.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
(noting certain materials available for purchase by regulators and what the UL calls
"authorities having jurisdiction.").
43. See generally Mark A Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem,
28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996).
44. The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4301)(1988) (relating to research and development joint ventures).
In 1993, the law was rewritten to include production joint ventures in addition to research.
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telecommunications industry has only a very recent history of group
certification for equipment interoperability purposes.45 This form of
certification most directly addresses the economic motivation for
certification-interoperability-which is an attribute that is both valued by
buyers and difficult for them to ascertain prior to product purchase.
Cable Television Laboratories ("CableLabs"), a nonprofit research
consortium founded in 1988, was formed not long after the passage of the
NCRA. Funded and controlled by cable operators, generally called multiple
system operators ("MSOs"), in the cable television industry, CableLabs
leads the development of cable television standards, as well as provides
certification and qualification testing for those standards.46 Equipment
vendors tend to ensure their designs meet CableLabs standards, and they
tend to seek CableLabs certification, mainly because many MSOs require
certification when making equipment purchases. MSOs, in turn, are
motivated to seek out certified vendors in order to increase the supply of
interoperable equipment, which makes the equipment more of a
commodity-an effect observable in cable modem pricing-and promotes
standardization of system design and performance. Testing is performed at
CableLabs, and vendors are charged fees that range from $50,000 to
$115,000 per product tested, depending on the standard to which
conformance is being certified.47
Telcordia Technologies, a subsidiary of Science Applications
International Corporation ("SAIC"), is a descendant of Bell Laboratories
by way of Bellcore.48 The company has traditionally supplied standards,
certification, 49 and other services to the regional bell operating companies,
as well as to other telephone companies and their equipment suppliers. As
is the case with the cable industry, telephony industry equipment suppliers
pay for qualification testing so that they can meet the certification
requirements of telephone operators. Among other areas of proficiency,
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 119
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1992)).
45. See Tim McElligott, Six Degrees of Preparation, TELEPHONY, Oct. 16, 2000, at 48.
46. CableLabs standards include the Data Over Cable Services Interface Specification
("DOCSIS") for cable modems and the CableHome and PacketCable specifications. See
CableLabs Certification and Qualification Process, http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
47. See CableLabs Pricing Schedule for 2005, available at www.cablemodem.coml
downloads/2005Pricing.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (explaining pricing for various
certification processes).
48. Bellcore was established from parts of Bell Labs during the AT&T divestiture in
1984, and SAIC bought the organization in late 1998. Bill Pitterman, Telcordia
Technologies: The Journey to High Maturity, 17 IEEE SoFrWARE 4, July/Aug. 2000, at 89.
49. See Testing Services, Telcordia Network Integrity Services,
http://www.telcordia.comservices/testing/ntwk-integrity.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL
Telcordia inherited unique expertise in certifying the interoperability of
products with Bell company operations and management databases.
In recent years, Telcordia and the company's proprietary Operations
Systems Modifications for the Integration of Network Elements
("OSMINE") process have engendered sharp criticism due to the high cost
of testing-as much as $2 million per product-and the long duration of
test cycles.50 As a result, the largest regional bell operating company,
Verizon, created its own accreditation program and ten labs, including
Telcordia's lab, which are currently accredited to certify compliance
against standards important to Verizon. z In this case, a large firm, rather
than the government, has made an investment in an attempt to create a
competitive market for interoperability-oriented certification testing.
Moreover, Telcordia now has to compete for certification business.
Accordingly, Telcordia's business strategy has shifted away from providing
sole-source research and certification-as was the case in the Bellcore era
and as is similar to the case with CableLabs52-towards providing a broad
array of services and technologies.
3. Meta-Standard Certification: ISO 9000
Nations may identify accrediting bodies that in turn accredit
certification bodies.53 Not surprisingly, the details of quality systems can
vary dramatically depending on the product being manufactured or the
service being provided. Meta-standard certification, then, is an attempt to
provide useful certification across a very diverse and heterogeneous set of
circumstances by focusing on process clarity rather than specific outcomes.
50. Dan O'Shea, A Certified Mess, TELEPHONY, Jan. 21, 2002, at 32, 34.
51. See Verizon Independent Testing Laboratories Network Equipment Building
System NEBS Testing Certification Program (NEBS-TCP), http://www.verizonnebs.com-
tcppage.html (last visited 15, 2005).
52. The transition of Bellcore from a consortium to a supplier was partly due to
increasing competition between the consortium's member regional bell operating
companies. Such competition undermines the viability of consortia. See Pitterman, supra
note 48, at 89.
53. In the United States, three bodies are designated as accrediting bodies: the
American National Accreditation Program for Registrars of Quality Systems, the American
National Standards Institute, and the Registrar Accreditation Board. See ISO Directory of
ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Accreditation and Certification Bodies, http://www.iso.chliso/enl
info/ISODirectory/Country/countryUS.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Also see Maureen
A Breitenberg, The ABC's of the U.S. Conformity Assessment System, Office of Standards
Systems, NIST, NISTR 5014 (April, 1997), available at http:llts.nist.gov/tslhtdocs/210/
ncsci/primer.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). National accrediting bodies may themselves
be accredited by a common international organization such as the International
Accreditation Forum. See International Accreditation Forum Home Page, http://www.iaf.nu/
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Note that ISO itself does not accredit any organization relative
to accreditation or certification.
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One management practice meta-standard is the International Standards
Organization ("ISO") 9000 series of standards, which prescribes quality
systems and their documentation and management, typically for
manufacturers, although the series has been applied to service providers as
well.54 A firm seeking certification creates and documents a quality system
that is both specific to its own activities and in conformance with ISO 9000
series principles. An ISO 9000 certification body (e.g., a commercial firm
offering auditing, certification, and consulting) then audits the firm to
verify system conformance with the standard and with system
documentation.55
Companies adopt ISO 9000 for the following reasons: to meet
customer certification requirements (particularly those of public sector
customers), to reduce the possibility of product liability, and to increase the
utility of quality improvement programs in general---consistent with the
theme, broadly developed in the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, that
quality improvement increases a firm's profitability.56 ISO 9000
certification has grown into its own industry, one that employs numerous
consultants, trainers, auditors, and registrars.57
As became apparent by the late 1990s, however, the correlation
between ISO 9000 certification and product quality is weaker than could be
hoped. Task forces in the UK evaluated this phenomenon and determined
that this disparity is the result of variable quality among the broad array of
certifying agencies.58 In other words, certification of a quality system does
not necessarily take into account the possibility that commitment to the
quality process may decrease post-certification or that certification may be
viewed as a hurdle to cross rather than as a new quality approach that
should be assimilated into the operation and culture of the organization.
Recommended changes to the ISO 9000 regime include calls to (1) reduce
the number of accredited registrars so that more effort can be spent on
accreditation; (2) use product and quality system certifications in
combination; and (3) recognize the value of just-in-time practices. 9 Some
of these changes are reflected in the more recent ISO 9001:2000
54. Mustafa V. Uzumeri, ISO 9000 and Other Metastandards: Principles for
Management Practice?, ACAD. OF MGMT. ExEcUTIVE Feb. 1997, at 21, 27.
55. See James C. Bruno and Brett D. Bynnonen, Legal Implications of ISO 9000 under
the UCC, 75 MICH. B.J. 1076 (Oct. 1996) (describing the general scope of ISO 9000).
56. Norman Burgess, Lessons Learned in Quality Management-A Rational Role for
Certification, IEEE SYMP. ON PROS AND CONS OF ISO 9000 ACCREDITED CERTIFICATION,
Mar. 31, 1999, at 1/1.
57. Id. at 1/2.
58. Id. at 1/1.
59. Id. at 1/2-1/3.
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framework.6°
4. Certification for Consumers: The Wi-Fi Alliance
The Wi-Fi Alliance is a nonprofit trade association founded in 1999
and organized by equipment and component providers interested in the
market for IEEE 802.11 wireless local access network equipment. The
alliance had more than 200 member companies by July 2004, and it
certified interoperability of more than 1,500 products between March 2000
and July 2004.61 As with a number of other consortia, the alliance is
intended to augment an otherwise established standards process-in this
case, IEEE wireless networking-by providing interoperability certification
and by building a consumer brand in order to ensure interoperability of
purchased products.62 The Wi-Fi Alliance accredits independent testing
labs as Wi-Fi Interoperability Certification Labs.63 These labs report results
to the Wi-Fi Alliance, which in turn grants certification and the right to
display appropriate Wi-Fi logos.64 While only Wi-Fi members can request
certification, the association's wide membership suggests that barriers to
membership are low; in other words, the association does not seem to
substantially restrict entry in order to limit competition.
5. Self-Regulation and Voluntary Agreements in Environmental
Policy
Environmental regulation has seen the most active experimentation in
self-regulation of any area of social policy. A sequence of environmental
disasters (e.g., Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island) and a set of vocal
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") combine to represent public
environmental interests, but recent neoliberal trends towards deregulation
recognize both the direct and indirect costs of command-and-control
regulation. The result has been a wave of self-regulatory experiments in
which firms and industries enter into voluntary agreements to reduce
60. L. Paul Dreyfus, Sanjay L. Ahire, & Maling Ebrahimpur, The Impact of
Just-in-Time Implementation and ISO 9000 Certification on Total Quality Management, 51
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 125, 125 n.1 (2004); E. Davies & M.
Whyman, ISO 9000:2000-New ISO, New Responsibilities for Top Management,
ENGINEERING MGMT. J. (U.K.), Oct. 2000, at 244; see also Eitan Naveh & Alfred A. Marcus,
When Does the ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Standard Lead to Performance Improvement?
Assimilation and Going Beyond, 51 IEEE TRANSAcTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 352
(2004).
61. See Wi-Fi Alliance, Wi-Fi Backgrounder, http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/
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environmental impact.65
The environmental self-regulation experience has been decidedly
mixed and has resulted in a number of findings that are beneficial to our
discussion of telecommunications emergency services self-regulation.
66
These findings include both theoretical and empirical evidence of the
detrimental impact of free-riding on effective industry-wide voluntary
agreements, 67 the importance of external stakeholder involvement in
negotiating credible voluntary agreements, 68 the critical role of public
monitoring of conformance with voluntary agreements by independent
parties,69 and the importance of a plausible threat of governmental
regulation.70
6. Certification Evolves: Telecommunications Certification Bodies
Until the late 1990s, the regulatory procedure for standardizing and
certifying devices for sale to the general public under FCC rules had not
changed significantly. For example, a company that wanted to market
devices that connect to the telephone network under Part 271 or Part 6872 of
65. See Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stem, Exploring New Tools for Environmental
Protection, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION,
AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 3,5 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stem eds., 2002); Frank Convery
& Frangois L6v&jue, Applying Voluntary Approaches-Some Insights from Research, in
RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL VOLUNTARY APPROACHES: RESEARCH INSIGHTS FOR POLICY-
MAKERS FROM THE POLICY WORKSHOP ON THE USE OF VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 65, 66
(Charles J. Higley & Franqois Lv~que eds., 2001).
66. See T. Lookabaugh & D. C. Sicker, Self-Regulation of E911 for VoIP: Lessons for
the Cable Industry from Environmental Voluntary Agreements, MAGNESS INSTITUTE
ACADEMIC SEMINAR, San Francisco, CA, 2005.
67. See Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without
Sanctions: The Chemical Industry Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 698
(2000) (discussing industry self-regulation and the difficulty in maintaining it without
specific sanctions); see also Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary
Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 POL'Y STUD. J. 417 (2004) (analyzing
a voluntary environmental initiative that lacked oversight and sanctions for poor
performance resulting in a worse outcome).
68. See JoAnn Carmin, et al., Stakeholder Involvement in the Design of U.S. Voluntary
Environmental Programs: Does Sponsorship Matter?, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 527 (2003).
69. See Kathryn Harrison & Werner Antweiler, Incentives for Pollution Abatement:
Regulation, Regulatory Threats, and Non-Governmental Pressures, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 361 (2003).
70. See Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15
J. ECON. SURVEYS. 291, 318 (2001); Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, Assessing
Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 157,
178 (2002).
71. Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters; General Rules and Regulations,
47 C.F.R. § 2 (2004).
72. Connection of Terminal Equipment to the Telephone Network, 47 C.F.R. § 68
(2004).
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the FCC rules (described below) had to first complete a series of tests,
which were either performed in the company's own laboratory or
outsourced to a third party. The actual testing process tended to take
anywhere from one day to one week, and the test results had to be
submitted to the FCC. The centrally controlled FCC approval process took
up to three months, and the device could not be properly marketed in large
commercial applications until it received FCC approval. The above
example highlights the FCC's device-level command-and-control
approach.
The questions, then, are these: what are these FCC rules, and why is
device certification relevant in this context? The answer to these questions
is simple: virtually every device that connects to the network must meet
certain FCC specifications before it can appear on the market. FCC Part 2,
for example, is a massive collection of technical data spanning several
hundred pages. It covers international regulations, nomenclature and
assignment of frequencies, and the complete table of frequency
allocations.73 FCC Part 68, in turn, regulates the connection of terminal
equipment to the telephone network, and any device that is regulated under
Part 68 (e.g., the limits set for intentional and unintentional radiation) must
also comply with the provisions of Part 15. Part 68 is important for future
wireless applications because any change in FCC regulations or policy is
likely to affect all interrelated FCC compliance regulations simultaneously.
In the VoIP area, as we will see, new Internet-enabled telephones will
easily span all of these areas and will require certification under many
different parts of the FCC rules.
Indeed, even the most banal wireless applications, such as cordless
phones, are regulated under Part 68 for their connection to the network,75
Part 15 for their radiation limitations in a broadcasting capacity,76 and Part
2 for their placement in the frequency allocation zoning map.7 7 In fact,
future technologies-like VoIP devices-are likely to dramatically increase
the complexity involved in adhering to FCC regulations. For example,
regulators used to be able to categorize transmitters and receivers with
relative ease in a bygone era when television and radio were the primary
subjects of regulation. Today, however, new technological advances are
supplanting these categorizations, and hybrid applications no longer fit
neatly within any single FCC provision. Examples of these
73. 47 C.F.R. § 2 (2004).
74. See 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2004).
75. See 47 C.F.R. § 68.2(a) (2004).
76. 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2004).
77. See 47 C.F.R. § 2 (2004).
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recategorizations include frequencies originally intended for UHF
television that have been reallocated for cellular 78 and frequencies
originally intended for garage-door openers79 that are now used for cordless
phones, wireless in-home local area networks ("LAN"), car alarms, and
electronic dog fences. Categorization is quickly losing its meaning, and
future regulations will likely have to address purely technical criteria rather
than application-specific criteria. Although VolP is sometimes
characterized as a revolutionary technology, in terms of its development it
is merely one of several hundred new devices or products entering the
marketplace.
In 1998, the FCC anticipated that its rules would not be able to keep
up with technological advancements, and it shifted away from its
traditional command-and-control paradigm by adopting ET Docket 97-94. 80
The FCC's action amended certain rules in order to (1) simplify our
existing equipment authorization processes; (2) deregulate the equipment
authorization requirements for certain types of equipment; and (3) provide
for electronic filing of applications for equipment authorization. The
proposals were designed to reduce the burden of the equipment
authorization program on manufacturers.81
As a result, the FCC shifted the regulatory burden for approval of
various devices to the private sector.8 2 The thrust of this action was to
organize a provision for so-called Telecommunications Certification
Bodies ("TCBs"), whose objective is to conduct various tests and
certifications following essentially the same criteria previously employed
by the FCC. 3 Another component of this plan was the adoption of Mutual
78. See Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency & 806-960 MHz, 46
F.C.C.2d 752 (1974) (discussing the rulemaking procedure that deals with reallocation of
UHF channels for cellular telephone services).
79. The 2.4 GHz frequency band was originally designated for home devices. The 2.4
GHz band now includes everything from wireless networking to invisible dog fences. See
Kenneth R. Carter et al., Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on
Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues 3, 16 (FCC Office of Strategic Planning
and Policy Analysis, OSP Working Paper No. 39, May 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-234741Al.pdf (describing in pages
1-4 the wide range of uses for unlicensed wireless devices).
80. Amendment of Parts 2, 15, 18 and Other Parts of the Commission's Rules to
Simplify and Streamline the Equipment Authorization Process for Radio Frequency
Equipment, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 11415 (1998), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/oetldocketslet97-94/ (follow "original order text" hyperlink).
81. Id. para. 3.
82. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of Parts 2, 25, and 68 of the
Commission's Rules to Further Streamline the Equipment Authorization Process for Radio
Frequency Equipment, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 24687 (1998) [hereinafter Implement
Mutual Recognition Agreements Report and Order].
83. TCBs are now captured in 47 C.F.R. § 2.960 (2004), and they are described on the
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Recognition Agreements ("MRAs") to allow foreign parties to evaluate
equipment conformance with U.S. technical requirements.8 The process
for approval under the new regulation is quite simple, and many expect it to
have an important effect on domestic and international commerce. The case
may be most significant in terms of international commerce, where
European organizations have enjoyed advances in standardization through
Europe-wide groups like European Telecommunications Standards Institute
("ETSr) 85 and European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
("CENELEC"),86 and through country-specific groups like AFNOR
(France),87 the famous TUV (Germany), 88 and others. If a U.S. company
wants to market a new device to the European Union, the company must
seek out a Conformity Assessment Body ("CAB") under Article 10(2) of
the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.89 A CAB9° is similar to a
TCB in the United States. The European CAB then issues a "Technical
Construction File," which consists of a technical judgment regarding the
overall compliance of a product. If the company receives a judgment in its
FCC Web site as follows: The FCC may designate a TCB to process an application to
determine whether the product meets the Commission's requirements and shall issue a
written grant of equipment authorization. A TCB may authorize such devices subject to
certification as the FCC except new technology devices or devices with unique radio
frequency ("RF') safety concerns. FCC Equipment Authorization, http://ftp.fcc.gov/oet/
ea/procedures.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
84. Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements Report and Order, supra note 82, para.
19 n.36 ("The model APEC MRA provides that countries will identify the relevant
regulations and requirements at the time they enter into bilateral agreements.").
85. See ETSI Home Page, www.etsi.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). ETSI was born out
of the development of Global System for Mobile Communications ("GSM") standards
across Europe. See generally Howard A. Shelanski, Competition Policy for Mobile
Broadband Networks, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97, 111-12 (2004) (describing GSM
and its relationship with ETSI).
86. See CENELEC Home Page, www.cenelec.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). See also
Suzanne Laplante, The European Union's General Product Safety Directive: Another Call
for U.S. Exporters to Comply with the ISO 9000 Series, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 155
(1996) (describing the role of various standards-setting organizations in Europe and their
relationship with certification programs like ISO 9000).
87. See Groupe AFNOR Home Page, http:/lwww.afnor.fr/portail.asp?Lang=English
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005). See also Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era
of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U.
KAN. L. RaV. 823 (2002) (describing AFNOR and other state-run standards-setting
organizations in Europe and elsewhere).
88. See TOV Rheinland Group Home Page, www.tuv.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
89. Council Directive 89/336/EEC, art. 10, 1989 O.J. (L 139) 19, 22 (EEC), available
at http://europa.eu.int/commenterprise/electr-equipment/emc/directiv/89-336-eec.pdf.
90. See John Bengston, Connecting Terminal Equipment Under the New EC Regs,
COMPUTER LAWYER, July 1992, at 32, 32. The Article outlines the early challenges and
regulations facing the European Community. The Article may be somewhat outdated now,
but it highlights the challenges of setting up uniformity in the pre-GSM European climate in
the early 1990s.
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favor, then the device receives the coveted "CE" mark,9' which can be seen
on virtually all electronic devices sold worldwide.92
Since roughly 1998, the European process and the U.S. process have
grown increasingly similar, and certification bodies and their processes are
themselves beginning to standardize on both sides of the Atlantic. In both
the European Union and the United States, companies with approved
telecommunications devices are expected to keep their certification reports
on file in each country where the devices are sold, and the reports must
stand up to scrutiny if device approval is ever questioned. A CAB-certified
(Europe) or TCB-certified (United States) device may pass all tests, but if a
report does not meet with inspector approval or if incorrect test data is
discovered, the company in question may be forced to suspend shipments
until it presents acceptable proof of conformity. In addition to receiving
certification, devices must thus be able to sustain audit.
7. An Expanded Role for Enforcement
It is within this latter inspection and policing capacity that the FCC
will continue to perform its own independent surveillance of products on
the market 93 using random product testing mechanisms and other
procedures to investigate allegations of noncompliance. 94 Ultimately,
however, the certification process of the delegates (the TCBs) will help to
free up FCC resources, marking the beginning of an ongoing shift in the
role of the FCC from command-and-control regulation to ex post
enforcement functions. Nonetheless, the FCC remains responsible for
issuing certifications to TCBs, 95 which is a responsibility that it shares in
91. "The letters 'CE' are the abbreviation of French phrase 'Conformit6 Europ6ene'
which literally means 'European Conformity.' The term initially used was 'EC Mark' and it
was officially replaced by 'CE Marking' in the Directive 93/68/EEC in 1993." What is CE
Marking (CE Mark)?, available at http://www.ce-marking.org/what-is-ce-marking.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
92. See the European Union's Web site on Electrical Equipment, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/electr-equipment/indexen.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
93. For a discussion of changes made and policing functions (including fines), see
David E. Hilliard & Kurt E. DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations,
COMPUTER LAWYER, Sept. 1992, at 27, 28-29. The Article discusses the expansion of
enforcement at the FCC level:
[In 1992, the FCC] substantially expanded the enforcement of its computing
device marketing rules . . . . The penalties for marketing unauthorized or
improperly tested computers or computer peripherals increased [to] ... (1) civil
forfeitures of $75,000 for continuing violations and $10,000 each for other
violations; (2) criminal penalties as high as $500,000 in fines and two years in
prison; (3) civil litigation; and (4) equipment confiscation. Id. (citation omitted).
94. Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements Report and Order, supra note 82.
95. See Accreditation of Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs) and
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certain cases with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 96and
the aforementioned rules allow either the TCB or the FCC to revoke the
interconnection authorization of terminal equipment. Thus, the FCC still
retains an important role in enforcement control, and it may even revoke
equipment placed on the market after authorization has been acquired by a
TCB.97 The law requires the FCC to prove that (1) the equipment approval
has been obtained by misrepresentation; (2) the approved equipment causes
harm to the public switched telephone network; (3) the responsible party
willfully or repeatedly fails to comply with the terms and conditions of its
equipment approval; or (4) the responsible party willfully or repeatedly
fails to comply with any FCC rule, regulation, or order relating to terminal
equipment under the Communications Act of 1934.98
It is not yet known if the enforcement arm of the FCC will prove
effective, especially in cases where a TCB certifies the commercial
application of a product that subsequently interferes with other entities.
Bell Atlantic raised this issue, contending that foreign certification of
equipment could introduce partiality into the authorization process and lead
to inconsistent application of standards. 99 Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the increasing number of FCC representatives at events, such
as COMDEX,' ° ° where new technologies are often shown to the public, 0 1
demonstrates the organization's willingness to embrace its enforcement
role.
The more pressing question, however, is how will the FCC actually
go about setting up deterrents to prevent wrongs, such as the proliferation
of an inexpensive, uncertified VoIP device that enters the market and takes
Certification Bodies (CBs) under the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA), National
Institute of Standards and Technology Web site, http://ts.nist.gov/tslhtdocs/210/gsigltcb-
program.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
96. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13
F.C.C.R. 10683, para. 15 (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering-
Technology/Notices/1998/fcc98092.pdf ("[Wie anticipate that circumstances may arise
where it may be necessary to suspend or revoke a TCB's certification authority.")
[hereinafter 1998 Bienniel Regulatory Review]; see also Implement Mutual Recognition
Agreements Report and Order, supra note 82.
97. 1998 Bienniel Regulatory Review, supra note 96, paras. 13-14.
98. Id. para. 15.
99. See id. para. 11 (discussing Bell Atlantic's opposition).
100. COMDEX is a major technology fair that, until recently, was held annually in Las
Vegas. In 2004, the organizers cancelled the event for the first time because of poor
participation from vendors. See Jim Carlton, Comdex's Organizers Cancel This Year's Show
in Las Vegas, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2004, at B9.
101. See Hilliard & DeSoto, supra note 93, at 29 (stating that in fall 1991 the FCC issued
more than 100 violations to vendors who exhibited unauthorized computer equipment at
COMDEX).
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off rapidly? It may be difficult or even impossible to recall all of the
devices, especially if they realize major sales within a short period of time,
such as during the Christmas season. The device manufacturers could be
sham organizations purchased through international e-commerce portal
sites-or even offshore companies-making them very difficult to monitor
from the FCC's point of view. Only through efficient delegation to third-
party authorities (e.g., the TCBs) will the FCC have any opportunity to
allocate the resources needed to police the proliferation and e-commerce
distribution of new technologies.
8. Certification Processes
Each of the preceding examples involves a certification process from
which we can abstract the following common and desirable elements:
(1) Pre-Certification. Certification processes, expectations, and
procedures are well-documented, and certification officials have easy
access to educational and background materials. If the certification process
is sufficiently complex, a third-party community of trainers, consultants,
and test equipment providers will participate in certification activities. The
goal is to facilitate a standard, straightforward, and repeatable process. Fees
are documented, predictable, and reasonable.
(2) Certification. Testing and evaluation against the certification
criteria takes place. Certification of easily transportable equipment occurs
at specified test facilities, preferably facilities that are conveniently, or even
regionally, located. Certification teams go on-site to test equipment that is
non-transportable and to evaluate facilities, infrastructures, or processes.
Testing is prompt and transparent, and it follows designated guidelines.
(3) Post-Certification. The certifying authority follows a clear process
that clarifies deadlines and formats for reporting test results. The reasons
for any failures are clearly documented, and comments and
recommendations are suggested. The certifying authority follows a clear
and transparent procedure for questioning and appealing results and for
publicizing successful certification, both by the certifier and by the certified
body. A publicly accessible database contains successful certification
results. The certification authority documents and institutes a periodic
follow-up reinspection process.
C. Implications for VoIP Emergency Services Certification
We can make several general observations about VolP emergency
services certification based on the preceding theories and specific examples
of certification. These observations will then inform specific
recommendations provided in Part VI. To begin, certification of emergency
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service capabilities for VolP better fits the category of certification for
social policy goals than certification for economic reasons, mainly because
firms have not traditionally been able to charge consumers for 911
services. 102 The implication is that standards and related certification bodies
are not likely to arise unless they are naturally driven by the industry's own
economic interest-as is the case with TCBs, such as Telcordia,
CableLabs, and Wi-Fi Alliance.
General evidence suggests that social policy self-regulation requires
strong external motivation. In the case of VoIP emergency services,
associations of public safety officials, such as the National Emergency
Number Association ("NENA") and the Association of Public Safety
Communications Officers ("APCO"), already play an active role in
prompting self-regulatory discussions.103 However, the effectiveness of this
external motivation is seemingly derived largely from the presumption that
these organizations have the ears of regulators at the local and federal
levels. For example, no truly separate nongovernmental organizations play
an active regulatory role (e.g., by influencing consumers). Hence, it appears
likely that government influence, either direct or indirect, is needed in this
case. Such influence can naturally take a number of forms. The government
could inspire self-regulation through the credible threat of potential
regulation, or it could actively share regulation responsibilities with social
policy organizations. Moreover, although the FCC is the most obvious
choice to take the reins of such social policy regulatory initiatives,
government influence could also come from state agencies-assuming they
can be sufficiently coordinated to be effective--or from a combination of
federal and state agencies.
In short, social policy self-regulation faces a credibility challenge.
Consequently, certification processes should not be held captive to the
certifying body, which could make the standards subject to use in
extracting monopoly rents (e.g., by restricting industry participation) or
could induce the standards to be set at inappropriate performance levels. 1°4
One option here is the use of a broad-based standards-setting organization
that openly invites the participation of other parties, such as government
102. Firms subject to rate regulation may remain relatively neutral toward the imposition
of 911 requirements if they are able to recover costs through a general increase in prices.
However, we expect many firms involved in VolP to be excluded from rate regulation and
consequently motivated to avoid costs without offsetting revenues unless other issues, such
as the threat of government regulation, arise.
103. See National Emergency Number Association Web site, http://www.nena9-1-
1.org/VolP_IP/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); see also APCO International Web
site, http://www.apcointl.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
104. As noted earlier, standards can be set too high in an effort to restrict competition or
too low in an effort to reduce industry costs at the expense of overall welfare.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] VOIP MODEL FOR EMERGENCY SERVICE
and consumer organizations. In parallel, it would be valuable to create a
hierarchy of trust of accrediting certifiers, whereby the root accrediting
organization remains credibly independent of the certified companies. This
role of the root accrediting organization can be played by the government,
as in the case of OSHA, or by a sufficiently independent group of
institutions, as in the case of the ISO 9000 series of standards. The role
should probably not be played by a major industry firm, as in the case of
Verizon's testing certification lab, or by a tightly controlled industry
consortium. 1
0 5
Many certification processes that involve conformance testing are
overseen by a competitive market of certifiers (e.g., product safety
certification, telephone company product interoperability certification, and
ISO 9000 quality system certification). Such an approach may work for
VolP emergency services certification as well. Note, though, that
implementation of this approach would reinforce the need for a hierarchy
of accreditation so that the certifiers' capabilities can be trusted.
Furthermore, VoIP emergency services certification is likely to
consist mainly of software certification. Here, it would be wise to
encourage certification processes that engage with software development
throughout its cycle rather than solely at the cycle's end. Also, some
aspects of VoIP emergency service performance will depend on network
and system characteristics that can be expected to vary widely among VoIP
providers. An element of system meta-management standardization and
certification, similar to ISO 9000, may be appropriate in such
heterogeneous circumstances, but we need to learn from the ISO 9000
experience so that we do not rely solely on process certification to control
outcomes.
In fact, consumers can play a key role in discriminating between
certified and noncertified firms and between different levels of certification
through their buying choices. Examples of such consumer involvement
include certification by UL and the Wi-Fi Alliance. However, for the
certification to be effective, consumers need to be aware of the
certification's implications and confident in its legitimacy, thus implying
an investment in consumer awareness and in policing inappropriate
assertions of certification. These functions can be accomplished through
the combined efforts of the government and industry trade associations
(e.g., the Wi-Fi Alliance), both of which create a brand around
105. While the Wi-Fi Alliance is clearly a membership-restricted industry consortium, it
nonetheless has a fairly open membership policy and therefore does not tightly control the
behavior of its members. However, even an organization with broad industry membership
risks the possibility that opaque and self-interested policies, the kind that are sufficient to
undermine credibility, could be implemented.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
certification, obtain legal rights to certification marks, and prosecute
infringers. Further, individual certified firms, which are generally
motivated to promote the significance of certification in order to
differentiate themselves from noncertified firms, could also accomplish
these functions.
Finally, careful consideration of the role of insurance and liability
mitigation could accelerate regulatory progress and industry participation
beyond that which would be naturally motivated by the threat of
government regulation. Here again, government involvement can
potentially help. For example, governmental roles, such as setting
appropriate standards and serving as the root accrediting body for certifiers,
can enhance the status of standards and the broad acceptance of
certification. Insurance industry participation in standards setting and in
institutional design of certification is also desirable if it leads to differential
premiums for industry participants based on certification.
III. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
This Part provides a technology assessment of VoIP emergency
services based on a classification of fundamental trends in technology and
protocol models. It will begin by reviewing the basic operations and
functions of today's emergency services. Next, it will discuss the
engineering and operations of VoIP systems. Finally, it will describe how
VoIP emergency services might be implemented and offer a set of possible
(preliminary) VoIP emergency services requirements.
A. Emergency Services and the PSTN
In the context of the PSTN, emergency services in the United States
have long been known by the dialing convention 911.106 When this number
is dialed, an emergency call is routed to the appropriate public safety
answering point ("PSAP") and then routed to fire, medical, or law
enforcement agencies, as appropriate. Enhanced 911 ("E911") added a
capability that enables the emergency services dispatcher to see the calling
number and information about the caller's location. Regulations imposed
on emergency services obligations vary across services, technologies, and
local, national, and international borders. 0 7 In the United States, certain
106. See generally FCC, 911 Services, http://www.fcc.gov/911 (last visited Nov. 16,
2005).
107. Although common in many respects, emergency services regulation in the European
Union differs from emergency services regulation in the United States. A simple but
obvious difference is the emergency number itself: 911 in the United States, 112 in Europe.
Commission Recommendation 2003/558, On the Processing of Caller Location Information
in Electronic Communication Networks for the Purpose of Location-Enhanced Emergency
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carriers are required to support 911 service under the 911 Act, 08 with
regulatory responsibility divided among federal, state, and local
authorities.' 09
With traditional E91 1, the initial routing of a 911 call is provided by
the central office, which uses a routing database to associate the caller with
the appropriate PSAP. E911 provides calling number information in the
Automatic Number Identification ("ANI") and location information in the
Automatic Location Information ("ALl"), and it assumes that the PSAP
that receives the call is geographically related to the call origination
location. This routing process is accomplished using a selective router
database search. The PSAP then accesses a Public Safety-Automatic Line
Information ("PS-ALI") database to associate the calling number with a
physical location. At this point, the PSAP may forward the call to an
emergency call center, which performs another database search on a
database maintained by the telephone company to associate the caller's
phone number with a particular location."10
B. Emergency Services and Wireless
Many of the problems facing VolP emergency services are similar to
those of emergency services for commercial mobile radio service, wireless
telephony. Although the technologies are different, some of the same
solution mechanisms apply. For example, the development and adoption of
wireless emergency service solutions followed a long and convoluted
path."' While many of the issues that arose were attributed to technical
uncertainty due to an inadequate level of technical understanding early in
Call Services, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 49 (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1_189/1_18920030729en00490051.pdf.
108. See Implementation of 911 Act; The Use of Nil Codes and Other Abbreviated
Dialing Arrangements, Fifth Report and Order, First Report and Order, Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,264 (2001).
109. For example, the 911 Act requires the FCC to take a leadership and support role in
implementing wireless 911, but the Act does not give the FCC the authority to regulate
statewide plans. See Federal Communications Commission: State 911 Deployment Plans,
http://www.fcc.gov/9 11/stateplans/about.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
110. See generally, Aaron Futch & Christine Soares, Enhanced 911 Technology and
Privacy Concerns: How Has the Balance Changed Since September 11 2001?, Duke L. &
Tech. Rev. 38 (2001) (describing the basic principles of E911 functionality).
111. See Dale N. Hatfield, Adjunct Professor, Univ. of Colorado at Boulder, Keynote
Address at the IEEE International Symposium: Challenges of Network Design in an
Increasingly Deregulated, Competitive Market (Mar. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.ieee-im.org/2003/presentation%20fileslRemarksDH-IM2003.doc. See also
DALE N. HATFIELD, A REPORT ON THE TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES IMPACTING
WIRELESS ENHANCED 911 SERVICES, 2002, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native-or pdf=pdf&id_document=6513296239 (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
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the process, a significant number of the delays were the direct result of
industry resistance caused by the absence of strict timelines. Another issue
to consider is whether or not certain policy approaches might hasten the
development effort. In the wireless emergency services regulatory process,
the FCC played a substantial role in specifying and assessing the technical
characteristics of the location technology. This initiative consumed
considerable time. An industry-led specification and assessment might have
hastened this process, particularly if regulatory agencies had monitored the
process and set deadlines.
Another issue to consider is that of the implementation itself.
Wireless emergency services made use of a phased implementation
approach that considered short-term versus long-term solutions. Such an
approach can help to promote interim solutions and allow for the creation
of reasonable timelines for long-term solutions." 12
One important lesson worth considering is this: past regulations
should not necessarily be used to define future policy. Different
technologies operate in different ways, and these variations can lead to the
development of new capabilities and features. For example, as Henning
Schulzrinne points out, VoIP offers a number of advantages over voice
telephony, including higher resilience, faster call setup, accessibility
support, multimedia support, greater cost efficiency, more call data, no
telephone reliance, and greater competition." 13 In addition, unlike
traditional telephony, IP phones do not need to associate with a local
central office, and they have little to no need for explicit voice service
providers. Instead, the functions of the provider are dispersed and require
minimal provider assistance.' 14 The development of policies that do not
appreciate such differences could signal the loss of technical opportunities
to better serve society.
112. An FCC news release describes the obligations imposed on certain carriers in terms
of providing emergency services. The regulations on carriers are imposed in two phases: the
E91 1 first phase requires carriers to report the wireless caller's phone number at the location
of the antenna that received the call, and the E91 1 second phase requires wireless carriers to
provide the precise location of a 911 caller within 50 to 100 meters. Deployment of the
second phase began in October 2001 and is scheduled for completion by December 31,
2005. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Expands E911 Rules (Nov. 13, 2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-241214A1 .pdf.
113. See Henning Schulzrinne, 9-1-1 Calls for Voice-Over-IP: Ex-Parte Filing for
Docket 94-102, 3-4, Feb. 28, 2003, available at http://www.cs.columbia.edu/IRT/papersl
emergency.pdf.
114. See Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice over
Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 97, 107-08 (2005) (describing the distributed fashion of VolP calling: "Gatekeeper or
call-manager devices, which authenticate users and establish connections, can physically
reside on any server on the network.").
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C. VoIP Technology
In simple terms, VoIP carries speech over an LP-based network."
15
The power and complexity of VoIP come largely from its ability to
separate functions that were traditionally bound together, such as transport
and signaling, thereby providing many more options for each function
based on ubiquitous and increasingly inexpensive IP-based networking and
IP-compatible access technologies, processing, and storage.
1. VoIP Parameters
IP networks may not offer the same level of performance as circuit-
switched networks for voice communications. In order to obtain a similar
level of performance, we must explicitly consider specific VoIP
parameters, such as encoding, delay, and transport.
On a VoIP telephone call, voice is transmitted over packet networks.
This transmission requires the conversion of analog voice to a digitized
form, followed by a subsequent encapsulation of the digital content into a
packet technology before the content is transmitted using an access
technology." 6 The initial analog conversion process is referred to as
encoding." 7 After the analog content has been encoded into a digital
format, the information is packetized with the help of a transport layer" 8
115. The difference between VoIP providers and VoIP services is worth considering.
VoIP as a product can be offered much like any other software application (e.g., Microsoft
Word). Some VoIP products can be installed on a PC and made to run with little or no
service provider participation. Some of the simpler products include NetMeeting, which is
sold by software giant Microsoft. See Microsoft Windows NetMeeting,
http://www.microsoft.comlwindows/netmeeting/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Vonage, a
service provider, also sells a product that can be loaded onto an individual's computer. See
Vonage Softphone, http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=softphone (last visited
Nov. 16, 2005). Such products make use of the network to reach other end points and rely
on so-called intelligence within the product (i.e., software features or information added to
the product, such as through software updates). Conversely, a VoIP service provider can
augment a product by including additional functionality, routing and database capabilities,
security, and more. In this model, the product may still be software, or it may be a
combination of physical devices and software coupled closely to the service provider.
116. See Garrie et al., supra note 114, at 105.
117. In digital telephony over the traditional PSTN network, voice is usually encoded
using PCM-u or PCM-A, resulting in a bandwidth requirement of 56-64 Kbps. However, a
variety of different compression algorithms can be applied in VoIP, providing all
participating terminals have the required capability. Various algorithms can introduce
quality, delay, computation, and bandwidth tradeoffs. For example, G.723.1 reduces the
bandwidth usage of the call to 5.3 Kbps, but it also introduces a computational delay of 37.5
ms. See DANIEL COLLINS, CARRIER GRADE VOICE OVER IP 102 (McGraw-Hill, 2000).
118. Typically, the Real-time Transport Protocol ("RTP") adds important timing and
other information relevant to voice and other time-sensitive media traffic. Next, the User
Datagram Protocol ("UDP") provides limited multiplexing and data detection. Unlike its
peer protocol, TCP, UDP does not provide error recovery; instead, error management is left
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and passed to the access technology (e.g., Ethernet) for delivery on the
network. At the other end, the digital information is retrieved and converted
back into analog form, which the listener can then understand. 19 VoW
permits a wider range of choices and tradeoffs among performance
parameters than traditional PSTN. These choices and tradeoffs include the
following:
(1) Distortion. Low bit rate compression may be bandwidth efficient,
but it may also distort speech.
(2) Errors. Voice traffic has some degree of error tolerance (e.g., a
small amount of missing information will not impact intelligibility,
whereas even a small error in a financial transaction is considered
intolerable). However, a high enough error rate from lost packets or errored
packets degrades data intelligibility.
(3) Delay. Compression algorithms, packetization, and other stages of
packet transmission induce delay. Delays in excess of 250 ms can be
annoying, and long delays tend to induce a half-duplex conversation in
which each party pauses for a substantial period of time after speaking to
determine if the other party wants to speak.
(4) Loaded Networks and Quality of Service. Both errors and delay
are affected by whether or not the networks involved in transmitting the
voice are loaded (i.e., whether they are subject to traffic that occupies a
substantial fraction of their capacity) and whether or not they have some
form of prioritization capability (i.e., quality of service ("QoS")). Loaded
networks that lack QoS typically induce long and variable delays, known as
jitter, and sometimes drop packets.
(5) Echo. Echo, a traditional issue in analog telephony, can still be an
issue in VolP, depending on the design of the analog portions of the
system.
(6) Power. Analog PSTN terminals can be powered by the phone
network. Assuming that the phone network has backup power, the system,
including 911 service, can remain operational even if the customer
premises is without power. VoIP systems do not automatically have such a
backup system-although, to be fair, neither do cordless phones, which are
connected to the PSTN.
120
to RTP and the voice codec used. Finally, UDP packets are placed in IP packets and
delivered to a specified Internet address. See generally COuN PERKINS, RTP: AuDIo AND
VIDEO FOR THE INTERNET (2003) (giving a general overview of RTP).
119. See generally R. Alex Dufour, Voice over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty
and Promoting Innovation through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
471, 474-75 (2005) (providing an overview of VolP and various tradeoffs with the PSTN).
120. See VolP 101: Circuit Switch Technology (PSTN), http://www.voipreview.org/
10l.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (providing an overview that compares VoIP with the
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For emergency services, we are concerned with the potential impact
of these characteristics on the intelligibility of calls and on users' capability
to place emergency service calls during power outages.
2. VoIP Signaling
While the traditional functions of setting up and tearing down calls
persist in VoIP, VoIP can augment these functions in many ways by
exploiting ubiquitous IP networks and inexpensive processing and storage
capabilities. VoIP signaling protocols control these functions, and these
protocols continue to evolve and include several variants, which in some
cases are competing variants, and in other cases, complementary. The most
important variants are the Session Initiation Protocol ("SIP"), H.323, media
gateway protocols,' 2 ' and a number of proprietary protocols. Here, we
focus primarily on the role of SIP-based systems in supporting emergency
services.
SIP, 122 a protocol developed within the Internet Engineering Task
Force ("IETF'),123 provides for the establishment, modification, and
termination of sessions, or calls. A SIP network generally consists of user
agents, proxies, registrars, and redirect servers, all interconnected via an IP
network. 24 These devices exchange messages in a process used to establish
the call, and they do so in a manner analogous to the now widespread
packet-signaling system used in the PSTN, Signaling System 7 ("SS7"). 125
PSTN).
121. Media gateway protocols include the Media Gateway Control Protocol ("MGCP"),
MEGACO and H.248. A media gateway might be used to interface between a VoIP network
and the PSTN, and a media gateway controller interacts with the signaling systems in each
domain and manages the configuration of the media gateway. The separation of voice
processing from management and the capability to independently distribute the functions
result in an architecture called softswitch. VoIP architectures, in which softswitch and
interfacing to the PSTN play a substantial role, generally provide less end user control over
system behavior. However, such constraints may aid in the implementation of traditional
PSTN system functionality, including E91 1. In any case, this type of architecture will be
important for a substantial period, likely measured in multiple decades, while VoIP and
PSTN systems must coexist. See Cox Communications, Whitepaper: Voice over Internet
Protocol: Ready for Prime Time, 9-10 (2004), http://www.cox.comabout/NewsRoom/files/
VoiPreadyMay04.pdf (describing the basic functionalities of VoIP and a media gateway).
122. See generally J. Rosenberg et al., SIP: Session Initiation Protocol, IETF Network
Working Group Request for Comments No. 3261 (2002), available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt [hereinafter SIP RFC 3261] (representing the core
Session Initiation Protocol).
123. Two IETF working groups, SIP and SIPPING, are active in the development of
session-related protocols. These groups have developed various standards (Requests for
Comments, or RFCs) and drafts, and SIP RFC 3261 represents the core protocol. See id.
124. See Session Initiation Protocol ("SIP"), http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sip-
charter.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
125. See What is SIP?, http://www.radvision.com/NR/rdonlyres/86D6EBDO-8C2E-
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SIP could enable emergency services enhancements by providing richer
information set than ANI and ALI. For example, an individual could
program a VoIP device to transmit medical records or emergency contact
instructions to an emergency calling center via SIP. Such functions, if
considered highly desirable socially and executable at a reasonable cost,
could easily become subjects of future social policy, or, as this Article
suggests, self-regulation.
D. Emergency Services for VoIP
As a basis for a technical model, we turn to the work of the IETF. The
IETF has developed several Internet "drafts" and "requests for comments"
describing the potential operation of VolP emergency services based on the
use of SIP and associated protocols. 126 This Subpart briefly describes these
works in progress and highlights areas relevant to our model. While some
of these drafts will not reach maturity, a reasonable VoIP emergency
services model should be discernable based on this work.
These proposed VoIP emergency services requirements are based
loosely on work within the IETF: 127 (1) support a reasonable QoS
connection; 128 (2) use a recognized emergency service number, the
equivalent of 911, to identify an emergency call;' 29 (3) route calls to the
appropriate response group PSAP; 30 (4) establish a means of locating the
caller;13' (5) establish a means of identifying the caller;' 32 and (6) establish
a means of testing the system. 133 Other concerns involving security or
45B9-82E8- 1A0556276106/0/RADVISIONWhatisSIP.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
126. See The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force,
RFC 3160 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (describing the
functioning of the IETF and the role of draft documents and the process for commentary).
127. H. Schulzrinne & B. Rosen, Emergency Services for Internet Telephony Systems
(Oct. 18, 2004), http:llwww.ietf-ecrit.orglcache/draft-schulzrinne-sipping-emergency-arch-
02.txt. Note that IETF documents are referenced, posted, and archived in different locations
on the Internet.
128. We realize that this requirement is not a part of the IETF specifications and that
many people will question its need. Nonetheless, if the communications cannot support the
intended media, or negotiate a new media type, the rest of the emergency services
mechanisms are moot.
129. See Schulzrinne & Rosen, supra note 127, at 5-6.
130. See id. at 10-11.
131. Id. at6-10.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 16-17. VolP-based emergency services users and service providers may wish
to test the operation of their service. Such testing might be motivated by reconfigurations,
new installations, power outages, changes in service or service provider, changes in
location, or simple maintenance testing. As the industry stands today, there is no mechanism
for consumers to complete a test call to E911, and the first call that consumers make is
likely to be made in times of emergency. Therefore, a policy and process for testing may be
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network operations are more general to VolP, though they still may warrant
consideration during the process of testing VoIP emergency service
operations. Furthermore, mechanisms for privacy, authentication,
authorization, and availability will be required.
We should note that much of the operation of SIP-based emergency
services would rely on well-established and commonly deployed protocols,
including SIP,134 Domain Name Service ("DNS"), Real-time Transport
Protocol ("RTP"), 35 and ENUM. 3 6 Functionality not provided within these
specifications is addressed by the draft documents that establish the SIP
community as resolving many of the problems associated with Vop
emergency services. A draft entitled "Emergency Services for Internet
Telephony Systems," for example, describes how SIP might be used to
provide emergency services, proposes an architecture based on existing SIP
features, and makes use of DNS mechanisms to provide location
mapping. 137 A second draft entitled "Emergency Services URI for the
Session Initiation Protocol" defines two universal emergency SIP Uniform
Resource Identifiers ("URIs"), which can be thought of as emergency
numbers like 911, and suggests ways to increase the likelihood of being
able to contact an emergency call center.'
38
Moreover, several drafts address the problem of location
identification by specifying the use of object formats, privacy mechanisms,
and other protocols. 39 Other drafts propose methods of conveying user
valuable.
134. See SIP RFC 3261, supra note 122.
135. RTP is the protocol used for carrying traffic such as voice and video on the Internet.
See Henning Schulzrinne et al., RTP: A Transport Protocol for Our Real-Time Applications
(Jan. 1996) (unpublished paper, available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1889.txt).
136. ENUM is a domain name service that supports the translation between Internet
addresses, or URLs, and telephone numbers. See generally ENUM Home Page,
www.enum.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
137. See Schulzrinne & Rosen, supra note 127.
138. See Henning Schulzrinne, Emergency Services URI for the Session Initiation
Protocol (Feb. 2004) (unpublished paper, available at http://www.cs.columbia.edu/sip/
draft/sos/draft-ietf-sipping-sos-01 .html).
139. See generally J. Peterson, A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format
(May 2004) (GEOPRIV, working paper), available at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/
04aug/I-D/draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-02.txt; J. Polk, Requirements for Session Initiation
Protocol Location Conveyance, (Feb. 2003) (Cisco Systems Internet Engineering Task
Force, working paper), available at http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04mar/I-D/draft-ietf-
sipping-location-requirements-00.txt; J. Polk et al., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
Option for Coordinate-based Location Configuration Information, (Dec. 2003) (Cisco
Systems Network Working Group, working paper), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc3825.txt; Henning Schulzrinne, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 and
DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses, (July 2004) (GEOPRIV, working paper), available at
http://www.ietf.orglinternet-drafts/draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-07.txt.
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agent capabilities and profiles, both of which help to provide a fully
functioning emergency system.14° An important emergency service
capability is caller authentication, and the SIP specification documents
authentication techniques, as do a number of draft documents.' 41 Finally, it
is worth noting that the provision of VoIP emergency services needs to
account for interfacing between the PSTN and VoIP networks. As indicated
in greater detail below, early implementations of VoIP emergency services
have been designed largely within the context of interfaced VoIP and
PSTN networks, with PSAPs and emergency service responders on the
PSTN side. 1
42
A phased approach could be employed to replicate emergency
services functionality in the SIP VoIP environment, as described by
Henning Schulzrinne and Knarig Arabshian. 14 3 In the simplest, and
typically initial, case, the SIP elements could connect to the legacy E911
system through a PSTN gateway. In this case, the SIP device would look
much like other devices commonly attached to the PSTN (e.g., a private
branch exchange ("PBX")). This scenario requires development of little
new technology, though a number of existing mechanisms would need to
be considered, such as security, availability, and routing. 44 Nonetheless, a
certification process could be useful in terms of ensuring the accuracy of
location information. 45 Also, a labeling procedure could indicate any
additional information that consumers might need. In a second case, the
PSAP would be directly connected to, or "aware" of, IP network traffic. In
other words, a gateway would not translate INVITE' 46 messages into PSTN
signaling messages; therefore, the SIP session would occur between the
140. See D. Petrie, A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol User Agent Profile
Delivery (May 2004) (unpublished paper), available at http:/www.softarmor.comlwgdb/
docs/draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-03.txt.
141. A user authentication capability should help prevent such problems as crank calls.
However, a failed authorization could result from an administrative or technical problem.
Accordingly, a response mechanism and an authentication policy need to be established.
142. See, e.g., White Paper, Avaya Inc., Solving the Challenges of E911 Service with
Avaya IP Telephony Networks (Nov. 2002), http://wwwl.avaya.com/enterprise/
whitepapers/lb 1879.pdf.
143. Henning Schulzrinne & Knarig Arabshian, PROVIDING EMERGENCY SERVICES IN
INTERNET TELEPHONY (Mar. 2004), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/-knarig/91 1.pdf.
144. Many security and routing technologies already exist. For example, the process of
authentication and authorization could be based on existing mechanisms or SIP techniques
and later could possibly be based on trait-based mechanisms currently under deveiopment.
Id. § 3.4.
145. As Schulzrinne describes, location information may need to be manually
configured, measured by the end system (GPS), conveyed to the end system, or provided
within the network. Id. § 3.3.
146. An INVITE message is used in SIP to serve as the mechanism for requesting a
session (i.e., a call) with another user. Id. § 3.4.
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caller and the emergency call center. As a result, the caller and the
emergency call center would be able to exchange additional information,
such as the patient's video or healthcare data. In this case, the routing,
identification, and location information would probably still reside in
telephone company databases; however, the responder could now
communicate with the caller using a richer media capability, as a result of
direct connectivity over IP, which is able to support multimedia
communications. In a third long-term case, the routing, identification, and
location information would now reside within the Internet, and the INVITE
message would carry the traffic to the PSAP. The elements within the SIP
network could gather the appropriate routing and location information
using a number of mechanisms (e.g., the use of DNS in mapping locations
to PSAPs and emergency call centers). While the details of such a process
are outside the scope of this Article, these details may nonetheless prove
extremely relevant to the certification mechanisms that could be deployed.
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, VoIP emergency services could
be developed by making enhancements to existing SIP-based networks.
The point is that these capabilities either currently exist or will soon exist.
The challenge now involves the actual implementation of these capabilities,
which is where a certification process can help.
E. Technology Requirements
To assist in defining the characteristics of this process, this Subpart
will next examine high-level requirements for VoIP emergency services. It
proposes that the certification process should first support a phased
implementation. While interim solutions are available immediately, some
aspects of the longer-term solution will require additional technical
development, further industry negotiations with possible regulatory
intervention, and considerable investment. Therefore, as Schulzrinne
describes, a short-term solution-attaching IP devices to the PSTN
emergency services in much the same way as the devices are attached to a
PBX-should be available for certification now. A longer-term solution-
where IP interfaces with the PSAP directly, the PSAP participates in the IP
session, and the databases are IP accessible-should also be specified as
soon as possible.
With this phased approach, this Article proposes that the technology
specifications should support a range of technologies. For example, a
certification process should be developed for other IP services, such as
instant messaging or videophone. Further, various levels of specification
should be available within a technology. For example, several levels of
VoIP certification might be made available (e.g., good, better, and best).
The Subpart below proposes a so-called straw man,-a provisional,
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exploratory sketch-of the high-level specifications that might be required
of a high-quality VoIP service, a "best" service level. Note that this service
could be running as software, an IP phone, or another device. 147 Also note
that this Article focuses on certifying and labeling the VoIP-end device
rather than the network.
This straw man framework's general capability would provide
information to end users through such means as device labeling or software
notification. It would also provide reasonable quality of service (i.e.,
meeting the performance and reliability measures previously discussed).
System capability would access the emergency services infrastructure and
form proper emergency services messages. It also would accurately
determine and communicate the proper location of VoIP applications and
callers. Finally, the end user capability would participate in an
authentication process, initiate emergency services calls using a recognized
emergency number (e.g., 911 or SOS), and test the emergency services
applications.
The details of how these requirements might be assessed remain to be
determined. Furthermore, other requirements also warrant consideration
and perhaps some of the requirements listed above merit debate.
Accordingly, comments and feedback are welcome.
IV. TRENDS IN CERTIFICATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
A BRIEF VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
This Article briefly outlined Europe's and the United States'
historically different approaches to standardization and certification and
asserted that many U.S. approaches have been borrowed from the European
tradition. This Article has also contended that the United States and Europe
are slowly harmonizing their approaches through the TCBs. How might
such a collaborative concept also apply to VoIP? One way is to consider
the best mechanism, European or American, for resolving the liability
issues that may arise from VoIP product certification. The United States
offers a consumer-action-based system of legal redress that contrasts
sharply with the preventative measures taken in the European state-based
social system of protections. In the United States, citizens can take legal
action and seek punitive damages for relief if products do not perform as
advertised or if products are defectively designed, manufactured, or
labeled. In Europe, however, the state tends to take a more active role ex
ante (i.e., before products are launched into the marketplace). The
European approach, then, is to rely on state-sponsored certification, to
147. While other network requirements exist, these requirements are beyond the scope of
this Article.
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provide protections to companies that obtain such certification, and to make
consumer remedies available only as a last recourse.
Europeans tend to be more precautious ex ante than Americans, and
they tend to turn to the state and to organizations like ETSI to help set
safety guidelines. In the case of VoIP technology, however, it is almost too
late for European and American regulators to implement preventative
measures of any kind. Any action, by definition, will be reactive. However,
in other areas of technology, such as wireless telephony, Europeans-and
to some extent Americans-have not hesitated to impose an oxymoronic ex
post precautionary principle, which will be discussed later in this section, to
an existing network of wireless telephones. 48 Such an ex post approach, if
applied to VoIP, will likely be unsuccessful, but it may prove instructive to
review some of the differences between European and U.S. approaches in
general. As scholar Adam Burgess explains, "Since the 1980s, Europe has
increasingly established an identity around concern about vaguely
conceived threats to the health of its citizens. Unlike uncaring, free market
America, in this scenario, 'social' Europe is aware of the threat posed by
the dangerous products of 'unscrupulous' multinationals."' 
49
It is perhaps helpful to understand that Adam Burgess is a sociologist
who recently published a book that tracks the sociological phenomenon of
the public's fear of phones based on the "hysteria factor," discussed
below. 50 In the instance cited above, Burgess purposely oversimplifies the
148. Fears arising from mobile phones triggered protests in Italy that called for the
closure of the Vatican's broadcast facilities, led to the freezing of wireless deployment in
Spain for nearly a year, and caused serious 3G deployment problems in Germany and
elsewhere. As a result, many called for the ex post application of the precautionary principle
to broadcast emissions. In Italy, the Vatican even turned down the emissions due to hysteria.
See Yaroslov Trofimov, Italians Say Potent Vatican Tower Emits Radiation That Poses
Cancer Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at B7A. Several failed U.S. cases also attempted
to attach cancer liability to mobile phone manufacturers. See, e.g., Motorola v. Ward, 478
S.E.2d. 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a claim against a cell phone manufacturer for
causing or exacerbating cancer due to lack of causation and inconclusive evidence);
Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (rejecting a plaintiff's
wrongful-death action for lack of causation and for failure of the Daubert test); Newman v.
Motorola, 218 F. Supp.2d 769 (D. Md. 2002) (rejecting a cancer claim against a cell-phone
manufacturer for failure of the Daubert test); Chernock v. U.S., 718 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Fla.
1989) (ruling against several workers' claims against the government for injuries allegedly
caused by operating radar devices); Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions
Products Liability, 248 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2003) (preventing claims brought by five
classes of phone purchasers who were not provided with headsets for use in guarding
against possible danger because federal law sets safety standards and preempts such claims).
149. Adam Burgess, A Precautionary Tale: The British Response to Cell Phone EMF, 21
IEEE TECH. & Soc'Y MAG., Dec. 2002, at 14, 15.
150. See generally ADAM BURGESS, CELLULAR PHONES, PUBLIC FEARS, AND A CULTURE
OF PRECAUTION (2003) (seeking to explain how these fears came about in the first place-in
both Europe and the United States-and uses a sociological lens to critique today's
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problem: America is not "uncaring," and Europe's "aware[ness] of the
threat" does not necessarily exceed that of America. What Burgess is
doing, then, is making an insightful cultural point: where the United States
tends to take an ad hoc, laissez-faire approach to consumer harms, Europe
traditionally takes a more precautionary stance. These markedly different
modi operandi and their impact on certification processes cannot be
overlooked.
A. Different Approaches to Product Liability
Interestingly enough, the American and European approaches to
liability have not always been so different, particularly since the United
States once borrowed many of its laws from Europe. Indeed, every first-
year American law student is familiar with a famous judgment that has had
widespread implications on U.S. liability cases. In 1934, Justice Benjamin
Cardozo first articulated and then dismissed the following legal principle,
and he did so in the same judgment: stop, look, and reconnoiter. Cardozo
had to first articulate the principle and then dismiss it because, in the
tradition of common law, the higher courts have to be clear on the
precedent before reaching a different conclusion. In plain English, this
precept was originally derived from advice about stopping a car before
crossing railroad tracks. However, the "reconnoiter" aspect is somewhat
more complicated, for it seemingly stipulates that a driver should stop the
car, get out, inspect the area and look for trains, get back in the car, and,
assuming no trains are approaching, cross the tracks. In this instance,
Justice Cardozo noted that reconnoitering is unnecessary and quite possibly
dangerous. 151 In passing this judgment, however, Cardozo reversed an
earlier decision by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had decreed that
an individual was obliged to get out of the vehicle and reconnoiter before
crossing the tracks. 152 Not unexpectedly, Cardozo's reinterpretation of the
"stop, look, and reconnoiter" provision and the greater application of that
provision in the legal world have had a profound effect on the number of
civil cases involving punitive damages that have been tried in the United
States during the past seventy years. When Cardozo declared that
precautionary climate).
151. Pokora v. Wabash R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). Justice Cardozo explained:
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken
over from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre is an
uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides being
uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes even dangerous. If the
driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn nothing by
getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and
sets his car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him.
152. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
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individuals no longer need to reconnoiter before crossing railroad tracks, he
initiated a trend that eventually placed a greater burden on railroad
companies, and, in turn, on manufacturers in general. In short, the state
would no longer expect individuals to take commonsense precautions to
protect themselves from harm; instead, large companies would be held
increasingly responsible for any damages caused by their products.
Here, let us take a step back and look at the philosophical and
linguistic underpinnings of expressions of precaution. The phrase "stop,
look, and reconnoiter" is composed of an unusual mixture of English (stop,
look) and French (reconnoiter, a derivative of the French word
reconnatre).153 Indeed, virtually all American law students have to stop,
look, and reconnoiter-that is, find a dictionary-when they read the
famous case, because the word reconnoiter is not commonly used in the
English language. The U.S. approach to consumer protection has changed
drastically in recent decades, as encapsulated by the multibillion-dollar
sums that tobacco plaintiffs have taken home. 54 Certainly, many of the
people who have been diagnosed with or who have died from cancer as a
result of smoking cigarettes did reconnoiter the damage that tobacco causes
to their lungs, and yet many of these individuals and their families have
sought punitive damages and have been compensated accordingly for pain,
suffering, and wrongful death by the cigarette manufacturers. As it turns
out, the leading U.S. cases for punitive damages have all arisen since the
1980s-and many have since been quashed by the Supreme Court. 155 So,
returning to Adam Burgess's quote above, even if Burgess has
oversimplified the American and European outlooks on consumer
protections, he is right to say that the divergence between the two world
views was set in motion at some point in the past century, possibly even in
1934 with Cardozo's ruling.
Thus, Americans arguably are no longer expected to reconnoiter;
instead, large firms and multinational corporations are seemingly expected
to shoulder the majority of consumer risk, and their perceived
accountability for product defects and failures often translates into
153. The French word reconnaftre and its English form, reconnoiter, means to faire une
reconnaissance or, in English, to survey and review. THE HARPER COLLINS FRENCH CONCISE
DICTIONARY 752 (1998).
154. See generally Elisabeth J. Calabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due
Process Limits of Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide
Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 979 (2001) (surveying and discussing the tobacco
claims and the multibillion-dollar settlements and awards).
155. See generally Patrick S. Ryan, Revisiting the United States Application of Punitive
Damages: Separating Myth from Reality, 10 ILSA J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 69 (2003),
available at http://ssm.coni/abstract=545243 (describing the development of punitive
damages as a tort remedy in the United States through recent U.S. Supreme Court cases).
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multimillion-dollar, or even multibillion-dollar, settlements. Nonetheless,
the essence of the "stop, look, and reconnoiter" precaution lives on in both
American and European culture in commonplace adages, such as "an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure," "better safe than sorry," and "look
before you leap." These expressions have Dutch, 56 French,57 and German
equivalents,158 as well as equivalents in other languages. The Hippocratic
Oath, which arose out of Greece more than 2,000 years ago, has governed
the actions of physicians for centuries, 159 and it offers yet another
interpretation of what will become known as the "precautionary principle."
According to the oath, each physician is instructed to "prescribe [a]
regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my
judgment and never do harm to anyone."' 6 While the United States has in
large part replaced the stop, look, and reconnoiter provision with a legal
mechanism for instituting punitive damages, at one point the U.S. system
much more clearly resembled the European system. In tying this discussion
back to the topic of VolP telephony, however, we can see that neither
Europe nor the United States has properly prepared for the new challenges
that will arise from the proliferation of VoIP or for the difficulties involved
in developing standards to address emergency services.
156. The following common Dutch phrases are translated more or less directly: "beter
voorkomen dan genezen" (it is better to prevent than to cure), "bezint eer ge begint" (reflect
before you begin), "beter te hard geblazen dan de mond gebrand" (it is better to have blown
too hard than to have burned your mouth), and "een gewaarschuwd man is er twee waard"
(one warned person is worth two people).
157. The most common term in French is "il vaut mieux prtvenir que gurir" (it is better
to prevent than to heal). Such was the title of a recent article in Switzerland asserting that
the precautionary principle should be applied to "electrosmog" and to radio emissions in
general. Jirg Baumann says that electrosmog is omnipresent in our environment and
suggests that the precautionary principle should be applied in a proposed law that would
greatly regulate and reduce the installation of new sites. Jirg Baumann, Smog tlectrique:
Mieux Vaut Prevenir que Gtierir, 2 ENVERONNEMENT 1999, available at http://www.umwelt-
schweiz.chIbuwal/fr/medien/umwelt/1999_2/unterseite4/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
158. The following common German phrases are translated more or less directly:
"vorsicht ist die mutter der porzelankiste" (care is the mother of the box of chinaware),
"vorbeugen ist besser als heilen" (prevention is better than cure), "man muss das uebel bei
der wurzel packen" (grab evil by its roots), and "wehret den anfaengen" (resist the
beginnings of something bad). The latter two phrases, outgrowths of Nazi Germany, are
often referred to in a political context. For a list of German aphorisms, see
www.aphorismen.de (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
159. "he Hippocratic Oath is thought to have originated some 2,300 years ago on the
Greek Island of Cos. It remains today the 'central document, the most often-cited summary
of the physician's own understanding of what is morally required to be a good medical
doctor."' David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row-Is Judicial
Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 707, 714 (1991) (citations omitted).
160. AAPS Physician Oaths, http://www.aapsonline.org/ethics/oaths.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2005).
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B. Technological Development Will Forge Ahead
in the Face of (Pre)caution
Internet telephony will continue to develop, and the absence of an
industry coalition to certify and standardize products will leave an
abundance of different standards and concomitant safety problems. In fact,
the market drivers for VolP adoption are overwhelming. For example,
Internet telephony will enable foreigners who live in the United States to
communicate with their loved ones in their home countries at virtually no
cost. Furthermore, products like KaZaA's Skype,161 an application-layer
terminal, are only in their infancy, and, regardless of what happens with the
regulation of E91 1, these products will continue to develop and appear on
the marketplace. Accordingly, the time is now to develop a certification
process that affords carriers a level of protection that they can rely on.
As can be observed in the status quo, inconsistent implementation of
protective measures in different U.S. states seems to have inspired certain
carriers to adopt subversive approaches to network deployment. For
example, in spite of political maneuvers undertaken to facilitate network
construction,162  vocal community protest induced companies like
Omnipoint to try to build several hundred stealth-antenna sites without
municipal authorization during the 1990s.163 In this particular case,
Omnipoint may have concluded that the time and expense required to
obtain authorization for the antennas, along with the ensuing public outcry,
161. See Skype Home Page, http://www.skype.com/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
162. See H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61-
162. The Report reveals Congress's intent to achieve national uniformity over radio
frequency emissions standards and notes the interplay between these standards and local
zoning laws:
The [Commerce] Committee has received substantial evidence that local zoning
decisions, while responsive to local concern about the potential effects of radio
frequency emission levels, are at times not supported by scientific and medical
evidence. A high quality national wireless telecommunications network cannot
exist if each of its component [sic] must meet different RF [radio frequency]
standards in each community. The Committee believes the [FCC] rulemaking on
this issue (ET Docket 93-62) should contain adequate, appropriate and necessary
levels of protection to the public, and needs to be completed expeditiously.
Id.
163. See John Cichowski, Antenna Critics Demand Answers, RECORD, Sept. 4, 1997, at
L3. Cichowski discusses Omnipoint's arrangement with the state of New Jersey to put up
122 sites without municipal approval. Because of political pressure, the New Jersey
Governor stepped in to provide the municipalities with a veto right. The article also
discusses Omnipoint's stealth erection of these sites in a commercial zone without first
obtaining zoning approval. Id. Leslie Haggin discusses an Omnipoint cellular phone antenna
that was erected on the side of the Newark Pompton Turnpike without any zoning approval.
Municipal authorities forced the antenna to be taken down. Leslie Haggin, Complaints
Force Down Cell Phone Antenna, REcoRD, May 9, 1997.
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would have prevented it from competing successfully with existing
providers who had erected antenna sites years prior. Such stealth
deployment of wireless sites is not unlike the phenomenon that we are now
experiencing with respect to new companies, like Skype, that are selling
application-level software for people to run on their PCs. Before we know
it, everyone's computer will be outfitted with not one but several
mechanisms that enable voice communications. In the end, an industry-
coordinated effort to certify these types of products may help to make the
stealth and lesser-known solutions less attractive to consumers.
C. Government Must Respond by Encouraging Self-Regulation
More and more VoIP products are deployed each day, and the
certification and associated liability issues will inevitably have to be
addressed. A concerted effort of various parties (e.g., academics,
consumers, governments, and nongovernmental organizations) will be
required to ensure that the growth and deployment of VoIP occur in a
sensible way that protects consumers by allowing them access to
emergency services. Moreover, even though the effort will need to be
coordinated by these various stakeholders, industry must leap to the
forefront of this initiative. Along these lines, the government will have to
abandon its attempts to control development-particularly in cases where
development cannot be controlled-and encourage industry to collaborate
in a self-regulatory effort.
As already seen, the government has relaxed antitrust regulation to
allow industry consortia to conduct joint research and development through
the NCRA. This trend must continue. In the words of science writer Robert
Pool:
[flor better or worse, technology has changed. Our days of innocence,
when machines were solely a product of larger-than-life inventors and
hardworking engineers, are gone. Increasingly, technology will be a joint
effort, with its design shaped not only by engineers and executives but
also psychologists, political scientists, management theorists, risk
specialists, regulators and courts, and the general public. It will not be a
neat system. It is probably not the best system. But, given the power and
complexity of modem technology, it is likely our only choice."6
Pool encourages us to embrace the future development of
technologies and to increase our awareness of the roles and impact of these
technologies. As he notes, the "power and complexity of modern
technology" warrant implementation of a proactive, multidisciplinary,
cooperative approach that addresses the challenges of our increasingly
164. Robert Pool, Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes Technology 305 (1997).
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technological world.
Of course, the idea that Robert Pool's "joint [product development]
effort" is really our only choice might be challenged by some skeptics.
However, the concept is a useful construct for the fast-changing technology
sector, particularly in areas, like VoIP, where government regulation has
proven that it has difficulty in keeping up with progress.
D. An Ounce of Precaution is Better Than a Pound of Precaution,
Particularly When the Opportunity is Lost
As previously seen, the development of emergency services and
wireless technologies can be analogized to the development of VolP.
Europeans, for example, have attempted to apply the precautionary
principle in wireless deployments. Accordingly, for our purposes it might
be useful to briefly explore the possible application of this principle in
E911 and VolP deployments and then dismiss that same possibility-much
like Justice Cardozo did when he ruled that individuals may need to stop
and look but that they do not need to reconnoiter.
The precautionary principle is a powerful, but extreme, example of
governments' constant struggle between encouraging the development of
new and exciting technologies and exerting control over those technologies
so as to protect the citizenry. In attempting to define the precautionary
principle and bring form to its manifold vague shapes, many scholars have
traced the roots of the principle to German law, the Vorsorgeprinzip,
165
particularly in connection with environmental policy.' 66  The
165. Vorsorgeprinzip, translated literally, means "foresight principle" or "forecaring
principle." A typically vague clarification of what the precautionary principle means can be
found in an article written by Nicola Notaro, Environmental Policy, in GUIDE TO EU
PoLIcIEs 226 (Gabriel Glockner et al. eds., 1998). The author notes that the precautionary
principle is part of European law and draws a connection between the principle and the
Vorsorgeprinzip, though he stops short of any meaningful discussion of its meaning.
According to Notaro, the precautionary principle was:
[a]dded by the TEU [Treaty of the European Union] and stems from German
environmental law where it is known as the Vorsorgeprinzip. The principle is that
whenever there is a strong suspicion that a certain activity may have
environmentally harmful consequences, it is better to act before the damage
occurs rather than wait for incontrovertible scientific evidence.
Id. at 229.
166. See Katherine Barrett & Joel Tickner, Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD)
Briefing Paper on the Precautionary Principle, (Apr. 23, 2001) (Working Paper, on file with
the University of Massachusetts Lowell Center for Sustainable Production). The authors
discuss the origins of the Vorsorgeprinzip, associating it with the modem precautionary
principle and attributing its origins to a West German movement during the early 1970s.
The authors emphasize, however, that the meaning of the term has changed since the 1970s:
"It is critical to note that the Germans viewed Vorsorge as a means of stimulating innovation
and social planning for sustainability, rather than simply a tool to block potentially
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Vorsorgeprinzip origins of the precautionary principle are based on the
rationale that, as Konrad von Moltke notes, "Environmental policy is not
fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and the elimination of
damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires
furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them are
made with care."' 167 The precautionary principle finds its natural home in
environmental law,168 but its exact meaning and the manner in which it
should be applied elsewhere, such as to various aspects of telephony
regulation, are subjects of great debate and controversy.169
Scholars have invested great time and energy in investigating the
origins of the precautionary principle and its application to science.
170
While it is correct to credit Germany with the principle's metamorphosis
into a legal norm, it is perhaps more useful to recognize the principle's
more general derivation. Simply put, the precautionary principle is at best
just a principle. Thus, the principle is not law, even if it is mentioned in the
Treaty for the European Union and other international laws in the United
States, Germany, and elsewhere. 17' Kenneth Foster, for one, has examined
the precautionary principle as it specifically applies, or could apply, to
mobile phones. Foster, an international expert on the effects of wireless
signals on human safety, has reached the following conclusions:
The PP [Precautionary Principle] is not a scientific proposition, nor is
it a precisely defined proposition in international law; there is some
question whether it even qualifies as being a "principle" at all. Rather,
it is a counsel for risk aversion, expressed in varying ways in
numerous treaties and other documents. In practice, its application is
constrained by policies, statutes and case law of individual states and
international law.'
72
dangerous activities." Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
167. Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, in
TWELFTH REPORT: BEST PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPTION app. 3, at 58 (Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1988) (quoting the West German government).
168. See generally Notaro, supra note 165 (discussing the precautionary principle in the
context of European environmental policy).
169. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv.
1003, 1003 (2003) ("[T]he precautionary principle should be rejected, not because it leads in
bad directions, but because it leads in no direction at all. The principle is literally
paralyzing-forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between.").
170. Id. at 1005 (noting the German origins of the precautionary principle).
171. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, 1551 (applying the precautionary principle by treaty to the ozone
layer); Conference on Environment and Development, March 2-April 3, 1992, Protection of
Oceans, 32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.21 (Dec. 17, 1991) (applying the
precautionary principle by international treaty to the coast); Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 29 I.L.M. 1027, 1027 (applying
the precautionary principle generally to living organisms).
172. Kenneth R. Foster, Professor of Bioengineering, Univeristy of Pennsylvania,
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Indeed, as Foster has suggested, the precautionary principle is no
more than "counsel for risk aversion," the kind that can be found both in
our legal systems and in everyday aphorisms (e.g., better safe than
sorry). 173 So, while it may be helpful for lawyers to take note of the
German movement that incorporated the Vorsorgeprinzip into
environmental law in the 1970s and 1980s, it is somewhat shortsighted to
draw wide-ranging conclusions from the German movement.
Thus, though we have gained a greater understanding of the origins of
the precautionary principle, we are nonetheless left with the following
questions: should precautions, or, more specifically, the precautionary
principle, be applied to mobile phone safety? To Internet telephony? The
answer to these questions, deceptively, is both yes and no. As might be
expected, the general confusion as to how to apply the principle only
increases when it is applied within the context of telephony and the
different technologies associated with it. 74 Naturally, we should be
cautious, even precautious, about products on the marketplace. However,
the precautionary principle should not be applied as a matter of law, if for
no other reason than the fact that it is not law. Accordingly, as we turn to
our proposed model for regulation, we wish to emphasize that the
unfortunate alternative to a self-regulatory certification process may be the
largely unproductive ex post application of precaution through some form
of the precautionary principle.
V. A PROPOSED MODEL
This Part will present a specific institutional framework and a set of
summary technical criteria and procedure recommendations in order to
provide a concrete model of a capability for emergency services self-
regulation and certification. Other models could be developed. However,
this proposed model represents the authors' best recommendation based on
current information and understanding.
A. Institutional Design
This Subpart refines the general observations of Part III into the
following recommendation: Government agencies should perform some
initial coordination between federal and state levels and then publicize a
Presentation at the WHO/NIEHS/EC Conference on the Precautionary Principle: Can
Electromagnetic Fields Trigger the Precautionary Principle? 2 (Feb. 2003) available at
http://www.seas.upenn.edul-kfoster/precautionary_foster.PDF. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
173. Id.
174. See Burgess, supra note 149, at 15.
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consistent and credible statement of intent to regulate VolP emergency
services unless credible self-regulation emerges. At the same time,
government agencies should move to facilitate successful self-regulation,
as described infra.
1. Industry Should Organize
Industry service and equipment providers should form an organization
to pursue VoIP emergency services. Such an organization could be a
derivative of an existing industry trade association or consortium, and it
should have the following characteristics: (1) it should be funded by and
heavily involve industry participants; (2) it should remain intentionally
open and transparent to all industry participants and other stakeholders,
particularly regulators and consumer interest groups-such arrangements
should be codified in the organization's bylaws; and (3) it should develop
standards, as well as update and extend them. Traditional open standards
bodies, such as IETF, the ISO, and the American National Standards
Institute ("ANSI") can serve as models. Although the body would initially
focus on emergency services, it could eventually embrace other social
policy self-regulation goals as well. 175 This organization should also do the
following: create a brand around the certification, establish the appropriate
legal protections, act as a co-sponsor with the government to promote
public awareness of the certification, maintain a database of accreditations,
and police accreditations. The standardization activity would draw on the
momentum built by the Voice on the Net ("VON") Coalition, an alliance
between NENA 176 and several VolP industry participants. The VON
Coalition is described in more detail on the following pages.
2. A Separation of Powers Should be Established
While organizing industry into consortia for appropriate standards-
setting efforts is a great start, an additional step is needed. In particular, the
process should not be held captive to the interests of certified parties.
Concretely, this Article recommends implementation of two specific
"separation of power" elements in order to enhance the credibility of the
process. First, multiple independent and competitive testing organizations
175. The motivation for new social policy goals could not be expected to arise naturally
from the industry participants in this organization. As indicated elsewhere, an external
motivation is needed. Most likely, such a motivation would come in the form of a public
debate culminating in a credible threat of government intervention. The close coordination
with government that this Article proposes could facilitate the efficient signaling of such
events.
176. See National Emergency Number Association Home Page, http://www.nena.orgl
About_Contact/index.htm.
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should perform accreditation. Furthermore, either these organizations or
third parties should provide precertification consulting and training.
Second, these testing organizations should be accredited by a third party,
distinct from both the standards-setting and certification branding
organization and from the testing organizations. The two major candidates
for this role are a government agency and an independent institution (e.g., a
respected neutral institution, such as ANSI).
3. Industry and Government Should Work Hand in Hand
In order to facilitate these ends, government agencies should appoint
personnel to assist in the formation of the self-regulation process as
follows: (1) credibly transmit the threat of government regulation if self-
regulation fails; (2) report back to the government the level of progress
made; (3) ensure agency experts provide input into certification standards
and process design; (4) promote self-regulation elsewhere in government
by recognizing self-regulatory efforts as mitigating factors in punitive
proceedings; (5) educate users about certification-both industry and
government should co-sponsor this goal; (6) work with the
telecommunications industry in order to incorporate the insurance industry
in the process and clarify the level of liability mitigation beyond
government liability mitigation provided to those who diligently certify
products; and (7) liaise with other interested government parties (e.g.,
Congress).
Although the preceding responsibilities will require significant
effort, their implementation will require dramatically less effort than that
required to create and execute government command-and-control
regulation. That said, it should be clear that this Article is by no means
advocating a passive government role.
B. Technical Approach
Ideally, this transition to an IP-based emergency services solution
should not burden future models with legacy assumptions. The design,
function, and operation of the Internet provide an abundant set of possible
solutions, and policy addressing future emergency services should embrace
this flexibility and optimize the potential social benefits. The policy thus
(1) should not restrict the manner in which a function is provided;
(2) should support multiple implementation methods; (3) should encourage
the incorporation of emergency services into other technologies; and
(4) should encourage developers to create cheaper, better, and more
feature-rich technologies.
Certification will likely need to include both certification of terminals,
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which can potentially be transported to a test site, and certification of
network characteristics, which cannot. This Article focuses only on the
former, mainly because it is difficult, if not impossible, to exhaustively test
all network nodes and usage combinations as a part of certification. With
these thoughts in mind, network testing should use a meta-standard style
process certification focused on (1) the way in which the network is
designed and managed to maintain an emergency services capability; and
(2) random performance testing of particular nodes and situations.
The diversity of possible VoIP systems will most likely preclude the
possibility of certification to a single level of performance. This diversity
should be encouraged. Consequently, this Article proposes that different
levels of capability be certified, keeping in mind that the number of levels
needs to be small enough that consumers can distinguish them. VoIP
systems might, for example, have two certification levels: a carrier grade
level with significant requirements and a noncarrier grade level with less
strenuous requirements.
As part of the proposed implementation plan, this Article
recommends the use of the stages suggested in the NENA/VON Coalition
initial agreement on VoIP emergency services.17 These stages, or phases,
are as follows:
Phase One Certification based on the NENA/VON Coalition interim
solution would include (1) delivering a 911 call through the existing 911
network; (2) providing a callback number to PSAP; and (3) providing
initial location information to PSAP (optional). 178
Phase Two Certification based on the NENA/VON Coalition long-
term solution would include (1) delivering a 911 call through an IP network
to an IP-connected PSAP or through an existing 911 network if PSAP is
not IP-connected; (2) providing a callback number or recontact information
to PSAP; and (3) providing caller location information to PSAP. 179 This
phased approach enables near-immediate implementation of emergency
services. It also encourages a move away from traditional emergency
services toward a more competitive environment.
C. Labeling
This Article has noted throughout that labeling could be an important
aspect of the certification process. While the details of such a mechanism
warrant a separate analysis, this Subpart briefly proposes a labeling
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initiative, discusses its merits, and provides suggestions regarding the
manner in which it might be used.
Labeling may include such concrete and diverse elements as (1) an
identifiable sticker attached to IP phones showing the name of the
certifying organization and the address of a website that provides
certification details and updates; (2) a software window that periodically
reminds users of emergency services specifications, possibly when the
device or software detects some configuration change; and/or (3) an e-mail
sent to the user when the network detects a change in its configuration.
By tying the operation of the label to system changes, the label
becomes a dynamic mechanism that could become very useful in situations
when the network and the device cannot automate the proper operation of
the emergency services system (i.e., when a user might need to intervene).
Lastly, considering the litigious nature of our society, labeling likely
provides some legal protection to the VoIP service or software provider In
other words, labeling could be used to provide users with information about
the (1) availability or lack of emergency services support; (2) emergency
services limitations; (3) configuration requirements; (4) configuration
changes; and (5) alternative methods of summoning help.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the telecommunications industry has proven adept at self-
regulating in areas of interoperability, social policy regulation has
historically been the purview of the government. The diversity engendered
through the transition to VoIP will challenge such command-and-control
regulatory policies, and we believe the time has come to consider the
alternative of social policy self-regulation. There are key challenges that
arise from a self-regulatory process, but the framework provided in this
Article offers a solution. Success in this area would not only provide
substantial value in the case of VoIP emergency services, but it would also
add a vital new regulatory approach for use within the telecommunications
industry, which continues to evolve rapidly.
VoIP technology enables a much broader range of technical and
business approaches than were feasible in the PSTN world. On the one
hand, this new technical reality heralds a new era of innovation and
flexibility for users, while on the other hand it makes difficult--or, more
likely, impossible---the task of mapping traditional social policy goals and
constructs from the PSTN world to the VoIP world in a straightforward
manner. Many current social policy goals should be preserved in one form
or another and new policy goals should be considered over time. With these
thoughts in mind, it seems we would be well-served by a more flexible,
rapid, and innovative method of mapping such goals onto the increasingly
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heterogeneous world of telecommunications.
Emergency services are a critically important and immediate case in
point. Traditional emergency services expectations include connection of
timely, highly intelligible emergency calls with the appropriate answering
point and communication of critical information regarding the call's place
of origin, both as a network address and as a physical location. The variety
of VolP implementations makes these expectations intrinsically difficult to
meet. Thus, this Article proposes that the industry design-using input
from the government and other stakeholders-a multi-tier certification
scheme that will provide a VolP emergency services capability that can
fully satisfy these expectations. The certification regime should focus on
several key technical characteristics of VoIP systems, including addressing,
routing, location, security, availability, and related network and application
standards.
This analysis is not complete in some important respects. From the
technology perspective, a broad set of technology categories should be
developed that might be based on media type, network access, user
expectations, or some other criteria. Within these categories, a set of
characteristics should be defined, upon which a certification process could
be applied as this Article laid out above for VoP. While this Article
presents some basic legal analysis and inquiry into the role of
standardization and consortia in institutional design, more research is
needed in this area: for example, how social policy funding will be affected
by the transition to VoIP (e.g., telecommunications industry taxation helps
to fund public safety, and it will be important to determine if these
obligations will be transferred to VolP or if they will be covered in some
other way). Finally, this Article briefly discussed the importance of
developing different categories of VolP implementations against which
different certification standards might be developed. Further investigation
could allow this approach to expand to include other types of media over IP
(e.g., instant messages and video).
Finally, the proposed model needs both refinement and assessment.
The Authors have evaluated the model by performing critical and
documented analysis of internal integrity and credibility with respect to
successful precedents and by disseminating this analysis to policy-oriented
audiences for critique and debate (as has been done by submitting a
preliminary version of this Article to the Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference). 180 Moreover, the analysis from Parts II and Ell
demonstrate the validity of the authors' approach. For the longer term, this
180. See Telecommunications Policy Research Conference Home Page, http://www.tprc.
org (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
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analysis was derived through the use of the proposed model, as well as
through the execution of specific strategies for assessing that model once it
is implemented. As part of this strategy, the Authors (1) monitored
elements that evolved beyond the scope of this paper's technical and
business model; (2) tracked specific performance metrics of certified
processes and compared that data against criteria derived from consumer
expectations and social policy goals; and (3) compared voluntary adoption
rates of certification against a template derived from the Authors'
experience in industry-sponsored certification processes. This longer-term
assessment represents an ongoing effort that can benefit greatly from reader
feedback. To that end, comments are welcome.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications
Commission,' the Third Circuit reviewed the media cross-ownership limits
proposed by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC").2 The
Third Circuit critically examined the FCC's use of a "Diversity Index" to
reach its proposed rules3 and then remanded the Cross-Media Limits to the
FCC for justification or modification.4 Given this somewhat unusual
decision-a court not deferring to an administrative agency on a technical
rule-making issue-there has been surprisingly little reaction from the
academic community. 5
This Article begins with a discussion of Prometheus, ultimately
concluding that the FCC's Diversity Index scheme is fatally flawed
because it cannot simultaneously satisfy two assumptions shared by the
FCC and the Third Circuit: (1) diversity in a media market decreases with
ownership concentration; and (2) the contribution to diversity of an
individual entity-"diversity importance" 6-increases with the weighted
market shares of that entity's outlets. In Part II, this Article considers two
alternatives to the Diversity Index: one designed by Professor Eli Noam to
emphasize pluralism-the number of voices in media markets-and one
original index specifically designed to simultaneously satisfy the two
assumptions shared by the FCC and the Third Circuit. In Part III, this
Article tests these alternative indices by applying them to one of the FCC's
1. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005).
2. See id. at 402-12; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) [hereinafter Order].
3. See 373 F.3d at 403-12.
4. Id. at 403.
5. Compare Byron L. Dorgan, The FCC and Media Ownership: The Loss of the
Public Interest Standard, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 443, 452-54 (2005)
(criticizing the Diversity Index and commenting on the Third Circuit's remand of the Cross-
Media Limits in Prometheus), with John F. Sturm, Time for Change on Media Cross-
Ownership Regulation, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 205-06 (2004) (criticizing the Third
Circuit's decision to remand the Cross-Media Limits). See also Ellen P. Goodman, Media
Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital
Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1411-13 (2004).
6. See Order, supra note 2, para. 396 (discussing diversity importance).
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sample markets: Altoona, Pennsylvania. Part Iml concludes with the
observation that the index proposed in this Article not only satisfies the two
assumptions shared by the FCC and the Third Circuit, but also places
greater practical weight on pluralism than Professor Noam's index. Finally,
the Article concludes with the suggestion that adopting a suitable formulaic
measure of media diversity could be the first step in a broader review of
governmental regulation of media markets.
II. ANALYZING PROMETHEUS
In Prometheus, the Third Circuit found that the FCC employed
"several irrational assumptions and inconsistencies" when deriving the
Cross-Media Limits. 7 In particular, the court found that the FCC had
"inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index
results." 8 This Part begins with a review of how the FCC defined the
Diversity Index, applied it to various consolidation scenarios, and then used
the results to determine its Cross-Media Limits. Subpart B then reviews the
Third Circuit's analysis of these procedures and its grounds for holding that
the FCC had inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits. Finally,
Subpart C explains how the Third Circuit had in fact understated the
problem, showing that the Diversity Index is fatally flawed because it
cannot simultaneously satisfy all of the critical assumptions shared by the
FCC and the Third Circuit.
A. The FCC Procedure for Deriving Cross-Media Limits
This Subpart reviews the three-step procedure the FCC used to derive
its Cross-Media Limits. The first section describes the FCC's Diversity
Index and how the FCC applied the Diversity Index to media markets. The
second section explains how the FCC used the Diversity Index to evaluate
various hypothetical consolidation scenarios in media markets. The final
section then describes the Cross-Media Limits that the FCC derived from
its analysis of these consolidation scenarios.
1. The Diversity Index
The FCC designed the Diversity Index to identify "at risk" media
markets and based it on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ("HHI"), which
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use to
measure the concentration effects of proposed mergers in local markets. 9
An HI score is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of
7. 373 F.3d at 402.
8. Id. at 403.
9. See id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 394).
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the competitors in a market. "At its core," the Diversity Index used the
same formula.'0
The FCC first selected which types of media outlets to include in
calculating the Diversity Index by looking at "consumers' reported
preferences for sources of local news and information."' 1 It then assigned a
relative weight to each type of media outlet based on the popularity of that
source.' 2 Using this procedure, the FCC assigned a weight of 33.8% to
broadcast television, 20.2% to daily newspapers, 8.6% to weekly
newspapers, 24.9% to radio, 2.3% to cable Internet, and 10.2% to other
Internet sources.'
3
To apply the Diversity Index to a specific market, the FCC counted
the number of outlets in the market within each included media type and
assigned each outlet within the same type an equal market share.' 4 So, for
example, each of the twenty-three television stations in the New York City
10. Id. See also infra Table 1 (providing the Diversity Index formula and sample
calculations).
11. 373 F.3d at 403. Local news is the FCC's "recognized indicator of viewpoint
diversity in local markets." Id. at 405 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 394, which states,
"News and public affairs programming is the clearest example of programming that can
provide viewpoint diversity... [and] the appropriate geographic market for viewpoint
diversity is local .... ). Of course, one could wonder whether the FCC's focus on local
news contributes to an artificial sense of an ongoing crisis in viewpoint diversity insofar as
other sources of information and perspectives are becoming substitutes for local news.
However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, providing
an adequate formula for measuring viewpoint diversity could be the first step in a broader
reconsideration of the FCC's regulation of media diversity. See infra Part V.
12. See 373 F.3d at 403 (citing Order, supra note 2, paras. 412,415, 417).
13. Id. Notably absent from this list is cable television. However, the Third Circuit held
that the FCC properly excluded cable television "because of serious doubts as to the extent
that cable provided independent local news ...." meaning news not also provided by local
broadcast television. Id. at 405. But the Third Circuit then held that the same considerations
should have led to the exclusion of Internet sources from the list on the ground that most of
the local news on the Internet is also duplicative. See id. at 405-07. The court also reasoned
that even though the Internet provides a "universe of information" through the Web sites of
individuals and organizations, those Web sites typically fall short of being actual media
outlets because they fail to provide the same aggregation and distillation functions as the
traditional media. Id. at 407. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that "[o]n remand, the
Commission must either exclude the Internet from the media selected for inclusion in the
Diversity Index or provide a better explanation for why it is included in light of the
exclusion of cable." Id. at 408. As a factual matter, one might object that the Third Circuit is
mischaracterizing much of what the Internet has to offer. Cf. id. at 406 n.34 (describing the
Drudge Report, an online source identified by the FCC as an aggregator of news stories).
Again, however, these considerations are outside the scope of this Article, although an
adequate formula for measuring media diversity may be a useful component in a broader
reconsideration of the FCC's role in regulating media diversity on these grounds. See infra
note 66 and accompanying text.
14. 373 F.3d at 403.
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market was assigned an equal 4.3% share of the television market. 5 The
FCC then multiplied the assigned market shares of the outlets within each
media type by the relative weight for that type.' 6 Continuing the prior
example, each broadcast television market share in New York City would
be multiplied by 33.8% (.338) in order to calculate its weighted market
share.'
7
The FCC then derived the weighted ownership shares of a single
entity by combining the weighted market shares of all of the media outlets
owned by that entity.18 So, for example, ABC owned one television station
and four radio stations in New York City. 19 The FCC combined ABC's
weighted television share with its weighted radio share (4.3% multiplied by
.338, which equals 1.45% for the weighted television share combined with
a total of 6.7% for four radio stations multiplied by .249 for the radio
market weight, which equals 1.67%).20 Accordingly, the FCC assigned a
total weighted ownership share of 3.12% to ABC's combination. 2'
Finally, the FCC summed the squares of the weighted ownership
shares to calculate the market's Diversity Index score.22 New York City,
for example, received a total Diversity Index score of 373, to which ABC's
23
squared weighted ownership share had contributed 9.8 points. The FCC
also used this methodology to calculate Diversity Index scores for several
media markets of different sizes, measuring market size by the number of
television stations in the market.24
15. Id. The Third Circuit ultimately held that the FCC could not justify its use of these
assigned equal shares rather than actual-use data in each market and remanded on this
ground as well. See id. at 408-09. This was an independent ground for remand, however,
and all of the other considerations in this Article should apply if the FCC adopts an actual-
use methodology for determining an outlet's market share. As an aside, one can note that the
effect of assuming equal shares rather than using actual-use data would be to understate
concentration as measured by the Diversity Index. See infra Table 1 (showing that a market
with ten equally-weighted outlets would receive a lower Diversity Index score and thus be
deemed more diverse than a market with ten outlets and an uneven distribution of shares).







23. See Order, supra note 2, app. C.
24. See 373 F.3d at 404 (citing Order, supra note 2, app. D). Appendix C of the Order
also contains sample calculations for ten of these markets. Order, supra note 2, app. C.
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2. Consolidation Scenarios
Next, the FCC looked at how the markets' Diversity Index scores
would change given different hypothetical consolidation scenarios.25 The
FCC considered seven possible combinations: (1) one newspaper and one
television station; (2) one television station and all of the radio stations
allowed under the local radio rule;26 (3) one newspaper and all of the radio
stations allowed under the local radio rule; (4) one newspaper, one
television station, and half of the radio stations allowed under the local
radio rule; (5) two television stations; (6) one newspaper and two television
stations; and (7) one newspaper, two television stations, and all of the radio
stations allowed under the local radio rule.2 7 To determine the hypothetical
effects of such combinations on media diversity, the FCC compared the
Diversity Index scores of the markets before and after the combinations;
the difference, an increase in the Diversity Index score, provided the FCC's
measure of the loss of diversity due to the consolidation scenario.28
3. The Cross-Media Limits
Finally, the FCC set the Cross-Media Limits, which varied with the
size of the market, purportedly based on whether or not the relevant
consolidation scenarios "resulted in acceptable increases to the average
Diversity Index score[]" for that size of market.29 For markets with three or
fewer television stations, the FCC prohibited all newspaper/television,
newspaper/radio, and radio/television combinations.3 ° In markets with nine
or more television stations, the FCC imposed no limits on cross-media
ownership.3' In markets with four to eight television stations, the FCC rule
allowed all of the scenarios except for two: a combination of a newspaper
and two television stations, or a combination of a newspaper, two television
stations, and all of the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule.32
25. 373 F.3d at 404.
26. The local radio ownership rule is an independent rule, established by statute, which
limits the number of commercial radio stations a single entity can own in a market based
upon the total number of commercial radio stations in that market. Id. at 387 n.9 (citing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 110 (codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.)).





32. Id. (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 466). Obviously, these are not separate rules.
The rule prohibiting a combination of a newspaper and two television stations also prohibits
a combination of a newspaper, two television stations, and any additional media outlets.
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B. The Third Circuit's Review
After analyzing the Diversity Index and its use by the FCC, the Third
Circuit held that the FCC: (1) had not justified its choice and weighting of
the specific kinds of media outlets to include in the Diversity Index; (2) had
not justified its assumption of equal market shares among media outlets of
the same kind for the purposes of calculating the Diversity Index; and (3)
had not rationally derived the Cross-Media Limits from the Diversity Index
results.33 The last of these three holdings is the focus of this Subpart.
The Third Circuit held that "[a]lthough the Commission is entitled to
deference in deciding where to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable increases in markets' Diversity Index scores, we do not affirm
the seemingly inconsistent manner in which the line was drawn. 34 To
support this conclusion, the Third Circuit highlighted the FCC's chart of
the effects of different "consolidation scenarios.,,35 As the Third Circuit
noted, the proposed "Cross-Media Limits allow[] some combinations
where the increases in Diversity Index scores were generally higher than
for other combinations that were not allowed. 36
The court particularly noted that in midsized markets, the markets
with four to eight television stations, one combination-a newspaper,
television station, and half of the radio stations allowed under the local
radio rule-allowed by the FCC's rule caused "considerably higher"
Diversity Index score increases than the other combinations allowed by the
FCC.37 In fact, this combination generally led to higher increases than a
combination that the FCC did not allow-a newspaper and two television
stations .3
The Third Circuit concluded that "[t]he Commission's failure to
provide any explanation for this glaring inconsistency is without doubt
arbitrary and capricious, and so provides further basis for remand of the
Cross-Media Limits., 39 The court rejected the argument that the relevant
difference between a combination of a newspaper and two television
stations and a combination of a newspaper, one television station, and half
of the allowed radio stations is that "a newspaper will benefit more from
... the consolidation with its first-acquired TV station than with
33. See id. at 404-11.
34. Id. at411.
35. Id. at 409-10 (citing Order, supra note 2, app. D). See also infra Table 2
(reproducing the FCC's chart).
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subsequently acquired stations." 4 The court concluded that this argument
"does not address why the newspaper + 1 TV station + 50% allowed radio
stations combination was permitted when its Diversity Index score
increases were overall much greater than the Diversity Index score
increases for other allowed combinations. ' 41
As this exchange illustrates, the Third Circuit was implicitly adopting
the Diversity Index as an appropriate measure of media diversity and then
requiring the FCC to justify any departures from the implied ordering of
consolidation scenarios based on this measure. Moreover, the Third Circuit
was requiring the FCC to justify not only departures where scenarios with
similar effects on Diversity Index scores were treated differently, but also
departures where scenarios with dissimilar effects on Diversity Index
scores were treated the same-a very robust use of the FCC's own formula,
despite the FCC's disclaimer that the Diversity Index is "a blunt tool
capable only of capturing and measuring large effects or trends in typical
markets.
' 42
C. The Underlying Issue: A Fatal Flaw in the Diversity Index
Although the Third Circuit based its holding on inconsistent line-
drawing, the court actually understated the underlying problems with the
FCC's use of the Diversity Index. The FCC's real problem is not finding a
consistent line to draw when using the Diversity Index; instead, the
Diversity Index itself is fatally flawed because it cannot simultaneously
satisfy two underlying assumptions about the relationship between media
market share and media diversity. This Subpart first explains how the
Diversity Index, as designed by the FCC and adopted by the Third Circuit,
was intended to satisfy these two assumptions: (1) diversity in a media
market should decrease with ownership concentration; and (2) the
contribution to diversity of an individual entity, its diversity importance,
should increase with the weighted market shares of that entity's outlets.
Section 2 shows that the Diversity Index as it is currently structured cannot
40. Id. at 411 n.41 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 467).
41. Id.
42. Order, supra note 2, para. 398. See also 373 F.3d at 473 (Scirica, J. dissenting in
part, concurring in part) (arguing that the Cross-Media Limits were reasonable and should
be upheld, even though the Diversity Index results "do not correspond to the Commission's
final rule for all combinations in all markets," because the Diversity Index nonetheless "lent
transparency and empirical footing to this massive undertaking"). The fact that the Third
Circuit was willing to use the FCC's own formula, even with these disclaimers, to justify
remanding the FCC's rule lends support to the claim that adopting a formulaic approach to
measuring media diversity can limit the discretion of government officials. See infra note
66 and accompanying text.
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simultaneously satisfy both of these assumptions. Accordingly, Part II
concludes with the suggestion that the FCC should consider alternatives to
the Diversity Index.
1. The Two Assumptions Underlying the Diversity Index
On the one hand, the Diversity Index is designed to treat increased
ownership concentration in a media market as having a negative impact on
diversity. Like the HHI, the Diversity Index sums the squares of the
weighted ownership shares. Mathematically, this formula can measure
increases in concentration in the market because each entity's contribution
to the concentration score before summation does not just increase linearly
with its weighted ownership share, in which case the distribution of
ownership shares would have no effect on the total score of the market
once all of the entities' shares were summed. Rather, each entity's
contribution to the concentration score before summation increases
exponentially, making the total Diversity Index score of the market
following the summation dependent on the distribution of ownership
shares.43
On the other hand, the Diversity Index also seems designed to treat
higher weighted market shares as representing a greater contribution to a
market's diversity. As the Third Circuit noted in Prometheus, the FCC, in
justifying its relative weighting of media types, stated that it has "no reason
to believe that all media are of equal importance" 44 and that "[n]ot all
voices.., speak with the same volume., 45 The court further noted that the
FCC's stated reason for departing from a simple voice-counting test and
moving to the Diversity Index methodology was that it wanted to take into
account the "diversity importance" of hypothetical merging parties.46
Indeed, the FCC suggested that, for example, "if radio has less diversity
weight than television, then a merger of a television station and a radio
station will cause less of a loss of diversity than will a merger of two
television stations." 47
Thus, when the Diversity Index calculates the weighted market shares
of media outlets by multiplying the outlets' assigned market shares with
weighting factors derived from the consumer popularity of various media
sources, it is creating a positive correlation between the weighted market
43. See 373 F.3d at 403 (discussing the mathematical characteristics of the HHI). See
also infra Table 1 (providing sample calculations using the Diversity Index).
44. 373 F.3d at 408 (citing Order, supra note 2, para. 409) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45. Id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 445) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. (quoting Order, supra note 2, para. 396).
47. Order, supra note 2, para. 396.
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share of an outlet and the calculated "importance" of that outlet, or the
"volume" of that voice, in the market. Consequently, this portion of the
Diversity Index scheme assumes that there should be a positive correlation
between a media outlet's weighted market share and the magnitude of its
contribution to diversity in the market.
The FCC did not clearly explain why it believed that greater actual
use of an outlet, as represented by its market share, should represent greater
diversity importance. The FCC stated, "[O]ur method for measuring
viewpoint diversity weights outlets based on the way people actually use
them rather than what is actually available as a local news source. We
adopt this approach out of an abundance of caution because we are
protecting our core policy objective of viewpoint diversity. ''48 But the FCC
had previously stated in its Order that "[v]iewpoint diversity refers to
availability of a wide range of information and political perspectives on
important issues,"49 and that "what ultimately matters here is the range of
choices available to the public . . . .50 Accordingly, despite the FCC's
claim that it was adopting this actual-use methodology out of an
"abundance of caution," it appears that the FCC was in fact implicitly
redefining viewpoint diversity by shifting its focus to the actual use of
media outlets.5'
The Third Circuit implicitly reached a similar conclusion when it
criticized the FCC's assignment of equal market shares within each media
type because that assignment generated "absurd results. ' 2 Focusing on the
New York City market, the court compared a community college television
station's weighted ownership share of 1.5% with the New York Times
48. Id. para. 399.
49. Id. para. 393 (emphasis added).
50. Id. para. 394 (emphasis added).
51. Id. para. 399. Assessing whether this was a permissible or justifiable revision of the
FCC's definition of viewpoint diversity is outside the scope of this Article. Cf. FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 (1978) ("Diversity and its effects are...
elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured .... ") (quoting Nat'l Citizens
Comm. for Brdcst v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Nonetheless, it may be
worth observing that the FCC describes its diversity goal as "fostering competition in the
marketplace of ideas." Order, supra note 2, para. 393 (internal quotations omitted).
Obviously, that metaphorical market does not include only media outlets on the supply side
and media consumers on the demand side. Instead, presumably, once media outlets have
supplied information or perspectives to their consumers, many of those consumers will then
resupply those ideas to other participants in this marketplace. In that sense, ideas first
transmitted through media outlets with a larger market share will be more competitive
simply by virtue of having a larger number of resuppliers in these second-stage transactions.
In other words, there is a straightforward sense in which ideas first transmitted by relatively
unpopular media outlets will be less available to second-stage consumers of ideas.
52. 373 F.3d at 408.
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Company's weighted ownership share, derived from a co-owned
newspaper and radio station, of 1.4%.53 The court concluded, "A Diversity
Index that requires us to accept that a community college television station
makes a greater contribution to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate
that includes the third-largest newspaper in America also requires us to
abandon both logic and reality., 54 Consequently, the court also appears to
have concluded that an entity's weighted ownership share should correlate
positively with the magnitude of that entity's contribution to diversity.55
2. The Diversity Index Cannot Simultaneously Satisfy These Two
Assumptions
The Diversity Index scheme, as used by the FCC, cannot
simultaneously satisfy these two assumptions: (1) diversity in a media
market should decrease with ownership concentration; and (2) the
contribution to diversity of an individual entity should correlate positively
with the weighted market shares of that entity's outlets. By calculating the
Diversity Index score as the sum of the squares of the weighted ownership
shares, the Diversity Index score contribution of a given entity increases
exponentially with the weighted market shares of its outlets. Consequently,
the Diversity Index score positively correlates with both increased
ownership concentration, as traditionally measured by the HHI formula,
and increased weighted market shares on an outlet-by-outlet basis.
Increases in the Diversity Index score of a media market could thus be
treated as representing decreases in diversity, in accordance with
Assumption (1). But such a scheme, by implication, would treat an
individual entity's contribution to diversity as correlating negatively, not
positively, with the weighted market shares of its outlets, thus violating
Assumption (2).6 Conversely, treating increases in the Diversity Index
53. Id.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Again, a critical review of the court's decision is beyond the scope of this Article.
But it is certainly worth noting that the court could have questioned this entire approach,
perhaps even remanding the case to the FCC on the ground that it had not justified defining
viewpoint diversity with respect to actual use of media outlets. Instead, the court not only
accepted this definition, but also used it as a substantive basis for reviewing the details of
the FCC's Diversity Index methodology.
56. For comparison, it may be worth noting that an HHI analysis of a media market for
the purpose of gauging concentration effects would also implicitly treat an entity's
individual contribution to those effects as increasing with the market shares of that entity's
outlets. Of course, in that context, such an assumption is appropriate. In other words, it
would not be objectionable to say that a media company with a large share of the media
market, such as the New York Times Company in New York, contributes more to media
concentration than a company with a smaller share of the media market. Again, the problem
in this context is that the New York Times Company is also, by the assumptions of the Third
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score as representing increases in diversity would satisfy Assumption (2),
but would then violate Assumption (1).
Consequently, any use of the Diversity Index scheme is bound to
violate the basic assumptions of the Third Circuit, and indeed the FCC
itself. Accordingly, to truly satisfy the Third Circuit on remand, the FCC
should consider alternatives to the Diversity Index. Part III presents two
such alternatives, one proposed by Professor Noam and one original to this
Article.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVERSITY INDEX
As noted in the Introduction, there has been surprisingly little
commentary on the Third Circuit's discussion of the Diversity Index and its
remand of the Cross-Media Limits. Professor Eli Noam, however, broadly
addressed the FCC's attempts to measure media market diversity in a
column for the Financial Times Online edition.57 Professor Noam was not
primarily concerned with the issues discussed in this Article, but he also
proposed an alternative to the Diversity Index. Accordingly, this Part
begins with Professor Noam's analysis of the Diversity Index and his
proposal of an alternative, which I will call the Noam Index ("NI").58
Subpart B then proposes an original index specifically designed to
simultaneously satisfy the two assumptions of the FCC and Third Circuit.
A. The Noam Index
Professor Noam identified two problems with the Diversity Index.
Noting that the Diversity Index is based on the HHI used in conventional
analysis of market concentration for antitrust purposes, he stated, "[t]he
issue is partly whether the concentration threshold for media should be
lower, and also whether the HHI methodology itself accounts sufficiently
for media pluralism. ' 59 Addressing the second issue, Professor Noam
argued that while the HHI is a good measure of market power, it fails to
properly account for pluralism.60 Contending that both pluralism and
Circuit and FCC, contributing more to the diversity of that market than entities owning less
"important," or lower "volume," media outlets.
57. Eli Noam, How to Measure Media Concentration, FT.coM, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/da3Obf5e-fa9d-1 ld8-9a71-00000e251 lc8.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2005). Noam is a Professor of Economics and Finance at the Columbia Business School and
Director of the Columbia University Institute for Tele-Information.
58. Following the convention established with the HHI, I will use personal names to
identify the indices in this Article, with the exception of the Diversity Index.
59. Noam, supra note 57. This Article focuses primarily on the second of these issues.
60. Id. Professor Noam described an example of a radio market:
[I]f [] two smaller stations were replaced by 20 stations, each with 1 per cent [sic]
of the market, the H1 would decline only slightly, from 3400 to 3220. Yet the
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market power are important considerations, he concluded that "one should
not have to choose between a measure of market power (the HHI) or of
pluralism ....
Accordingly, Professor Noam proposed an alternative to the Diversity
Index that incorporates both concerns. The NI takes the HHI as a measure
of market power and then divides it by the square root of the number of
voices in the market.62 As Professor Noam explained, the more voices there
are in a market, the lower the NI score will be.63 To provide for a practical
test, he advocated limiting the counting of voices to those above a certain
size threshold, and he proposed 1%.64 Finally, he proposed that this same
approach could be used for cross-media analysis, "since a company might
have no special market power in any particular medium but be involved in
several media so that overall it would hold significant power, especially if
it were to have multiple holdings in one city. ' 6
5
As an aside, it is worth noting that the NI does not appear to deal with
the underlying problem identified in this Article-the inability of the
Diversity Index to simultaneously satisfy Assumptions (1) and (2). Rather,
the NI is designed to give extra weight to the loss or addition of voices
when assessing media concentration. But the NI provides a useful
comparison for the purposes of this Article because it is also a formulaic
alternative to the Diversity Index, designed to fulfill the same basic
purpose-measuring the media diversity of individual markets. Professor
Noam argued broadly in favor of such an approach:
[To some], any numerical test is suspect as mechanistic. They would
prefer a case-by-case consideration of many factors relevant to a media
market. But this would leave a judgment call over media ownership to
government officials able to reward friends and punish enemies, or
enable powerful media companies to thwart unfavourable decisions-
both undesirable options given the inherently adversarial relationship
of government and media. This argues for a relatively clear-cut test,
with a relatively clear-cut methodology. 66
diversity of the local radio market would clearly be significantly increased by the
presence of 18 additional radio station providers.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also infra Table 1 (using sample calculations for the Noam Index).
63. Noam, supra note 57.
64. Id. Unfortunately, Professor Noam did not specify exactly how this percentage
should be calculated.
65. Id. Professor Noam did not explain exactly how his index would apply to the cross-
media case, but this Article will assume that the NI could be applied to weighted market
shares as determined by the FCC.
66. Id. In response to Professor Noam, Professor Richard Epstein argued that in light of
the online media market, including such entities as "bloggers," the actual number of media
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Accepting the potential benefits of such formulaic approaches, the
next section of this Article proposes another alternative to the Diversity
Index---one specifically designed to address the underlying assumptions of
the Third Circuit and the FCC.
B. The Hill Index
67
Holding aside the issues of how to select media types, how to weigh
those types, and then how to assign market shares to outlets within those
types, we can assume that the FCC started with appropriately-weighted
market shares.68 As with the Diversity Index and the NI, the Hill Index
("HI") would combine the weighted market shares of co-owned outlets to
derive weighted ownership shares. However, instead of summing the
squares of these shares, the HI would sum the square roots of these
shares.69
As with the Diversity Index, an individual entity's contribution to the
market's HI score would increase with the entity's weighted market share.
Accordingly, under Assumption (2), increases in this modified Diversity
Index score should be treated as representing increases, not decreases, in
diversity. In other words, a greater HI score represents a more diverse
market, and a lower HI score represents a less diverse market. °
voices is much larger than Professor Noan assumes. Richard A. Epstein, No Need to Fight
Yesterday's Wars, F.CoM, Aug. 30, 2004, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/da30bf5e-fa9d-1ld8-
9a71-00000e251 lc8.html (last visited, Oct. 20, 2005). Also in response to Professor Noam,
Thomas Hazlett argued that the broader context is a "regulatory failure" in the broadcast
segment of the media market, and he concluded that courts should extend the protections of
the First Amendment from print media to all "communications." Thomas W. Hazlett, The
'Noam Index', FT.coM, Aug. 30, 2004, http://news.ft.comcms/s/da30bf5e-fa9d-1 ld8-9a71-
00000e251 lc8.html (last visited, Oct. 4, 2005). Taken together, these responses suggest that
the proper conclusion may be that there should be a more limited role for the FCC in this
area, and perhaps no role at all. Although such an argument is mostly outside the scope of
this Article, it is worth noting that a formulaic approach to measuring media diversity,
properly applied in light of actual facts, may bolster such arguments. See infra Part V. In
that sense, Professor Noam's observation that a formulaic approach limits the ability of
government officials to "reward friends and punish enemies" applies equally well to these
broader questions of whether the government should be regulating at all. Noam, supra note
57.
67. At the risk of seeming immodest, this Article will continue to use the convention of
identifying indices by proper names for the sake of clarity.
68. Examining these prior steps is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth
noting that doing so would be one way to initiate the broader discussion of whettler any
ongoing regulation in these areas is warranted. See generally Epstein, supra note 66. See
also supra notes 13, 15, 66, and accompanying text.
69. See infra Table 1 (comparing, side-by-side, the formulas used in the Diversity
Index, NI, and HI).
70. It may be important to stress the contrast between the HI and the Diversity Index
and NI. In both of the latter indices, a greater score indicates a less diverse market. With the
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With the HI formula, an entity's contribution to diversity increases in
a diminishing, not increasing, fashion as its weighted ownership share
increases. 7' As a result, treating increases in the HI score as representing
increases in diversity would not violate Assumption (1). Indeed, decreases
in the HI score could be treated as representing decreases in diversity under
both assumptions.
For example, a media market with only one outlet, and thus with a
weighted ownership share of 100, would have an HI score of 10 (the square
root of 100). For comparison, using the same share of 100 in the Diversity
Index formula would result in a score of 10,000 (the square of 100).
Moving to a market with 10 separately-owned outlets, each with an equal
weighted share of 10, the HI score would increase to 31.6 (the sum of 10
square roots of 10). By contrast, the Diversity Index score would decrease
to 1,000 (the sum of 10 squares of 10). Similarly, moving then to a market
still with 10 separate outlets, but one with a weighted share of 50, one with
a share of 10, and the remaining 8 with shares of 5, would result in a
decrease in the HI score to 28.1, and an increase in the Diversity Index
score to 2,800. Alternatively, moving from a market with 10 equal outlets
to a market with 8 equal outlets, each with a share of 12.5, would result in a
decrease of the HI score to 28.3, and an increase of the Diversity Index
score to 1,250.72
As this example demonstrates, treating decreases in the HI score as
decreases in diversity is consistent with the assumption that increases in
ownership concentration in media markets correlate with decreases in
media diversity. Unlike both the Diversity Index and the NI, the HI
accommodates both of the assumptions shared by the Third Circuit and
FCC.
In order to determine whether the HI is useful in practice, including
for the purpose of evaluating the effects of consolidation scenarios, it must
be tested. Part IV considers the results of applying all three indices to a
sample market: Altoona, Pennsylvania.
HI, in contrast, a greater score indicates a more diverse market. See infra Table 1
(comparing sample calculations for all three indices).
71. For example, an entity with a weighted ownership share of 10 would contribute
3.16 (the square root of 10) to the HI score. Increasing the entity's weighted ownership
share to 20 would increase its contribution to 4.47-an increase of 1.31. But then increasing
its share from 20 to 30 would only increase its contribution to 5.48-a further increase of
1.01. As this example demonstrates, the marginal increase in its contribution to the HI score
decreases as an entity grows, a mathematical consequence of using the square root function.
72. See infra Table 1 (comparing the sample calculations across the Diversity Index,
NI, and HI).
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IV. A TEST CASE: ALTOONA, PENNSYLVANIA
The natural next step would be to apply the NI and HI to all of the
data underlying the FCC's chart of consolidation scenarios, comparing the
results with the Diversity Index. Unfortunately, the FCC did not provide all
of this information in its published Order.7 However, the FCC did provide
sample base Diversity Index calculations for ten markets in Appendix C of
the Order. For one of those ten markets-Altoona, Pennsylvania-the FCC
also provided two sample calculations for hypothetical consolidation
scenarios.74 As it turns out, Altoona is a suitable test case for the NI and HI
because it fits within the range of markets subject to the rules held
inconsistent by the Third Circuit: Altoona has six television stations,
placing it within the disputed range."
This Part begins by confirming that the application of the Diversity
Index to the Altoona market leads to the same sort of inconsistent results
that the court identified with respect to the FCC's Cross-Media Limits.
Subpart B then applies the NI and HI to the Altoona market, comparing the
results given the relevant consolidation scenarios. On the basis of this
comparison, this Part confirms that only the HI simultaneously satisfies the
two basic assumptions shared by the FCC and the court. Moreover, this
Part also concludes that the HI puts greater practical weight on the loss of
voices than the NI, and thus is also better-suited to address the issues of
media pluralism that motivated Professor Noam to create an alternative
index.
A. Altoona and the Diversity Index
Before applying the NI and HI to the Altoona market, it is necessary
to check whether applying the Diversity Index to the combination scenarios
as applied in Altoona would lead to results comparable to those represented
in the FCC's summary chart. One immediate difficulty is that there are not
unique ways to carry out the scenarios described by the FCC. Altoona
apparently has both a daily and a weekly newspaper, although the weekly
newspaper remained unnamed in the FCC's chart, and thus the
combinations involving a newspaper could take two different forms.76
Similarly, combinations involving multiple radio stations could be created
out of different combinations of the existing radio groups. For example, the
73. See Order, supra note 2, app. D.
74. See Order, supra note 2, app. C.
75. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. See also infra Table 3 (reproducing the FCC's
analysis of the Altoona media market).
76. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. See also infra Table 3.
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local radio rule allows a combination of up to five stations,77 and in
Altoona this result could be reached by combining three independent
stations with one two-station group, or an independent station with a four-
station group, and so on. Finally, combinations involving two television
stations could be formed by acquiring two independent stations, or one
two-station group.
To resolve these issues, this Article calculates results using several
different scenarios, taking the average of the results. So, for combinations
involving a newspaper, scenarios for each newspaper were calculated. For
combinations involving two television stations, scenarios were calculated
both for combining two independent stations and for one two-station group.
Hence, for the combination involving a newspaper and two television
stations, four scenarios were calculated, as a result of compounding both of
these rules.
For the radio combinations involving five stations, scenarios for a 1-
1-1-2 combination and 1-4 combination were calculated. For radio
combinations involving three stations, scenarios for a 1-1-1 combination
and a single three-station group were calculated. Again, when combined
with the newspaper rule, this rule resulted in four possible scenarios.78
As noted above, this Article also uses combinations involving three
stations when calculating the scenario involving acquisition of half of the
radio stations allowed by the local rule. Half of the five stations allowed by
the local rules would have been 2.5 stations, and it is unclear whether the
FCC intended to round up or down in such circumstances. However, as it
turned out, the Altoona market failed to mirror the results of the FCC's
chart when only two stations were used. Since, as discussed below, using
three stations did bring Altoona into alignment with the chart results, that
interpretation was adopted for the sake of this test case.
The result of applying these rules to the Altoona market is shown in
Table 4. As noted by the Third Circuit with respect to the overall chart, a
combination of a newspaper, television station, and half of the allowed
radio stations, three in this test case, led to a greater average increase in the
77. Because Altoona has fourteen radio stations, the local radio ownership rule provides
that a single party can own up to five stations. 373 F.3d at 387 n.9 (citing
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. at 110 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)).
78. As an aside, this Article did not calculate results for two combinations on the FCC
chart: the newspaper, radio, and two television station combination, and the two television
station combination. The first combination was uncontroversially prohibited, and calculating
the results after applying the above rules would have required eight scenarios. The second
combination was uncontroversially allowed and mathematically uninteresting. See generally
id. at 411 (reviewing the FCC's chart).
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Diversity Index (386) than a combination of a newspaper and two
television stations (356). Similarly, the former combination led to a
considerably higher average increase than any of the other allowed
combinations: a television station and five radio stations (142), a
newspaper and five radio stations (297), or a newspaper and one television
station (162). As a result, the Altoona market seems to present a specific
case of the general problem identified by the Third Circuit, at least when
the FCC's combination scenarios are interpreted as above.
B. Applying the Noam and Hill Indices
Having confirmed that Altoona is a suitable test case, this Subpart
applies the NI and HI to the Altoona market. The results of applying the NI
and HI are also summarized in Table 4.
The NI starts with a base of 240-the HHI score of 960 divided by
the square root of the number of voices. Since there are 16 voices in
Altoona the base-case denominator in the NI is 4.79 The average change in
the NI for each combination is represented as a positive number, indicating
a loss of diversity. The HI starts with a base of 37.73.80 As noted above, the
average change in the HI for each combination is negative, also
representing a loss of diversity.
One obvious question is whether either the NI or the HI could shield
the FCC from the Third Circuit's conclusion that the FCC engaged in
inconsistent line-drawing. The answer is no. Both alternative indices led to
the same result: a combination of one newspaper, one television station,
and three radio stations averaged higher than a combination of one
newspaper and two television stations, and substantially higher than any
other allowed combination.
With the details of the Altoona market before us, it is now obvious
why this result occurs. The three additional radio stations have
approximately the same total weighted share (5.4) as the one additional
television station (5.6).81 Accordingly, a combination of a newspaper,
television station, and three radio stations will result in a media group with
approximately the same weighted share as a combination of a newspaper
79. Note that the Internet is represented by two voices: cable and "other." Although this
approach accords with the general methodology of the FCC, and although commentary on
that methodology is outside the scope of this Article, it is once again worth noting that this
analysis is controversial at best. See generally Epstein, supra note 66.
80. See infra Table 5 (breaking down the Altoona market as analyzed by the HI).
81. The numbers underlying these calculations are found in Table 5. A single radio
station has a weighted share of 1.779. Thus, three radio stations would have a weighted
share of 5.4 (after rounding). As Table 5 also indicates, a single independent television
station has a weighted share of 5.633, or 5.6 after rounding.
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and two television stations. However, the former combination will, on
average, eliminate more independent outlets than the latter. For that reason,
by any of these measures, the former will lead to a greater net loss of
diversity.
The NI only underscores this effect by giving greater weight to the
greater loss of voices caused by the radio combination. The HI leads to the
same result because the positive benefits of creating a combination with a
greater weighted share are approximately equal in each case, allowing the
loss of additional voices to dominate. All three indices support the Third
Circuit's holding that the FCC had drawn an inconsistent line by allowing
this particular combination.
The various indices do, however, disagree on other issues. According
to the Diversity Index, the next-worst combination is the combination of a
newspaper and two television stations, a combination the FCC sought to
prevent. In contrast, the next-worst combination for both the NI and HI is
the combination of a newspaper and all the radio stations allowed by the
local rule. As it was designed to do, the NI picked out a scenario which led
to a significant reduction in the number of voices. The HI reached the same
result for a slightly different reason: the radio stations each added relatively
little to the voice of the newspaper, so the marginal increase in the voice of
the combination was heavily outweighed by the loss of the independent
voices.82 The NI and HI both indicate that the FCC should also reconsider
allowing this combination but prohibiting a combination of newspaper and
two television stations.83
So far in this discussion, both the NI and HI have lived up to their
intended purposes. At the next stage, however, the NI arguably breaks
down. After the newspaper and full radio combination, the next-worst
combination for the HI is the television station and full radio combination.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the next-worst combination for the NI is
not that combination, but rather the newspaper and two television station
combination-even though the combination picked out by the HI results in
the loss of more voices.84
82. For example, the combined daily newspaper and radio group contributed 5.398
points to the HI score. Separately, the components of this group had been contributing either
10.388 points (1-1-1-2 scenario) or 8.501 points (1-4 scenario). Similarly, the combined
weekly newspaper and radio group contributed 4.177 points to the HI score. Separately, the
components had been contributing either 8.813 or 6.926. See infra Table 5.
83. Of course, the FCC could address this problem in several different ways:
disallowing both combinations; allowing both combinations; or, inverting its prior rule by
allowing combinations of a newspaper and two television stations, but disallowing
combinations of a newspaper and all the radio stations allowed under the local radio rule.
84. It may be worth recalling that Professor Noam had provided an example of media
pluralism based on increasing the number of radio stations. See Noam, supra note 57.
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This occurs because the HHI, as indicated by the Diversity Index,
increases more rapidly in response to the combination of one big player (a
newspaper) and two medium players (the television stations) than it does to
the combination of one medium player (the television station) and five
small players (the radio stations). In the NI, the numerator's rapid increase,
which is a consequence of the summing of the squares of combined market
shares, can outweigh the denominator's gradual decrease, which is a
consequence of taking the square root of the number of voices.
In the HI, by contrast, the fact that the combination resulting from a
television station and five radio stations is smaller than the combination
resulting from a newspaper and two radio stations actually counts against
the former. That is because the lower strength of the smaller combination's
voice is more easily outweighed by the loss of additional voices.85
In summary, like the Diversity Index, the NI violates Assumption (2)
by treating larger combinations as contributing less to diversity. As a result
of doing so, it arguably violates its own preference for a greater number of
voices: it treats increasingly large combinations as an increasing problem,
while treating a diminishing number of voices as a diminishing problem. In
contrast, as discussed above, the HI simultaneously satisfies both
Assumption (1) and Assumption (2). Moreover, the HI can actually put
greater practical weight on the loss of voices than can the NI. When an
increasing number of small voices are combined, the HI registers for each
additional voice a fixed loss of diversity and a decreasing marginal benefit
in terms of the "strength" of the combined voice. Consequently, the HI
both provides an internally consistent measure of media diversity and also
effectively fosters media pluralism.
V. CONCLUSION
As Professor Noam implied, a formulaic test for media diversity could
have the beneficial effect of constraining government regulators who
might, intentionally or unintentionally, abuse excessive discretion. In
Prometheus, the Third Circuit, somewhat surprisingly, did not defer to the
FCC's discretion with respect to the Cross-Media Limits, and that decision
was facilitated by the FCC's inconsistent use of a formulaic test, the
85. The combined television and radio group contributed only 3.811 points to the HI
score; whereas, individually the components had contributed 8.261 (1-1-1-2) or 6.374 (14).
In contrast, the newspaper and two television station groups contributed 5.614 (daily) and
4.452 (weekly), compared with a prior total of either 9.246 (daily plus 1-1) and 7.857 (daily
plus 2), or 7.671 (weekly plus 1-1) and 6.282 (weekly plus 2). In other words, according to
the HI, the diversity lost through combination was roughly equivalent in each of these cases,
but the strength of the resulting combination was lower for the television and radio group,
resulting in a greater net diversity loss for that combination. See infra Table 5.
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Diversity Index. But the court also implicitly undermined the entire
Diversity Index scheme because the Diversity Index fails to coherently
reflect the assumptions of the court, and indeed the FCC itself, with respect
to diversity in media markets.
Placing this discussion in a broader context, Professor Noam
suggested important considerations of pluralism that also militate in favor
of adopting an alternative to the Diversity Index. Although Professor Noam
suggested his own index, the Altoona test case indicates that the HI not
only reconciles the assumptions of the Third Circuit and the FCC, unlike
the NI, but also surpasses the NI itself with respect to protecting media
pluralism.
However, determining the most appropriate index of media diversity
is only the first step in a broader project. With a proper understanding of
the facts of media markets, applying an appropriate index may do more
than simply sort the possible regulations with respect to something like
cross-media ownership. Rather, applying such an index may suggest that in
light of modem media markets, no such regulations are warranted. The first
step in making such an argument, however, is to find a rule which can
reasonably and effectively be used to bind the regulators.
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TABLE 1
SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF DIVERSITY INDEX, NOAM INDEX, AND
HILL INDEX, WITH SAMPLE CALCULATIONS
Diversity Index Noam Index Hill Index




1 x 100 10= 10000 10000/41 = 10000 4100 = 10
lox 10 10 x (102) = 1000 1000/410 = 316 10 x 4 10 = 31.6
50,10, 8 x 5 502 + 10'+ 8 x (52 ) 2800/410 = 885 4 50 + 4 10 + 8 x
= 2800 45 = 28.1
8 x 12.5 8 x (12.52) = 1250 1250/48 = 442 8 x 412.5 = 28.3
Source: The figures are derived from sample calculations. The entries
in the grid apply the formula in the first (boxed) row to the numbers in the
first column.
Note: For Diversity and Noam Indices, higher scores represent less
diversity. For the Hill Index, higher scores represent more diversity. Note
that the numerator for the Noam Index is always equal to the Diversity
Index score.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] MEASURING MEDIA MARKET DIVERSITY
TABLE 2
REPRODUCTION OF THE FCC CHART SUMMARIZING
AVERAGE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY INDEX GIVEN VARIOUS
HYPOTHETICAL CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS
Base Case Average Change in Diversity Index, Resulting from Mergers
TV Average 100% Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper 2 TV Newspaper + Newspaper
stations in Diversity Radio + 1 + 100% + 1 TV +1 TV stations 2 TV stations +100%
market Index score TV station Radio station station + Radio+2 TV
50% Radio stations
1 1701 651 271 910 1321 1
2 1316 301 335 731 1009
3 1027 390 242 331 515
4 928 138 236 242 408
5 911 111 263 223 393 91 376 846
6 889 79 239 200 340 63 357 688
7 753 73 171 121 247 47 242 533
8 885 79 299 152 314 36 308 734
9 705 64 198 86 207 28 172 473
10 635 56 107 51 119 23 101 292
15 595 43 149 48 145 10 97 302
20 612 49 222 40 128 6 80 350
Source: Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 409-10 (citing Order, supra note 2,
app. D).
Note: Shaded areas indicate combinations prohibited by the FCC's
proposed rules. Dark boxes indicate areas of contention where the Third
Circuit found that the FCC had drawn an inconsistent line.
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TABLE 3
REPRODUCTION OF FCC's CHART ANALYZING THE ALTOONA, PA
MEDIA MARKET.
Media Market Ownership Shares Percentage Share of Media
Market
% of % of Parent Company # of % %Share Cross Col. F
Media Medium -Stations Share (AxBxE) Ownership Squared
A B C -.. G H
- -
Broadcast Clear Channel 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Television 100.0% Communications
33.8% Cornerstone TV, 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Inc.
Cox Broadcasting 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
Peak Media LLC 2 33.3 11.3 126.9
Penn State 1 16.7 5.6 31.7
University_
Allegheny 3 21.4 5.3 28.5
Radio Mountain Network
24.9% Altoona Trans 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Audio Corp Inc
B&F Enterprises 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Forever 4 28.6 7.1 50.6
Broadcasting
Incorporated
Martinsburg 2 14.3 3.6 12.7
Broadcasting
Sounds Good 1 7.1 1.8 3.2
Incorporated
Vital Licenses 2 14.3 3.6 12.7
Daily Altoona Mirror 1 100.0 20.2 409.9
Newspaper 70.3%
28.8% Weekly Weekly Newspaper 1 100.0 8.6 73.2
29.7%
Cable Cable 1 100.0 2.3 5.2
Internet 18.3% 1 1 1
12.5% Other Dial-up, DSL, and 1 100.0 10.2 104.3
181.7% other
Cross-Ownership None
Diversity Index (Sum of Column H) 960
Source: Order, supra note 2, app. C.
[Vol. 58
Number 1] MEASURING MEDIA MARKET DIVERSITY
TABLE 4
AVERAGE CHANGE IN INDICIES RESULTING FROM HYPOTHETICAL
CONSOLIDATION SCENARIOS IN THE ALTOONA MEDIA MARKET
Index Base 100% 100% Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper
Case Radio Radio plus plus I TV plus 1 TV plus 2 TV
plus 1 TV Newspaper station station stations
Station plus 50%
Radio
Diversity 960 142 297 162 386 356
Noan 240 66 110 50 134 106
Hill 1 37.73 1 (3.51) 1(3.87) 1(1.66) 1(4.24) (2.73)
Source: Order, supra note 2, app. C. The basic methodology for
applying each index is explained throughout this Article.
Note: Again, increases in the Diversity and Noam Indices represent a
loss of diversity, as do decreases in the Hill Index.
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TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF ALTOONA MEDIA MARKET USING HILL INDEX
Media Weights Ownership Shares HI Analysis
% of % of Parent Company # of % Share Weighted Square Root
Media Medium Outlets Medium Share of Weighted
Share
Clear Channel 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Television Broadcast Communications
33.8% 100% Cornerstone TV, Inc. 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Cox Broadcasting 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Peak Media LLC 2 33.33 11.267 3.357
Penn State University 1 16.67 5.633 2.373
Allegheny Mountain 3 21.43 5.336 2.310
Radio Network
24.9% Altoona Trans Audio 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Corp Inc
B&F Enterprises 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Forever Broadcasting 4 28.57 7.114 2.667
Martinsburg 2 14.29 3.557 1.886
Broadcasting
Incorporated
Sounds Good 1 7.14 1.779 1.334
Incorporated
Vital Licenses 2 14.29 3.557 1.886
Newspaper Daily Altoona Mirror 1 100 20.246 4.500
28.8% 70.3%
Weekly Weekly (no name in 1 100 8.554 2.925
29.7% data)
Internet Cable Cable (no name in 1 100 2.288 1.512
12.5% 18.3% data)
Other Dial-up, DSL, and 1 100 10.213 3.196
81.7% other (no names in
data)
Hill Index (sum of square roots of weighted ownership shares) 37.733
Source: The first four columns are taken from the FCC's chart for
Altoona. See Order, supra note 2, app. C. The fifth column is calculated by
dividing the number of outlets for the parent company in the fourth column
by the total number of outlets in that media type. These figures are identical
to those found in the FCC's chart, except that they are taken to an
additional significant digit. The sixth column multiplies the media weights
in the first two columns with the share in the fifth column. These figures,
too, are identical to those found in the FCC's chart, except they are taken to
two additional significant digits. Finally, the last column is the square root
of the sixth column.
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Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the recording or publication of
jury deliberations. As with any other judicial function in our democratic
society, the public relies on the work and product of the jury to ensure that
justice is done. Unlike any other governmental deliberative process, jury
deliberations receive unparalleled protection from the glare of the public
eye. An increasing mistrust of the jury has resulted from public displeasure
with the results in high profile cases. In addition, access to jurors and the
contents of the deliberative process is increasing through the prevalence of
postverdict interviews. When freely given, the First Amendment almost
insurmountably protects this post-verdict testimony.
Under a contemporary reading of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,1 faithful to one prong of that majority opinion,2 and in
*J.D. 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 1992, Bard College. I am
particularly grateful for the assistance of Professor Fred Cate, who was invaluable as a critic
of this Comment. I wish also to acknowledge the support of the staff of the Federal
Communications Law Journal.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. The most substantive explication of this "logic" or "structural" prong came from
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers. Justice Brennan wrote:
[Tjhe First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and
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consideration of the current "treatment" of jury anonymity,3 a limited right
of access should attach to jury deliberations after the end of trial. This right
of access should be subject to limitations designed to protect both
defendants' fair trial rights and juror privacy and safety.4
Discretion whether to permit access to deliberations would thus
inhere in much the same way it does in the context of media access to
communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. Implicit in this
structural role is not only 'the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' but also the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate--as well as other civic behavior--must be informed. The
structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication
necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for
communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication.
Id. 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is arguable that
the Court moved closer toward this single-pronged focus in Globe Newspapers Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982) ("Whether the First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such
as a murder trial (the setting for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial,
depends not on the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state
interests assertedly supporting the restriction.") (emphasis added). See also Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court (Press Enter If), 478 U.S. 1, 21 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
historical evidence proffered in this case is far less probative than the evidence adduced in
prior cases granting public access to criminal proceedings."); El Vocero de Puerto Rico v.
Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (holding that despite no history of openness, access
attached). For an exhaustive survey of Justice Brennan's contribution, and how it extended
from the First Amendment scholarship of Alexander Meiklejohn, see generally Eugene
Cerutti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New
Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 269 (1995):
In most respects, [the two-prong test] fails to justify the extraordinary extension of
the right of access to proceedings and documents with no real history of access
and no real utility to the governing process. Many [lower] courts have in fact quite
explicitly forsaken the two-prong standard while at the same time extending the
right.
(citations omitted); cf. Clifford Holt Ruprecht, Are Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting
the Cloak of Jury Secrecy, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 237-41 (1997).
3. The historical model of access-"experience"-fails to address modem advances in
media culture. Increased access suggests that more and not less information should be
available; the reasons for limiting access to jury deliberations are no longer held sacrosanct
either by the courts or by the public at large. If the reasons are no longer persuasive, then the
question of access to jury deliberations needs to be recast to address that reality. See
generally Cerutti, supra note 2 (arguing that the right of access needs to be restructured in
the interests of doctrinal integrity to account for vast expansions and address claims for
more openness in government).
4. Nothing in this proposal implicates the rules prohibiting impeachment of jury
verdicts as a legal or judicial matter, nor violates historical concern for jury privacy in the
deliberative process. If necessary, juror privacy may still be maintained through the use of
various technical or legal devices. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 488 U.S. at 580-81, and
its progeny; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (considering
restrictions on access when prejudice or disadvantage might otherwise follow).
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judicial proceedings generally.5 This approach would serve as a basis for
demystifying the jury process while educating the public and increasing its
confidence in the jury system. Furthermore, a right of access to jury
deliberations might lessen the incentive for publicity-hungry media to
harass and intimidate individual jurors. Finally, and over time, the
publication of jury deliberations, and the accompanying scrutiny by the
public, scholars, and bar, might produce better juries, resulting from a
broad and informed solemnity for the jury process.6
This Comment argues that transcripts of jury deliberations, subject to
the same balancing exercised by judges in the context of access to judicial
proceedings, should be routinely accessible after trial. These transcripts
could preserve juror anonymity through the use of codes or numbers to
distinguish, but not personally identify, individual jurors. Further, and
subject to the consent of the defendant and the jury, audio and visual
records of jury deliberations should be permitted, subject to judicial
discretion similar to that exercised in the context of televisions in the
courtrooms.7 Additional mechanisms are proposed to mitigate concerns that
these recordings would skew the composition of the jury. At no point does
this Comment argue that transcripts or audiovisual records should be
subject to judicial review, form the basis for appellate litigation, or disturb
the common law and statutory prohibitions on the impeachment of jury
5. A limited right of access in this context
may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that [post-trial]
closure [of that record] is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated long with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered.
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enter 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). In the context
of access to the transcript of jury deliberations, a general and unarticulated reference to
"jury privacy" would not alone suffice to justify presumptive closure of the jury record.
6. See generally Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-
Verdict Interviews of Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REv. 465, 498-501 (1997) (suggesting that access
might increase accountability and cause juries to take their work more seriously); Kenneth
B. Nunn, When Juries Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury's Representative Function in
Highly Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405, 434 (1995) (arguing in the context
of the "Jury's New Representative Function," that "[tihe more public the workings of a jury
are, the more likely the community will be to fulfill its role as an arbiter of disputes and
accept jury conclusions."). But see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. The right of access does not attach to recording devices in courtrooms-required
access involves merely allowing media to be present during trial proceedings and to inspect
court documents related to those proceedings. See Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 610 (1978), where the Court stated:
Nor does the Sixth Amendment require that the trial--or any part of it-be
broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied
by the opportunity of members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to
report what they have observed.
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verdicts.8
Part I of the Comment explores the constitutional provisions relevant
to access to jury deliberations. Part II outlines the common law traditions
regarding access to jury deliberations, specifically impeachment of jury
verdicts and the protection of jury privacy. Part II explores the dangers
associated with access to jury deliberations, concluding that such concerns
are ultimately unpersuasive in the postverdict setting, and in light of
already existing practices that compromise the privacy of the jury. In either
case, the concern for jury privacy should otherwise be subordinated to the
public benefits from a limited right of access. Part IV suggests a framework
for limited access to jury deliberations that satisfies most of the historical
concerns for jury privacy and concludes with an argument that limited
access to jury deliberations might result in an increased and informed
solemnity for the function of the jury. A Postscript addresses the particular
case of audiovisual recording devices in the jury room.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND ACCESS TO JURY DELIBERATIONS
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the recording of jury
deliberations. 9 Nevertheless, any positive theory of access to jury
deliberations must be grounded in that text in order to mitigate the ongoing
and inevitable legislative attempts to bar such access.10 Additionally, such a
8. This position contrasts with other arguments for access posed previously, which
suggest that judicial, preverdict inquiry should be encouraged and permitted in order to
ensure that juries are performing their duties consistent with their commitments. See, e.g.,
Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495,
1502 (2001) (arguing for a balance between "jury secrecy" and "judicial inquiry" in the
preverdict context, which errs toward more inquiry in order to permit impartial inquiry into
ongoing jury deliberations). But see United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 623 (2d Cir.
1997):
[W]e are compelled to err in favor of the lesser of two evils-protecting the
secrecy of jury deliberations at the expense of possibly allowing irresponsible
juror activity. Achieving a more perfect system for monitoring the conduct of
jurors in the intense environment of a jury deliberation room entails an
unacceptable breach of the secrecy that is essential to the work of juries in the
American system of justice. To open the door to the deliberation room any more
widely and provide opportunities for broad-ranging judicial inquisitions into the
thought processes of jurors would, in our view, destroy the jury system itself.
Case law and conventional wisdom, which insist that juries follow instructions, would seem
to support a vision that the integrity of the jury is challenged more by preverdict judicial
inquiry than by postverdict public access; particularly upon the assumption that finality of
the verdict cannot be challenged. In any event, the competing interests at stake in the
preverdict and postverdict settings are sufficiently distinct as to preclude analogy.
9. The realities of the modem context advise that the trend of the federal-if not
state-courts is away from access in the context of judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, the
absence of constitutional text bearing on the question of restricting access-versus
affirmative access, however limited-is evidence that the question remains open and vital.
10. TX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 36.215 and 36.22 (Vernon 1981) (prohibiting
[Vol. 58
ACCESS TO JURY DELIBERATIONS
theory of access must account for constitutional provisions, which, in the
context of access to jury deliberations, might be used to affirmatively bar or
severely limit such access. Once a limited right of access attaches, similar
findings and devices, balanced against the right of access in order to justify
closure of courtroom proceedings,"' can be implemented to mitigate any
constitutional privacy or fair-trial implications that arise in the context of
access to jury deliberations.
A qualified right of access attaches to judicial proceedings through
the First and Sixth Amendments. The Court in Richmond Newspapers
found that "the right to attend... trials is implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials,. . . important




The Court also found that in the absence of identifiable prejudice to the
defendant this right of access trumped the defendant's right to a fair trial as
protected by the Sixth Amendment.' 3 Further, the defendant's right to a
public trial did not include the negative right to a private trial. 14 Finally, the
Court recognized that in the modem era, the public receives most of their
information from the media, which acts as a proxy for the public.'
5
In order to determine whether a right of access attached to judicial
proceedings, the Court looked to both logic, the "community therapeutic
value" of openness, and experience-whether the trial proceedings in
question had historically been opened to the public. 16 However, implicit in
the Court's opinion are two concerns: (1) the media increasingly functions
any recording of jury deliberations, and provides that "[n]o person shall be permitted to be
with a jury while it is deliberating"). See also Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (codifying the
impeachment doctrine).
11. When "a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches ... the proceedings
cannot be closed unless specific, on-the-record findings are made demonstrating that
'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."' Press Enter 11, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Press Enter 1, 464 U.S. at 510). In
Richmond Newspapers, the Court asserted that lower courts must: (1) make specific and on-
the-record findings; (2) investigate less restrictive alternatives to closure; and, (3) identify
the constitutional right of access and balance the findings against that right. 488 U.S. at
580-81 ("[T]he trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to
whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; there was no
recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the trial.").
12. 448 U.S. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). The Court
found that this guarantee encompassed each of the specific rights to speech, press and
assembly. Id. at 575-78.
13. Id. at 580-81.
14. Id. at 580.
15. Id. at 577 n.12; see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609 ("Since the press serves as the
information-gathering agent of the public, it [can] not be prevented from reporting what it
ha[s] learned and what the public [ius entitled to know."). But see Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-835 (1974).
16. 448 U.S. at 570.
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as a proxy for the public and as a check on and observer of government,
specifically judicial proceedings; and (2) because of the nature of modem
society, where individuals have neither the time nor the proximity to
courthouses in order to participate, a more fundamental right of access was
needed in order to accommodate and facilitate scrutiny of judicial
proceedings.
In this way, Richmond Newspapers seems to assert that, in
consideration of the public's alienation from the trial experience, a right of
access must now attach as an indispensable element of an "informed"
democracy, necessary to the "enjoyment of [those constitutional] rights
explicitly defined." 17 Viewed in the context of subsequent case law,
18
focusing more specifically on the logic prong, Richmond Newspapers can
be viewed as a fundamental decision that unlocked the door and grounded
the right of access as an indispensable element of modem democracy, a
"categorical assurance of the.., freedom of access to information" in the
judicial setting.' 9 And the parameters of this right of access must shift with
other developments in modern life. Indeed, just as technology will open
new and less intrusive avenues to access, the Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized that the doctrine of access will similarly accompany such
changes.2° In this sense, the right of access will come to play "a structural
role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of self-
government.",2' And this right of access, to gather information, will not be
17. Id. at 580.
18. See, e.g., Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (right of
access attaches to testimony of rape-victim minors, even though historically closed); Press
Enter I1, 478 U.S. at 9 (right of access attaches to preliminary proceedings in California,
even though historically closed); In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) (resolving
persistent claims to secrecy within the appellate process); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d
354, 363 (5th Cir.1983) ("[T]he lack of an historic tradition ... does not bar ... a right of
access."). See also Cerutti, supra note 2, at 280 (highlighting the structural prong of
Richmond Newspapers and asserting that this prong has been "significantly extended by the
lower courts").
19. 448 U.S. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring). The primacy of this structural analysis is
evident in the majority's citation to Jeremy Bentham:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all
other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions
might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate
rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
Id. at 569 (quoting I J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)).
20. "When the advances in these arts permit reporting ... by television without [its]
present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965). See also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (overruling Estes in everything
but name).
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Indeed, the majority was explicit in this regard:
Looking back, we see that when the ancient "town meeting" form of trial became
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subordinated to the rights or interests of the parties or of the courts except
on particularized findings that prejudice will inhere.
Constitutional provisions that might insulate or bear on the roles of
jurors and jury are not sufficient to trump the right of access to gather
information. A constitutional right of privacy does not attach to the
deliberations of the jury, nor does such a right attach for the individual.
Indeed, absent articulable findings as to possible danger to jury safety, juror
identity is part of the public record generated during trial proceedings.22
Such concerns for privacy are generally satisfied through enforcement of
common law protections of jury secrecy. Alternately, the First Amendment
affords almost complete protection for postverdict speech by individual
jurors.23 Indeed, the increase and profile of postverdict interviews in the
media today is some evidence both that juror secrecy is no longer
sacrosanct in our culture and that limited access to jury deliberations is
both desirable and necessary to an informed democracy, albeit one where
the distinction between entertainment and news has been significantly
eroded.24
Finally, any right of access to jury deliberations, as protected by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, might impair the defendant's right to a fair
trial-specifically as fairness is implicated by jury privacy in deliberations.
As Justice Cardozo opined, "For the origin of the privilege we are referred
to ancient usage, and for its defense to public policy. Freedom of debate
too cumbersome, 12 members of the community were delegated to act as its
surrogates, but the community did not surrender its right to observe the conduct of
trials. The people retained a "right of visitation" which enabled them to satisfy
themselves that justice was in fact being done. People in an open society do not
demand infallibilityfrom their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted in the
open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in general
and its workings in a particular case ....
Id. at 572. Cf. Cerutti, supra note 2.
22. In re Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 76 (4th Cir. 1988) the court stated:
We recognize the difficulties which may exist in highly publicized trials such as
the case being tried here and the pressures upon jurors. But we think the risk of
loss of confidence of the public in the judicial process is too great to permit a
criminal defendant to be tried by a jury whose members may maintain anonymity.
If the district court thinks that the attendant dangers of a highly publicized trial are
too great, it may always sequester the jury; and change of venue is always
possible as a method of obviating pressure or prejudice.
See also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (realistic threats to juror
safety or jury corruption were compelling reasons sufficient to warrant protection of juror
identity).
23. But see In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating in
dicta that jurors could be prohibited from disclosing individual votes of other jurors).
24. See Markovitz, supra note 8, at 1514 ("IT]he extensive postverdict disclosure of
jury deliberations makes it likely that jurors already enter deliberations with the
understanding that their discussion may become public at some point.") (emphasis added).
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might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made
to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
world."25The argument follows that, if jurors were aware in advance of the
verdict that their deliberations were to be disseminated to the public, their
ability to remain free of influence (neighbors, parties, media) and to
deliberate freely would be affected, possibly affecting defendant's right to a
fair trial. Given that the right to a fair trial is owned by a defendant, and
post-verdict release of jury transcripts might be said to impair that right, a
"knowing and intelligent" waiver by the defendant could cure this
concern.
26
Nevertheless, the suggestion that postverdict release of jury
deliberations might have more affect than media presence and reporting
during the trial and after the verdict is not persuasive.27 Indeed, arguments
against postverdict access to jury deliberations are purely speculative,28 and
sound ominously familiar to the "parade of horribles" hypothesized in the
wake of the early placement of televisions in courtrooms. 29 Empirical data
confirming that juries will be chilled by postverdict access to their
deliberations is neither available nor logically sustainable given both the
informal access already generated through interviews and the relative
ambivalence to televisions in the courtrooms.
Further, once the jury's work is complete, who "owns" the trial
proceedings and the jury verdict? If we are to take the right of access and
25. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
26. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Brady, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970); cf. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
27. A more thorough exploration of this issue will have to await publication of
empirical studies. For the purposes of this Comment, I argue that specific parameters for
postverdict release-juror anonymity, sufficient time lapse between verdict and release-
satisfy those concerns for privacy that might otherwise interfere or balance against a
constitutional right of access necessary for an informed democracy.
28. See Abraham Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 295, 307-08, 314 (1993) (arguing without support that "the
defendant's right to a fair trial-by a jury confident that its deliberations will remain
secret-is seriously threatened when jurors expect that they will have to face the media, or
that their fellow jurors will talk to the media." Further, the expectation of such access "will
affect how freely [the jurors] talk to each other; it will make them feel visible to the world
and accountable as individuals, not as a body."). In the words of the same author, "these are
the grossest of speculations." Id. at 313. Indeed, the parameters here proposed on access
might mitigate the inevitable effects already present from current forms of access-
dissemination of transcripts with anonymous identities may actually increase our
understanding of the jury as a "body," and not a rag-tag gathering of "individuals."
29. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 546, where the Court stated:
It is the awareness of the fact of telecasting that is felt by the juror throughout the
trial. We are self-conscious and uneasy when being televised. Human nature being
what it is, not only will the juror's eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind
will be preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.
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its intended use to foster and sustain an informed democracy, then "[a] trial
is a public event. What transpires in the court room [and in the jury room]
is public property. '30 By analogy, and recognizing the need for jury privacy
during deliberations, a right of access that attaches after the release of a
verdict, is consistent both with tradition and with the need to know what
attaches to any governmental or judicial process. Indeed, "[h]istory ha[s]
proven that secret tribunals [are] effective instruments of oppression.'
31
In the context of media access to judicial proceedings, resolution
depends upon a balance between speech, societal interest in the
proceedings, increasing public confidence in the judicial process, and a
defendant's right to a fair trial. While the defendant's right to a fair trial is
arguably implicated by postverdict access to jury deliberations, in the
absence of particularized findings and mindful of special parameters for
release of this information, such a right should be subordinated to the
postverdict right of access to jury deliberations.
II. THE JURY AND THE COMMON LAW
Critical to identifying a postverdict right of access to jury
deliberations while maintaining allegiance to the common law traditions of
jury secrecy is the unrecognized and central distinction between
contemporaneous access to jury deliberations and subsequent access to a
jury verdict, owned by the public as an expression and representation of our
system of justice. The model of access proposed here in no way subverts or
challenges the common law traditions of jury privacy that have thus far
served as an almost impenetrable barrier to disturbing the finality of the
verdict itself. Indeed, the structural model of access above identifies the
public as the political body to scrutinize the work of juries, and neither
allows for even limited judicial review of these transcripts for the purposes
of inquiring into jury deliberations, nor provides a means by which to
challenge those verdicts (either post-trial or on appeal).32
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) codified the long-standing common
law proposition that jurors may not impeach their own verdict.3 3 Rule
30. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
31. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
32. But see Ruprecht, supra note 2 (arguing that limited judicial review-not public
access-should flow as the appropriate "check" on jury deliberations). If any limited
judicial review should attach, the appropriate context would be the penalty phase of a death
penalty case, where the jury is asked to "weigh" aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in order to determine whether the defendant is death-eligible. The danger for misconduct or
extraneous influence in this context is extreme and might warrant inquiry sufficient to
determine whether the jury behaved irresponsibly.
33. See, e.g., 8 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2352, pp. 696-97 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (1904) (explaining that the rule originated from an opinion by Lord Mansfield in 1785
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606(b) provides that a juror may not testify on the subject of deliberations
to impeach the finality of the verdict, "except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 34 The most recent
interpretation of this doctrine came in Tanner v. United States,35 where the
Court refused to inquire into jury deliberations despite evidence that the
jurors had been doing drugs and drinking alcohol throughout the trial and
during deliberations. 36 Notwithstanding the reasonableness of this decision,
the Court's concern focused on "the finality of the process, 37 and the
safety of the verdict as it related to the continued vitality of the jury system
as a means to administer justice. The Court's concern with juror privacy
in this context represents a policy choice between "redressing the injury of
the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if
and "came to receive in the United States an adherence almost unquestioned.").
34. FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
35. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
36. In terms of evaluating whether a verdict should be scrutinized, the Court fashioned
from prior case law a sharp distinction between external and internal influences. See
generally Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1896) ("a juryman may testify to any
facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as
to how far that influence operated upon his mind.") (quoting Woodward v. Leavitt, 107
Mass. 453, 466 (1871)).
37. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
38. Id. ("There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would
in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper
juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts
to perfect it."). Similarly, the court in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir.
1997) stated:
The jury system incorporated in our Constitution by the Framers was not intended
to satisfy yearnings for perfect knowledge of how a verdict is reached, nor to
provide assurances to the public of the primacy of logic in human affairs. Nor was
it subordinated to a "right to know" found in the First Amendment. The jury as we
know it is supposed to reach its decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy;
objections to the secrecy of jury deliberations are nothing less than objections to
the jury system itself.
(emphasis in original). But see Tanner, 483 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
the opinion of the Court):
The Court acknowledges that "postverdict investigation into juror misconduct
would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after
irresponsible or improper jury behavior," but maintains that "[i]t is not at all clear
... that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it." Petitioners are not
asking for a perfect jury. They are seeking to determine whether the jury that
heard their case behaved in a manner consonant with the minimum requirements
of the Sixth Amendment. If we deny them this opportunity, the jury system may
survive, but the constitutional guarantee on which it is based will become
meaningless.
(citations omitted).
ACCESS TO JURY DELIBERATIONS
jurors were permitted to testify as to what happened in the jury room., 39
Concern for the ability of the jury to function in this context is
inextricably linked to judicial intervention (at trial or on appeal) and not
with public scrutiny of verdicts themselves, which will continue unabated
even without a postverdict right of access. 4° This concern for the finality of
verdicts is not compromised by postverdict public access to jury
deliberations-where scrutiny will not lead to trial challenges or post-trial
litigation. On the contrary, knowledge that a limited right of access
attaches-with the accompanying public scrutiny-might enhance both
jurors' seriousness and commitment to service as well as the public's
commitment to the central and solemn function of the jury in our system of
justice.
In addition to the common law doctrine restricting juror
impeachment, the courts have long recognized a freestanding commitment
to jury secrecy during the deliberative process. This tradition has been
incorporated in both statutes and judicial canons restricting the presence of
individuals (nonjurors or alternates) and recording devices in the jury
room.4' In addition, the commitment to jury secrecy is reflected in judicial
pronouncements founded upon broad policy concerns: (1) the need to
assure full and frank discussion in the jury room, 42 (2) to prevent
harassment of or retaliation against jurors from both losing parties and
39. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). The Court stated:
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry
in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.
Id. However, in Clark, the Court stated:
Assuming that there is a privilege which protects from impertinent exposure the
arguments and ballots of a juror while considering his verdict, we think the
privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently
begun or fraudulently continued. Other exceptions may have to be made in other
situations not brought before us now.
289 U.S. at 13-14.
40. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 124 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), which
asserted that "[j]urors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be
scrutinized in post-trial litigation.").
41., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) provides that alternate jurors are to be excused at the
commencement of deliberation. However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 737 (1993), held that deviation from this provision, and allowing jurors to sit in
the jury room without deliberating, did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. See
also McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268 (recognizing that while limiting access to the jury room
may "exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change in the rule would open the
door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with jurors. The practice would be replete
with dangerous consequences. It would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse and no verdict
would be safe.") (citations omitted).
42. Clark, 289 U.S. at 13.
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other aggrieved members of the public,43 and (3) to preserve the
community's trust in a system that relies on juries to mete out justice.44
Again, the concern that jury speech will be chilled flows from the
influence that a recording device or alternate presence might have had, and
not on the effect created by the knowledge of limited access (anonymously
configured) to jury deliberations. In this sense, "the primary if not
exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury's
deliberations from improper influence.A5 Whether postverdict
dissemination of a jury transcript (anonymously configured) will have
prejudicial impact is questionable; whether that concern is as weighty as
the public's right to know is doubtful. Furthermore, this calculus must also
include the likelihood that postverdict public scrutiny will actually improve
the content of jury deliberations through increased public knowledge and
respect for the jury process.
The concerns that individual jurors might be harassed are not distinct
or persuasive in this context. Indeed, "generalized social claims should not
bear upon a decision whether limitations should be placed upon the press's
ability to have post-trial access to jurors." 6 As to aggrieved parties, trial
courts have limited power to curtail the speech of judicial officers.47
Further, trial courts cannot silence requests to individual jurors for
postverdict interviews.48 Harassment from aggrieved members of the public
can be minimized through release of transcripts that do not identify jurors
by name. In particularly high profile or other special cases, and subject to
the balancing test for closure of judicial proceedings generally, the right of
access may be subordinated to absolute juror privacy. Given that juror
anonymity itself is only rarely upheld, such instances of closure will be
43. If privacy did not inhere, "U]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct."
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267.
44. See Part I, supra.
45. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737-38. In this sense the Court's scrutiny is focused on
"prejudicial impact." Id. at 738. Cf Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 124 (7th Cir.
1981) (because "the privacy of jury deliberations is so essential to the 'substance of the jury
trial guarantee[,]' .. . when strangers are permitted to intrude upon such privacy, an error of
constitutional dimension is committed.") (quoting Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138
(1979)).
46. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1363 (3rd Cir. 1994).
47. See generally Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ("[D]isciplinary rules
governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment.");
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (arguing that any prior restraint on
speech in the context of a criminal trial bears a "heavy burden" of justification).
48. See, e.g., Antar, 38 F.3d at 1363 (stating that the right of access attaches and "[t]he
court must articulate findings of the actual expectation of an unwarranted intrusion upon
juror deliberations or of a probability of harassment of jurors beyond what the jurors, rather
than what a particular judge, may deem to be acceptable.").
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similarly rare. Indeed, the fact that juror anonymity is so rarely imposed
and upheld is evidence both of the importance of the right of access, and
that arguments for juror privacy are unavailing-the system is not designed
to provide postverdict privacy. 49
The concern for the jurors' privacy has historically been confined to
the deliberative process. Access to information after that process is
complete implicates that concern for privacy only to the extent that this
postverdict access might influence the deliberative process. As noted
previously, because this concern is both unsubstantiated and highly
speculative, it should give way to the public's right to know. In other
words, society owns the verdict after it has been rendered. The verdict is a
proxy for justice, and the public has a right to know whether and how
justice was done in the individual case.
III. No DANGER: ABSOLUTE JURY PRIVACY IS A RELIC
The primary danger of a postverdict right of access to jury
deliberations is that the transcript might become a vehicle for disturbing
jury verdicts or appellate litigation. In this sense, right of access would
become a threat "to the jury system itself."50 This slippery slope argument
posits that any inquiry into jury deliberations will inevitably lead to judicial
review of those jury deliberations and destabilize the entire foundation of
the jury system. 5' Unarticulated, but implicit in this formulation, is that any
scrutiny of jury deliberations is likely to uncover widespread misconduct
and incompetence. Whether such fear is warranted is debatable, but the
49. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 2004) (attaching right of access to
voir dire proceedings; subjecting closure to strict scrutiny; publishing the transcript later is
irrelevant). This approach is consistent with an historical examination of juror privacy in the
context of early American society-where neighbors in relatively confined communities
were keenly aware of who was serving on the jury. See, e.g., David Weinstein, Protecting a
Juror's Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 30 (1997) ("Jurors in the early days of this republic were selected from within small
communities, and shielding their identity simply was not possible."); see also infra note 52
and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 619 (2nd Cir. 1997).
51. See generally Goldstein, supra, note 28, at 313-14 ("If we let the genie out of the
bottle, we probably will be unable to put it back again."). Goldstein goes on to suggest that
"[o]nce the inscrutability principle has gone, the time has come to set up another kind of
tribunal." Id. at 314 (quoting William R. Cornish, TIm JuRY 258 (1968)). See also Abraham
Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An Unnecessary and
Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 865, 881 (1996) ("[T]aped deliberations may indeed
reveal jury misconduct or discussion of extraneous factors, but they also open the door to a
stream of potential litigation .. "). But see Ruprecht, supra note 2 (arguing that limited
judicial review should follow from a right of access to jury deliberations, thus improving
our determination of error in the courtroom and the public confidence in the system
thereby).
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proposition that we should avoid excavation, because we are likely to dig
up evidence that calls into question our current method for administering
justice, is unsupportable as a matter of democratic principle. If the effect is
to undermine public confidence in the jury, that effect should be welcomed.
We might then begin to consider and institute a remedy for this erosion of
confidence, if such a remedy is not self-generating through the process of
transparency itself.
A reflexive citation to the ancient common law tradition of jury
secrecy is also an insufficient response. Any discussion of postverdict
access to jury deliberations must acknowledge both the changing nature of
privacy,52 the diffuseness of modem American society, as well as an
increasing alienation and mistrust of the jury process. In this sense, an
unexplored and rigid adherence to jury secrecy fails to even address
whether such access might, in fact, increase accountability and trust for our
judicial institutions.
The rationale for this historical preservation of juror secrecy is that
any contemporaneous access to jury deliberations might affect free debate
within the jury room, thus distorting the process and jeopardizing the fair
administration of justice. Of course, this blanket prohibition is completely
anathematic to our approach to accessing governmental, particularly
judicial, deliberations generally, where case by case scrutiny (adjudication)
is undertaken to determine whether those particular proceedings need to be
closed. Furthermore, there is only a "generalized social claim'' 53 of
prejudicial effect to justify frustrating access. This is an empty and untested
hypothesis on balance, and in the absence of empirical evidence, this claim
must be subordinated to the public right of access.
The final rationale for jury secrecy is that the release of jury
deliberation will compromise juror safety. As an initial matter, juror
anonymity is provided for only in cases where a real threat has been
identified.54 Furthermore, absent identifiable, special circumstances which
52. It also seems clear that the public enjoyed a level of access to juries at early
American common law unheard of to contemporary society. Jurors then were actually
neighbors, local figures, etc. who were well known to each other. Indeed, jury lists were
presumptively available-consistent with the relative size of those communities and the free
flow of information within those communities regarding judicial proceedings. See, e.g., In re
Baltimore Sun Co., 841 F.2d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1988) ("When the jury system grew up with
juries of the vicinage, everybody knew everybody on the jury . .
53. See Antar, 38 F.3d at 1363.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
empanelling of an anonymous jury for a Mexican mafia RICO case); United States v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's decision to empanel
anonymous jury and to prohibit media access to information after the verdict had been
rendered); United States v. 77 E. 3rd St., 849 F. Supp. 876, 878-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("History of violence" warranted empanelling anonymous jury in civil forfeiture case to
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would change the entire calculus, a postverdict right of access to
anonymously configured jury deliberations would, standing alone, appear
to be less likely to compromise juror safety than pretrial publication of
jurors' identities."
Again, nothing in this theory of access precludes the balancing test
already employed with regard to closure of trial proceedings or
empanelling of anonymous juries. Postverdict access to jury deliberations
would be presumed, but upon specific findings that such access
compromised juror safety or the right of the defendant to a fair trial, access
could be denied. As with the other dangers identified above, juror safety is
already implicated in the right of access to trial proceedings, and extending
that right of access to include postverdict release of transcripts of jury
deliberations (anonymously configured) does not inherently increase the
risks identified.
Current invasions into jury secrecy clearly subvert many of the claims
made by opponents of a postverdict right of access to jury deliberations. 6
Indeed, many proponents of jury secrecy have already identified these
intrusions as an irreparable affront to the common law tradition.57 As noted
above, the narrowly tailored limitations on anonymous juries are one
indication that our concern for juror privacy must be balanced against a
right of access. In addition, the incidence of postverdict interviews already
provides an opportunity to scrutinize the content of jury deliberations.
Furthermore, if a record existed and was publicly available, the media
would have less incentive to interview or harass jurors, and the financial
incentive for jurors to engage in postverdict interviews would be mooted. 58
protect jurors from retaliation by Hell's Angels). These cases make clear that empanelling
anonymous juries is contingent on identifiable risk to juror safety-based on threats,
conduct of the defendant, or history of intimidation.
55. That the media will pore over these transcripts and be able to identify and
distinguish individual jurors would be nothing new-postverdict interviews with jurors
already facilitate such scrutiny. In addition, this concern is only present in high-profile cases
where special circumstances might weigh toward jury anonymity. More traditional media
and scholars seeking to demystify and understand the jury process will utilize transcripts
from lower profile cases. In this way, by force of repetition and scholarship, the jury process
will become both demystified and more mundane, but still accountable, and less subject to
publicity. Indeed, the majority of the records that would be synthesized and reported on
have little else but scholarly, judicial, and historical value.
56. Not taken up here, but also relevant to inroads into absolute jury secrecy, is the
increasing discretionary practice of allowing individual jurors to ask questions via the trial
court judge of the various witnesses. See, e.g., IND. JURY R. 20(7) (stating that jurors may
seek to ask questions of witnesses by submitting those questions in writing). See also State
v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio 2003) (on the propiety of juror questions); Commonwealth
v. Britto, 744 N.E.2d 1089 (Mass. 2001) (discussing the propriety of juror questions).
57. See generally Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 51; Goldstein, supra note 28.
58. 1 do not mean to suggest that a limited right of access would completely moot the
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Ultimately, the prevalence of postverdict interviews itself suggests: (1) a
weakening public concern for juror privacy, (2) a correlative increase in
public interest in jury deliberations, and (3) a need for access to jury
deliberations to increase public confidence in the institution and for the
"community therapeutic value" that flows from the gathering and
dissemination of information.
IV. PARAMETERS FOR A POSTVERDICT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
JURY DELIBERATIONS
Once the right of access attaches, parameters for release of a
transcript of jury deliberations can be tailored to address realistic concerns
for juror privacy. As an initial matter, postverdict release coupled with an
absolute prohibition against use of transcripts for litigation purposes 59
address most of the historical and policy concerns for juror secrecy.
Primarily, juror secrecy was intended for the actual process by which juries
reach their verdict.60 This concern is evident in common law doctrine
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their own verdict.61 Postverdict release
insures that juror safety, which is already implicated by the right of access
to jury lists, is not further compromised. Protestations that speech will
nevertheless be chilled are a general societal claim lacking an evidentiary
foundation. The implied postverdict right of access that inhered in early
American society62 casts further doubt on the legitimacy of this claim.63
Secondly, transcripts of jury deliberations can be configured without
identifying individual jurors by name, thus serving as an additional
safeguard against potential postverdict harassment or retaliation. This
parameter is also consistent with the Fifth Circuit's dictum that prohibiting
desire or hysteria concerning postverdict interviews with jurors, more that the form of such
access would mitigate and counterbalance the hysterical access characterized currently by
the sensationalism of postverdict interviews. Indeed, the prevalence of such interviews
reinforces the point made above: jury privacy is no longer sacrosanct. Further, and more
importantly, creating a limited right of access, while not stemming the hysteria, would offer
a countervailing and more solemn and academic approach to assessing jury performance.
This argument then flows back into my secondary thesis: that access in this format may
have the result of increasing respect for and understanding of the jury process.
59. Prohibiting the use of transcripts for posttrial litigation or verdict inquiry also works
to preserve the common law doctrine against the impeachment of jury verdicts. If an
absolute prohibition against such use of jury transcripts was instituted, no concern regarding
possible impeachment is availing.
60. See Goldstein, supra note 28, at 299-300 n.19 (discussing the critical "relationship
between secrecy and finality").
61. See, e.g., Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785) (opinion by Lord
Mansfield) (refusing to accept into evidence the affidavits of jurors to show they had arrived
at their verdict by lot); see Wigmore, supra, note 33.
62. See Weinstein, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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disclosure of "the ballots of individual jurors" is a "paramount value." 64
Again, the limited right of access should not be viewed as an extension or
further invasion of jury secrecy. These invasions already occur, albeit in a
less vital and more perverse way. In this sense, a postverdict right of access
to jury deliberations might actually enhance the public debate on the jury
process, providing a mechanism for informed and circumspect evaluation
of that process.
Finally, the parameters that would justify postverdict closure of the
jury transcript can be assessed on a case-by-case basis, subject to the same
balancing used to assess access to judicial proceedings generally. Arguably
the contexts in which such closure might be justified are more numerous
with regard to jury privacy; case law development can address these
circumstances. As elsewhere, "any privilege of access to governmental
information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the
information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. 65
The attachment of the right of access means that the values that inhere in
the structural model are observed-a respect for "th[ose] process[es] of
communication necessary for a democracy to survive..."66
Against the argument for absolute jury secrecy, with its attendant
fear-mongering and blind adherence to dated mantras, lies a conception of
access to jury deliberations as an "indispensable condition[] of meaningful
communication" about the American justice system.67 The increasing
incidence of sensationalistic postverdict interviews with jurors, themselves
uninformed and lacking meaning, has already unalterably pierced the veil
of juror secrecy. 68 What is needed is reasonable access to these
deliberations, not to perfect the jury system, but to generate and foster
informed debate and serious reflection on that deliberative body. Contrary
to opponents' speculations, a right of access to jury deliberations, in text
and anonymously configured, is more likely to lead, not down the slippery
slope, but to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ' 69 public dialogue
regarding the jury process and, finally, a renewed sense of public
commitment to the solemnity of jury duty.
64. In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Goldstein, supra
note 28, at 304.
65. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 588.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., William R. Bagley, Jr., Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock
the Door?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 481,500-01 (1999).
69. N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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V. POSTSCRIPT: CAMERAS IN THE JURY ROOM?
As with cameras in the courtroom, future developments in recording
jury deliberations for postverdict dissemination should proceed subject to
judicial discretion and the dual concerns for jury privacy and defendants'
right to a fair trial. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes v. Texas is
instructive: "[T]he day may come when television will have become so
commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate
all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the
judicial process. 7°
Indeed, "[t]he law [] favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as
that object can be attained without injustice to the persons immediately
concerned."'', In these developments, the lower and state courts should
serve as laboratories-as long as the state action does not infringe upon
constitutional guarantees, the states must be permitted to experiment.72
Similarly, the common law of judicial discretion should govern these
experiments. The trial judge, through grant of jurisdiction, is generally
charged with the maintenance of order within her own courtroom. In this
regard, the judge has both inherent power and broad discretion over control
of judicial proceedings. For example, a judge may authorize presence of
cameras in the courtroom over an objection by the defendant, unless the
defendant makes a showing that the presence of those cameras will be
prejudicial.73 Similar discretion, mindful of a tradition of jury secrecy,
would inhere in the discretion whether to record jury deliberations for
future dissemination.
The following parameters for audiovisual recording of jury
deliberations could mitigate the constitutional concern for defendants' fair-
trial rights as well as the common law tradition providing for juror secrecy.
First, defendants would need to waive objection to the recording,
70. 381 U.S. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also supra note 22 and accompanying
text. Cf Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575, where the Court stated:
The risk of juror prejudice is present in any publication of a trial, but the
appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to
demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case ... compromised the ability of
the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly.
71. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542. (citation omitted).
72. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id.
73. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 575.
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precluding them from using the fact or product of recorded deliberations as
a mechanism for challenging a verdict or for pursuing appeal.74 Second, a
jury would be empanelled without knowledge that their deliberations would
be filmed. This protocol would insure that the jury composition would not
be skewed toward only those willing to seek out publicity.75
After empanelling the jury, each juror would be asked to approve the
unobtrusive placement of cameras in order to record their deliberations. If a
single juror objected at this point, then no recording devices would be
permitted. Finally, and assuming unanimous agreement to audiovisual
recording, each juror would retain a postverdict veto on release of the
audiovisual record. Each of these safeguards works to confirm juror
autonomy in the deliberative process.
74. This provision is premised on the notion, inherent in the right of access generally,
that it is the defendant who owns the right to a fair trial. Estes, 381 U.S. at 588 ("[T]he right
of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused .... )
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also Gannet Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-388
(1979). While all parties have an interest in the fair administration of justice, only the
defendant's right should be able to trump the court's exercise of judicial discretion to permit
cameras in the jury room. But see State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. Crim
App. 2003) (prohibiting cameras in the jury room despite waiver by the defendant of use of
recording and agreement by all jurors to be taped).
75. Administrative Order, Docket No. SJC-228, 1996 Me. LEXIS 32 at *5 (Fed. 5,
1996) (Glassman & Ridnman, JJ., statement in nonconcurrence) ("Selection of only those
jurors who do not mind thinking out loud before millions of observers, or those who will
serve but in silence, by its nature will distort the jury's deliberative process.").
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The Continuing Role of State Policy
New Television, Old Politics: The Transition to Digital TV in the United
States and Britain, Heman Galperin, New York, N.Y., Cambridge
University Press, 2004, 311 pages.
Jeffrey A. Hart*
Hernan Galperin uses comparative case studies of the transition to
digital television in the United States and Britain to address a variety of
theoretical questions regarding the relative impact of political factors
versus markets and technological change on regulatory regimes. The book
is organized into four parts. The first part introduces the topic and provides
background on digital TV. The second and third parts focus on the digital
transitions in the United States and Britain, respectively. The fourth part
contains summaries and conclusions.
In Chapter One, Galperin argues that three factors were the impetus
for the transition to digital TV in both countries: the steady decline of the
domestic consumer electronics industry, "the international diffusion of the
information revolution agenda, and the spectrum shortage created by the
rapid growth of mobile telephony and other wireless telecommunications
services."' Nevertheless, the strategies chosen to make the transition and
the outcomes of these strategies differed markedly.
According to Galperin, three nation-specific factors produced
variance in strategies and outcomes across the two countries: the
organization of the state (cabinet-led parliamentary v. presidential
*Jeffrey Hart is a professor of political science at Indiana University-Bloomington. Over his
career, Professor Hart has focused his research on international politics, technology,
international competitiveness, and telecommunications. Recently he has written on
globalization, economics, and the politics of digital television.
1. HERNAN GALPERIN, NEW TELEVISION, OLD PoLITIcs: THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL
TV IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 15 (2004) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION].
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government), the normative orientation of media policy, and the legacy of
the analog TV regime.2
The British transition included greater efforts to foster competition in
broadcasting than the U.S., partly because Britain started its transition with
a lower level of competition. The dominance of the national public
broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC"), was an
important differentiating factor, but Galperin argues also that a major
impetus for British strategy was the threat posed by the rapid success of
pay TV services delivered via satellites controlled by Rupert Murdoch and
his allies.
Despite its dominance, however, the BBC did not always get its way.
Galperin attributes this to the British government's ability to resist capture
by either public or private interests, in sharp contrast to the American
system, which was the result of the centralization of power made possible
by cabinet government. Overall, the "American strategy ...privileged
continuity over reform." 3 The U.S. efforts at broadcasting reform were
stymied by private local broadcasters who successfully used the idea of
preserving "free TV" as their watchword throughout the long struggle.
Chapter Three does a good job of providing background about the
regulatory regime for analog TV in the United States. Galperin describes
the public interest standard for the licensing of stations by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") and the impact of new technologies
like VCRs and cable TV. There is nothing particularly new here, but it is a
good summary nonetheless.
Chapter Four summarizes the U.S. debate over high definition
television ("HDTV") in the 1980s and shows how it led to the idea to
pursue digital television ("DTV") in the mid 1990s. DTV included the
possibility of HDTV digital broadcasts among other ways of using the
spectrum allocated for DTV. The implicit deal with local broadcasters was
that they would be loaned an additional television channel to experiment
with digital services during the transition. They would have to return the
analog channels once the transition was completed.
In Chapter Four, Galperin also discusses the changing views of the
broadcasters as represented primarily by the National Association of
Broadcasters ("NAB") and their ongoing battles with the cable operators as
represented by the National Cable Television Association ("NCTA"). The
basic conflict between the two was over "must carry" rules.4 Earlier FCC
decisions and Supreme Court rulings had determined that cable operators
2. Id. at 23.
3. Id. at 18.
4. Id. at 66.
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could be required to carry the signals of local broadcasters. 5 This would
have to be renegotiated for digital TV, especially if local broadcasters
chose to use their digital channel for "multicasting"-broadcasting a
number of standard-resolution signals (somewhat like a mini-cable system).
The Author briefly discusses the rise and decline of the linkage
between the debates over HDTV and DTV and concerns over the decline in
U.S. economic competitiveness vis a vis Japan and Western Europe. He
also briefly discusses the arguments between the U.S. television and
computer industries over DTV standards and the ungainly compromise on
picture formats embedded in the FCC decisions of the mid 1990s.6 Both of
these topics are covered in greater detail in other works.7
Chapters Five and Six deal with the changes in the DTV bargain that
occurred after 1996 when the White House and key leaders in Congress
demanded a quick return of the analog channels so that a spectrum auction
could be used to reduce the budget deficit. The debate over the 1996
Telecommunications Act included a discussion of the DTV transition. The
local broadcasters successfully lobbied for new rules that would delay the
return of the analog channels. These rules required that 85 percent of
households be able to receive digital signals before the broadcasters would
be obliged to return their analog channels.8 That threshold has yet to be
reached.
Chapter Seven provides a description of the European context for the
British transition. The British case differs from that of the U.S. in that
Britain is embedded in a larger system of governance thanks to its
membership in the European Union, making this chapter absolutely
necessary. After quickly reviewing the reasons for the European rejection
of the Japanese proposal for HDTV standards in the mid 1980s, Galperin
turns to a discussion of the politics behind the Multiplexed Analog
Components ("MAC") systems that were supposed to replace the analog
color TV standards in Europe. He provides a summary of the European
debate over Open Network Provision ("ONP") standards that were
designed to apply not just to telecommunications networks but to all high-
bit-rate digital infrastructures, including digital broadcasting. The ONP
debate played a key role in the British transition strategy because key
political actors strongly embraced the ONP approach.
Chapter Eight provides a description of the regulatory regime for
5. Id. at 67.
6. Id. at 87.
7. See, e.g., JOEL BRINKLEY, DEFINING VISION: How BROADCASTERS LURED THE
GOVERNMENT INTO INCITING A REVOLUTION IN TELEVISION (1997); JEFFREY A. HART,
TECHNOLOGY, TELEVISION, AND COMPETITION: THE POLITICS OF DIGITAL TV (2004).
8. NEW TELEVSION, supra note 1, at 110.
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analog television in Britain. It contains a short history of the idea of "public
service broadcasting" that has played such an important role there. The
BBC was never particularly well liked by Conservatives, including
Winston Churchill, but it came under particularly heavy fire during the
Thatcher administration. Thatcher wanted, in particular, to change the
funding scheme for the BBC so that the BBC would lose its dominant
position. The Major administration did not agree with this idea, however,
so despite the addition of competitors to the BBC in the form of the
independent television companies and Murdoch's satellite-delivered pay
TV services, the BBC managed to remain the dominant force in British
broadcasting. Galperin argues that the Major administration, by separating
the transmission services of the BBC from its programming and
encouraging it to expand its commercial activities, made it both necessary
and possible for the BBC to engage in a successful form of public
entrepreneurialism during the digital transition.
Chapters Nine and Ten detail the rather baroque maneuvers that
occurred once the British government decided to get serious about the
digital transition. These all concerned Digital Terrestrial Television
("DTT") since all earlier attempts in Britain other than Murdoch's to enter
the digital satellite television market had failed spectacularly and cable
television had been unable to compete successfully with analog terrestrial
TV or satellite pay TV.
The key players on the government side, besides the BBC, were the
Independent Television Commission ("ITC"), the Department of Trade and
Industry ("DTI"), and the Office of Telecommunications ("OFTEL"). The
ITC was primarily responsible for decisions about licensing and a few other
regulatory duties mandated by Parliament under a series of
telecommunications acts. The DTI was concerned primarily with
encouraging the building of high-speed digital networks and creating a
more favorable environment for digital technology more generally, while
the OFTEL attempted to "nurture ... competition and prevent dominant
firms from leveraging market power across the supply chain." 9
Competition among these agencies played an important role in the British
digital transition.
Chapter Ten, which is entitled "Murdoch Phobia," explains the
outcomes of the various bids for DTIT licenses on the part of various
consortia, but more importantly why the competition for licenses was
structured as it was. Murdoch's attempts to compete in the DTI sphere
were mostly frustrated by government elites intent on fostering a British
competitor to his satellite-delivered pay TV services.
9. Id. at 192.
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Chapter Eleven takes up the story of DTT licenses after the election
of a Labour government under the leadership of Tony Blair. There was
considerable continuity in policy from Major to Blair because of the two
administrations' shared belief in the need for greater competition in
broadcasting while preserving the public service tradition. The BBC was
disappointed that the new administration did not go along with its request
for major user fee increases. When the independent television companies'
digital TV service failed in 2002, there was no government bailout, and a
new consortium was permitted to take its place that combined the resources
of the BBC and Murdoch's BSkyB. (So, no need to feel sorry for Rupert
Murdoch.) Britain emerged in the end with two major digital broadcasters:
the BBC and Murdoch. Was this "industrial policy through other means"?' °
Galperin's comparative case studies show the enormous pressures
exerted on both governments to revise their regulatory regimes. He argues
that the British digital transition went more smoothly, despite its various
glitches, than the American one. In Chapters Twelve and Thirteen, he
suggests that cabinet-led parliamentary government in Britain, as compared
with presidential government in the United States, made it possible for the
British government to act against the organized interests of the
broadcasting industry to establish a regulatory regime that recognized the
regulatory impact of "digital convergence"--that is, the need for greater
consistency of regulation of telephone networks, computer networks, and
broadcasting, as high-bit-rate digital transmission technologies permitted
high-quality audio and video to be carried over a variety of transmission
media.
The Author argues that inter-industry coordination problems were
important in both countries and that the transition was strongly influenced
by state policy as a result. In Britain, "[inter-industry] coordination
problems were minimized by past policy changes favoring industry
consolidation, national ... stations, and vertical integration in the pay-TV
market."" In the United States, in contrast, the "organization of the state ...
stands in sharp contrast to that of Britain. In a few words, it militates
against regime change and policy innovations .... Fragmentation of policy
authority favors fragmentation of interest representation."' 2 In the United
States, inter-industry coordination problems and a fragmented government
resulted in a more difficult transition.
In somewhat of an after note, the Author summarizes his case against
the arguments of globalization theorists about the declining power of the
10. Id. at 226.
11. Id. at266.
12. Id. at 255.
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state: "The transition to digital TV reveals that policymakers have not
passively accepted losses in their ability to organize the media sector.'
' 3
The two case studies show how regulatory changes actually increased the
power of the state in some areas while diminishing it in others. It is thus
better to speak about a restructuring or reconfiguration of the state as a
major consequence of globalization, rather than a retreat. And despite
globalization and the alleged tendency of globalization to produce
convergence in regulation, the governments of advanced industrialized
states remained sufficiently different from one another to produce different
policy responses to similar challenges.
This Book's main contribution is its careful analysis of the British
transition and its careful comparison of the transitions in the two countries.
I have a few quibbles with Galperin's facts and interpretations. I would not
have been as comfortable about pronouncing the British transition strategy
superior to the American. Neither transition has resulted yet in the
switching off of analog services. The projected date for the end of analog is
2009 in the U.S. and 2012 in the U.K. The British, like the rest of Europe,
were blindsided by rapidly increasing demand for high-definition TV sets
and programming-the Europeans decided to invest in a type of wide-
screen digital TV that did not easily upgrade to high definition. 14 Still, I
believe Heman Galperin has performed a great service in providing the
readers of this Book with yet another reason to believe that states still have
the desire and the power to shape markets even in this new and glorious
age of globalization.
13. Id. at 287.
14. Peter Feuilherade, Europe Lines Up for TV Innovation, BBC News World
Edition, Sept. 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/golprlfrl-/2/hi/technology/3652402.stm.
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